



K.N.BRUTENTS

National Liberation Revolutions Today

(Some Questions of Theory)

PART I



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КАРЭН НЕРСЕСОВИЧ
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CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	7
SECTION ONE. New Type of Democratic Revolutions	21
CHAPTER ONE. National Liberation Revolutions as a Special Form of the Revolutionary Process	23
CHAPTER TWO. Some Features of National Liberation Revolutions in Our Day	36
1. Socio-Economic and Political Aspects	36
2. A Component Part of the World Revolutionary Process	48
CHAPTER THREE The Motive Forces of Revolution	70
1. The Proletariat and the Peasantry	73
2. The National Bourgeoisie	93
3. The Petty Bourgeoisie and the Middle Sections	107
CHAPTER FOUR. Specific Ideological Features of Present-Day National Liberation Revolutions	126
CHAPTER FIVE. The Character of National Liberation Revolutions in Our Day	145
SECTION TWO. New Phase of the National Liberation Revolutions	161
CHAPTER ONE. New Phase of the National Liberation Revolutions and Its General Democratic Platform	165
CHAPTER TWO. Configuration and Balance of Class Forces	196
1. The Role of the Working Class and the Peasantry	196
2. The Stand of the National and the Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie	229

3. The Role of the Petty-Bourgeois Forces and Middle Sections	240
4. The Motive Forces of the Revolution at the New Phase	251
CHAPTER THREE. Some Ideological Processes After the Winning of Political Independence	266
CHAPTER FOUR. International Conditions for the Development of the National Liberation Struggle	289
CHAPTER FIVE. Some Factors Stimulating the Anti-Capitalist Tendencies in the National Liberation Process	310

INTRODUCTION

One of the key aspects of historical development and the revolutionary process in the postwar period is the tempestuous rise and vast scale of the national liberation movement, its transformation into an active and global factor in the anti-imperialist struggle and social progress, and the qualitative changes in the social content and forms of the movement. However "explosive" these developments may appear, their course was predicted by Marxism. In 1921 Lenin said: "...In spite of the fact that the masses of toilers—the peasants in the colonial countries—are still backward, they will play a very important revolutionary part in the coming phases of the world revolution."¹

The importance of the national liberation movement lies above all in that it is, in effect, the main channel through which the bulk of mankind—hundreds of millions of men and women in Asia, Africa and substantially in Latin America as well—are involved in the worldwide revolutionary process, and is also the high road along which their immediate historical destinies are being shaped.

The national liberation "explosion" in the postwar period has had an important part to play in that we now have more ground than ever before to designate the revolutionary process as being *worldwide*, implying not only the general crisis of capitalist structures and imperialist policy, but also the vigorous attacks on them from the opposing forces. It should

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 482.

be recalled in this context that in his speech at the Second Congress of the Comintern Lenin emphasised that the Congress could be well regarded as a World Congress, particularly because of the presence of "representatives of the revolutionary movement in the colonial and backward countries".¹

The national liberation movement as a whole entered the 1970s following deep-going changes. In the main, the colonial empires have been broken up, and a system of national states has taken shape and is being consolidated in the vast zone of the once subjugated countries. In many countries, the anti-imperialist national liberation revolutions have been going through a so-called *second, economic and social phase*.

There seems to be enough ground to say that just now the national liberation movement is at something like a turning point. A phase of its development, which could be designated as the postwar phase (to be more precise, it is the period of the disintegration of the colonial system) has drawn to an end or is in its closing stages.

Of course, for the most part this period ended either at the beginning or in the early half of the past decade (when, indeed, it was suggested that the national liberation struggle was entering a new phase). However, for a number of years after that the earlier socio-political tendencies continued to operate and even to predominate, with the old alignment of class forces basically remaining the same. Now, a new alignment and balance of class forces in the national liberation movement are taking shape on the basis of the changes in the social structure and in the platform of struggle, which, as the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties and the 24th Congress of the CPSU noted, has been acquiring a sharper social edge. As its social aspect is intensified, the movement tends to lose some of its "national" and acquire more "class" characteristics.

In the present circumstances, the old division of the movement into a revolutionary and a reformist wing (the latter now also appearing as the conciliatory one) as a rule in the main coincides with the social division, so putting the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 232.

exploiting sections and the exploited, working people on opposite sides of the barricades. The struggle between these trends is becoming pivotal to the development of the movement, as two opposed lines, two conceptions of the national liberation process are pitted against each other: the bourgeois-reformist approach, which is largely ineffective and is mostly oriented upon collaboration and close ties with world capitalism, on the one hand, and the revolutionary process, whose objective logic tends to invest it not only with an anti-imperialist but also variously with an anti-capitalist tenor, on the other. In these conditions, as L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the Party, "*the struggle for national liberation in many countries has in practical terms begun to grow into a struggle against exploitative relations, both feudal and capitalist*".¹

In contrast to the preceding period, in which the relations of political domination imposed by the colonialists were destroyed, thereby inflicting heavy blows at the political system of imperialism, the contest between the forces of national liberation and imperialism does not now assume such overt forms, so that the damage being done to the latter is not so obvious. Nevertheless, the liberation struggle has not only continued, but has, in a sense, gained in depth. It is aimed to eliminate economic dependence, to provide an adequate economic basis for national-state institutions, to overcome the archaic social forms and to restructure "in a fight" some of the essential economic ties and relations in the capitalist world.

In the past few years this aspect of the struggle has taken a new turn that makes it possible to speak of the emergence of a confrontation between imperialism and the developing countries with respect to the international capitalist division of labour and to neo-colonialism. The tendency to nationalise the property of foreign monopolies has swept through literally the entire third world—from Peru to India, from Libya to Madagascar. It has taken hold even in those countries that imperialists considered, and not without reason, their loyal clients and allies.

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1971, p. 23.

On the one hand, nationalisation is geared to the resurrection of the developing countries' sovereignty over their own natural resources. On the other, it promotes the independence of these countries in decision making with respect to the present and future of the economy, and makes it possible to pursue a policy that corresponds to their national interests.

Moreover, their actions against individual monopolies and some forms of exploitation led the developing countries to oppose the very system of neo-colonial exploitation. They demanded that their inter-state relations with imperialist nations be restructured on principles of parity.

L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, emphasised at the 25th Party Congress:

"It is quite clear now that with the present correlation of world class forces, the liberated countries are quite able to resist imperialist diktat and achieve just—that is, equal—economic relations."¹

He added: "From the rostrum of our Congress we again emphasise that the Soviet Union fully supports the legitimate aspirations of the young states, their determination to put an end to all imperialist exploitation, and to take full charge of their own national wealth."²

The period of nationalist "intoxication" into which public opinion in the once subjugated countries was plunged after the scrapping of the colonial regimes has ended or is in its final stages. There is a growing mood of social discontent among the masses, whose material conditions, contrary to their own expectations and the general promises of some nationalistic leaders, did not improve (and in some instances even worsened) with the winning of independence.

Despite the efforts of the neo-colonialists, who are looking to the class solidarity of the local bourgeoisie in the former colonies and semi-colonies, no solid or extensive compromise has yet been reached between that bourgeoisie and imperialism. Such an arrangement has been hampered above all by the

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy*, p. 16.

² *Ibid.*, p. 17.

objective anti-imperialist tendencies in the development of independent national capitalism in the countries of Asia and Africa at the present phase.

In addition, imperialism has vacillated and displayed inconsistencies in implementing its line with respect to the national bourgeoisie, and has not abandoned its attempts to re-establish its positions in the Third World, which it naturally expects to do on a different basis and in a different form. It regards the national liberation movement as the least stable element of the world revolutionary process.

Finally, there is a growing economic gap between the industrialised centres of capitalism and the newly liberated countries, which in the decades ahead could be an important source of political and economic instability throughout the world and generate situations leading to political upheavals with different ideological complexions.

There is every indication that the former colonial and dependent countries continue to be a vast area of social ferment, and a reservoir of already awakened and, especially, potential social energy, whose tendencies aim at resolutely rejecting exploitative relations, but which may be channelled in various directions.

At the present phase, the national liberation movement has become a most complex historical phenomenon. Even in the past, terms like "national liberation movement" and "national liberation struggle" were something like political generalisations used to designate more or less similar phenomena which were identical only in the main. This is even truer today. Behind these conceptions we now find an unprecedented range of forces involved in the national liberation struggle, their relations with each other, the vastly diverse conditions of their struggle and, finally, opposite ways of social development. Superimposed on this motley pattern and intensifying it today is the peculiarity which the revolutionary creativity of the peoples of the former colonies and semi-colonies tends to introduce into the forms of movement along the path of independence and social progress because of the specific conditions in the countries themselves and also in consequence of the specific features of the present-day international situation.

The national liberation movement in our day is the aggregate result of the existence and action of forces which differ importantly from each other, some of these arising anew and others modifying their forms and orientation in the struggle. These are the patriotic, revolutionary parties and political movements, and mass organisations whose activity rests on millions of men and women and which have acquired an important social complexion. These are the young states, and not only the revolutionary democratic states, but also the bourgeois states conducting a nationalistic and variously anti-imperialist policies and coming out against neo-colonialism. Action by these forces tends to be concentrated not only in the political but also, and increasingly, in the economic and spiritual spheres.

Furthermore, the national liberation movement in our day has been going forward both within the national and the international framework. In the international framework, it has taken the form of struggle against imperialism and the pro-colonialist governments allied with it, against the remaining colonial regimes, and the form of interaction with other anti-imperialist forces of the world. Within the national framework, it has taken the form of struggle against the remaining positions and influence of the imperialist monopolies in the young states, and against the reactionary forces.

For all the diversity of situations in the former colonies and dependent countries, *the process of national liberation* with a mainly *anti-imperialist tenor* continues to be the distinctive and unifying feature of that zone of the world, a feature which still warrants the use of the term "national liberation movement" as the most general designation of the main orientation in current social development there.

It was Marx and Engels who first established a connection, in theory and in proletarian policy, between the struggle for national liberation and the working-class struggle in the capitalist countries. They did not have in mind a general kind of solidarity bearing only on the emotional sphere, but a solidarity determined by objective factors and practised in joint struggle. They regarded this connection especially as a problem of internationalism, of political education of the

working class and its release from the bonds which held it tied to the bourgeoisie and its policies. Hence the well-known formula which says that "NO nation can be free if it oppresses other nations".¹ That was determined by the atmosphere of the epoch: capitalism had yet to grow into imperialism, while the national movement was above all a privilege of so-called civilised nations.

Despite the relatively modest scale of the national liberation movement of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples in that period, Marx and Engels fully realised its importance. Analysing the events in India, Afghanistan, China and other countries, they emphasised, in particular, that the stubborn resistance put up by the peoples of the East against the colonialists fettered the British reactionaries and hampered their action against the drive of the European revolutionary movement. In other words, the founders of scientific communism regarded the problem of solidarity between the working class and the national liberation movement in the light of revolutionary goals.

The reformists who took over in the West European working-class movement after the death of Marx and Engels turned their backs on these internationalist tenets. Lenin showed that such an approach could have sprung only from total indifference to the future of the socialist revolution and the national liberation movement.

Lenin devoted great attention to the problems of the national liberation movement in the East, which he treated both as a great humanist—let us recall his indignant comments about the "civilised" colonial plunderers—and as a brilliant politician and farsighted strategist of the worldwide proletarian revolution. Like the founders of scientific communism, Lenin concentrated on the revolutionary potentialities of the national liberation movement and the connection and relationships between it and the working-class struggle. Elaborating on the approach formulated by Marx and Engels, Lenin saw the connection not as any abstract solidarity or even as some kind of class charity, not as a product merely of some

¹ K. Marx, F. Engels, V. I. Lenin, *On Scientific Communism*, Moscow, 1972, p. 382.

"mutual sympathy", but as a necessary and militant alliance and joint action for the purpose of crushing a common enemy. Indeed, the very success of the revolutionary struggle on a world scale now depended on such joint action.

Lenin returned again and again, especially in the last decade of his life, to this vastly important problem of an alliance between the forces of national liberation and the international proletariat and the whole revolutionary movement. The idea of such an alliance became one of the basic elements of the communist strategy of world revolution. In the autumn of 1916, he wrote: "We shall exert every effort to foster association and merger with the Mongolians, Persians, Indians, Egyptians. We believe it is our duty and *in our interest* to do this, for otherwise socialism in Europe will *not be secure*."¹

Three years later, in November 1919, after the establishment of the world's first workers' and peasants' state, Lenin was equally emphatic, when he said: "The socialist revolution will not be solely, or chiefly, a struggle of the revolutionary proletarians in each country against their bourgeoisie — no, it will be a struggle of all the imperialist-oppressed colonies and countries, of all dependent countries, against international imperialism."² A statement which he made a year later shows the lines on which he was thinking. Addressing the Second Congress of the Communist International, Lenin stressed: "World imperialism will fall when the revolutionary onslaught of the exploited and oppressed workers in each country, overcoming resistance from petty-bourgeois elements and the influence of the small upper crust of labour aristocrats, merges with the revolutionary onslaught of hundreds of millions of people who have hitherto stood beyond the pale of history, and have been regarded merely as the object of history."³ This unambiguous "when" stresses Lenin's conviction of the need, which he keeps reiterating, to join the proletariat's onslaught with the "onslaught of hundreds of millions" of colonial slaves.

Since then the world has undergone vast changes. Socialism has scored a number of historic victories. The world socialist

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 67.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 30, p. 159.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 232.

system has been established. The Soviet Union and the socialist community have become an insuperable force. However, the tremendous growth of world socialism has not reduced the importance of its alliance with the forces of national liberation in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but helps to exert an immensely more important class influence on the course of development. That is the fundamental premise of the CPSU in elaborating and implementing the whole of its policy in that part of the world.

Today, in virtue of various circumstances, Lenin's approach to the question of this alliance is especially important. The point is that left opportunist and many nationalist ideologists of the Third World have clearly overrated the worldwide importance and revolutionary role of the national liberation struggle. On the other hand, it is impossible not to take a critical view of the stand of some influential forces in the Third World which are anti-imperialist-minded but which have failed to take a sufficiently stable attitude to world socialism. Their idea is to engage in political manoeuvring between the two systems, with occasional plunges into anti-Sovietism and anti-communism. Finally, the strategic aspect and the raw material problem aside, the developing countries do not now have a great part to play in the technico-economic and military balance of strength in the world.

From the Marxist standpoint, the forces of national liberation still have, even in the present conditions, and as Lenin had predicted, an important contribution to make to the final outcome of the struggle between the two world systems. The question of *how* the former colonial and semi-colonial world is to develop, *which way* the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America will take continues to be one of the cardinal issues of our epoch. The Third World has, in effect, become one of the most important front lines in the contest between the chief social tendencies and the chief ideologies of our day.

Accordingly, the Soviet Union's invariable solidarity with the anti-colonial forces, and its all-round cooperation with the young states to promote their independent and progressive development have a profound anti-imperialist content and are in line with the fundamental interests of the worldwide

liberation struggle. The April 1973 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, which discussed the Central Committee's international activity in implementing the decisions of the Party's 24th Congress, re-emphasised the need "to continue developing cooperation with Asian, African and Latin American countries".¹

In accordance with the whole course of the world revolutionary process, the question of alliance with the national liberation movement and the orientation of development of the once subjugated countries has now acquired both objectively and subjectively—in the light of the struggle between the two social systems—a largely different meaning than it had, say, in the early period of the Soviet state. At that time, it was largely a matter of *defence* of the first socialist revolution against imperialism, whereas today it is a question of carrying on the *offensive* against imperialism and world capitalism as a whole in order to do away with them.

The "captains" of the capitalist world are fully aware of this, and have said as much. Judging by their words and deeds, they regard the involvement of the former colonies and semi-colonies in the "Western way of life" as one of the major problems for the destiny of world capitalism. The social aspect of this problem was most clearly brought out by the late President J. F. Kennedy, who declared that the form the economic, social and political institutions in the Asian, African and Latin American countries assumed in the decades ahead would drastically affect the shape of the world "in which our children grow to maturity".² However, the slackener pace of the neo-colonialist expansion in the past few years, mainly by the USA, due to some extent to the failures of the "New Frontiers" policy, does not mean that imperialism has been losing its interest in the former colonies and semi-colonies or that it has effected a fundamental change in its attitude to that part of the world.

Imperialist policy regards the Third World above all as an arena for social expansion by world capitalism, as a formation, with its main aim in the area being the establishment of

¹ *New Times* No. 18, May 1973, p. 4.

² See, *The Department of State Bulletin*, April 22, 1963, p. 592.

capitalist relations, and prevention of close political, economic and ideological ties between the newly independent countries and the socialist world. In view of the highly intricate and confused socio-economic problems facing the developing countries, it would be entirely wrong to hope that the capitalist world will be unable to cope with these problems or that the spread of capitalist relations in these countries will merely increase its burden of contradictions. One should rather assume that this would also give world capitalism some important assets.

At any rate, the establishment of capitalism in the developing countries, the chauvinistic or ultra-leftist degeneration of influential forces of the national liberation movement in the Third World are two variants each of which could, in its own way, apparently complicate the further advance of the world revolutionary process.

Important changes which are unparalleled in the postwar period are now taking place in international relations. The restructuring of relations between the socialist and the capitalist states which has been started with the firm establishment of the principles of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation, the end of the war in Vietnam, the first few steps leading to a settlement in the Middle East, the marked improvement of the atmosphere on the continent of Europe, which was the world's powder-keg on two occasions within a half-century—all of this is evidence of important changes in the general trend of relaxing international tensions, stronger peace, and security of nations.

The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR noted that the increased role of emerging countries is now an important aspect in the development of international relations. The Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Congress stated: "Glancing at the picture of the modern world one cannot help noticing the important fact that the influence of states that had only recently been colonies or semi-colonies has grown considerably.

"It may definitely be said about the majority of them that they are defending their political and economic rights in a struggle against imperialism with mounting energy, striving to consolidate their independence and to raise the social, economic and cultural level of their peoples.

"The foreign policy of the developing countries has become visibly more active. This is seen in many trends—the political course of the non-alignment movement, and the activity of the Organisation of African Unity and of the various economic associations formed by the developing countries."¹

In these conditions, the developing countries, acting together with world socialism, can make an important contribution to the struggle to consolidate the detente and to extend it across the world, so as to make the positive processes in international affairs irreversible.

The stand taken by the young states is of especial importance in the light of the schemes being fostered by some imperialist and reactionary circles, who would like to induce opinion in the developing countries to oppose the detente, to arouse suspicion among the national liberation forces with regard to the Soviet Union and the socialist community, and so reduce the authority of socialism in the Third World.

How effective this resistance to the schemes of the international reaction is will largely depend on the strength and vigour of the anti-imperialist tendencies in the policy of the young states which have emerged from the national liberation struggle.

In this context, considerable interest for Marxist science and policy attaches to the problem of national liberation revolutions in our day, of their socio-economic, political and ideological features, their chief motive forces and their anti-capitalist tendencies. First of all this subject bears on some urgent practical matters like the probable course of the class struggle and lines of social development in the once subjugated countries over the historical period immediately ahead, the prospects for the development of contradictions between these countries and imperialism, the progressive potential of the various social forces involved in the national liberation struggle at the present stage, the role of revolutionary democracy and the political line to be taken with respect to it, and the present features of the alliance between world socialism and the forces of national liberation.

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy*, p. 16.

An analysis of these questions can be of substantial help in enriching the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the national liberation movement and in generalising the growing social experience of the peoples in the national liberation zone.

The general theoretical importance of the problem likewise merits attention, for it is latent with important matter for fundamental methodological conclusions concerning transitional socio-economic and political forms whose spread is a distinctive feature of the historical process in our day; there is also the relationship between the objective basis of progressive development and the subjective revolutionary factor, the importance of the new international situation for the development of the world revolutionary process, the changing balance of strength within the non-socialist countries, the modification of the course of the class struggle and the stand taken by the various social groups in these countries, the extent to which present-day petty-bourgeois socialism is progressive, and other questions.

It is quite natural, therefore, that many researchers have dealt with the characteristic features of national liberation revolutions in our day.

In this book I have tried to continue the elaboration of some aspects of the problem which I believe to be important and which have yet to be adequately analysed.

In Part One of the book I consider the specific features of national liberation revolutions in Asia and Africa in our day and the conditions of their development, including the premises for the emergence and expression of anti-capitalist tendencies in these revolutions. In Part Two I have dealt with problems connected with revolutionary democracy, the chief nonproletarian socio-political vehicle of these tendencies in the national liberation zone.

I have naturally made no attempt to produce a comprehensive analysis of these problems. Some of my considerations amount to a mere approach to the problem, especially because many of these processes are still at the "height" of their development.

When I say *present-day* national liberation revolutions I have in mind above all the processes of wartime and especially of the postwar period. Of course, *in principle* the new features dealt

with here are inherent in anti-colonial revolutions of the epoch of the general crisis of capitalism. But *in practical terms*, like many other phenomena whose emergence is connected with the October Revolution, these features tend to stand out most clearly and fully after a certain period, as a result of a process of "accumulation" of the social material generated by the October Revolution, which gave a start to social progress as a truly worldwide revolutionary process.

SECTION ONE

NEW TYPE OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONS

The epoch of the general crisis of capitalism is characterized by a new type of democratic revolutions. These revolutions are a special form of the revolutionary process, which is a result of the accumulation of the social material generated by the October Revolution.

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CHAPTER ONE

NATIONAL LIBERATION REVOLUTIONS AS A SPECIAL FORM OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS

The issue of the specific features of national liberation revolutions as a definite form of the social process and the content of this conception of "national liberation revolution" is one of the first which naturally arises before anyone seeking to characterise national revolutions in the middle and last third of the 20th century. This is due above all to the fact that this question is yet to be adequately elaborated.

The adoption of "national liberation revolution" as a scientific term and its extensive use provide a good illustration of the close connection and correspondence between Marxist terminology and the political reality and practice of revolutionary struggle which it reflects. This term (in Comintern documents, that is, before the formation of the world socialist system and the disintegration of the colonial empires, "national colonial", "national", "colonial" and "semi-colonial" revolution¹) was very widely used in Marxist sources as early as the Second Congress of the Communist International and in the 1920s, chiefly in connection with the 1924-1927 revolution in China.

However, the term became very widespread during the postwar upswing in the national liberation movement and the

¹ See, for instance, "The Programme of the Communist International", in the book *International Press Correspondence*, Special Number, Vol. 8, London, 1928, p. 1761; "Thesis on the International Situation and the Tasks of the Communist International, Adopted at the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International, 1928", London, 1929, p. 21; "Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies", in the book *International Press Correspondence*, Special Number, Vol. 8, pp. 1659-76.

collapse of the colonial system of imperialism. It is used in the documents of the CPSU and other Communist and Workers' parties, in scientific and popular writings, and has been further elaborated. The CPSU Programme, for instance, says that "the world is experiencing a period of stormy national liberation revolutions".¹ The statement issued by the 1960 Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow characterised the present epoch as a "time of struggle between the two opposing social systems, a time of socialist revolutions and national liberation revolutions".² The resolution of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU on the Central Committee's Report speaks of "the consummation of the national liberation revolution".³

At the same time, despite the ever more extensive use of the term "national liberation revolution" methodological and scientific publications frequently fail to give a clear-cut and straightforward definition of the specifics of this phenomenon as a special form of the social process.

Some authors are inclined to give too broad a reading to the term, ascribing to this revolution phenomena and processes which are more characteristic of social transformations. By contrast, others take a stand which logically deprives the term of any essential meaning. When using the term they fail, in effect, to see its specific content or do not feel the need to bring it out. They merely equate national liberation and bourgeois-democratic revolutions, using the corresponding terms as synonyms. Finally, some apply the term to any national liberation movement and to any act proclaiming national independence.

All of this shows the need for a further study of national liberation revolutions as a definite form of the social process so as to specify the content of this term.

First of all, I think, there is adequate political and scientific ground for bringing out national liberation revolutions as a special social phenomenon, a specific form of the revolutionary process, and on that basis to consider the conception of

¹ *The Road to Communism*, Moscow, 1962, p. 490.

² *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, Moscow, 1963, p. 38.

³ 23rd Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1966, p. 283.

"national liberation revolution" in order to produce its own definition.

The political ground for this consists of the important role of national liberation revolutions as a factor of historical development. Let us bear in mind that national liberation movements and revolutions have a long and stormy history, for the succession of historical periods so far has as a rule gone hand in hand with the growing social importance of these revolutions and movements. In the recent period they have already made up a substantial part of the "fabric" of the social process. Thus, Lenin observed that in Europe in the 1850s and 1860s and later bourgeois-national movements had been the main objective content of historical phenomena.¹

However, the national liberation movement has become most important in our own day. Some imperialist ideologists have responded to this fact in their own way, by designating the present epoch as "the age of nationalism".²

We shall consider below the scientific and theoretical grounds for regarding national liberation revolutions as a special form of the revolutionary process.

National liberation revolutions are revolutions stemming from national liberation movements and aimed to do away with foreign political, economic and ideological domination and oppression (including national colonial subjugation), and to set up sovereign states. Considering the question of the "national uprising", Lenin said: "It is an uprising aimed at the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 147.

² Hans Kohn, a prominent US sociologist and historian has called one of his books *The Age of Nationalism*. He tends to reduce the content of the national liberation movement to "nationalism", when he says: "In this age for the first time a common attitude includes peoples and civilisations all over the globe, and this under the sign of nationalism. Therefore this new age may be called the age of pan-nationalism." (Hans Kohn, *The Age of Nationalism. The First Era of Global History*, New York, Evanston, and London, 1962, p. XVI.) Kohn propounded the same idea about ours being "the age of nationalism", "the age of pan-nationalism on all continents" at the 12th International Congress of Historical Sciences, where he gave one of the main reports. (Hans Kohn, "Nationalism and Internationalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries" in: *XII Congrès International des Sciences Historiques*, Vienne, 29 août-5 septembre 1965. Rapports, Horn-Wien, 1965, pp. 193, 236, 240.)

achievement of *political* independence of the oppressed nation, i.e., the establishment of a *separate* national state."¹

The socio-economic tasks and class content of national liberation revolutions are determined both by the internal conditions of the given country and by the nature of the epoch in which they take place. Let us note, as a definite regularity, the fact that the social aspect of national liberation revolutions tends to become ever more pronounced from one epoch to another. At the same time, many social revolutions tend to have a growing national liberation aspect.

Every epoch leaves its imprint on national liberation revolutions. In his work entitled "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism", Lenin stressed that it is impossible to understand any national liberation war without an understanding of the general conditions of the epoch in which they unfold.² They are a part of the social fabric in the given epoch and an element—however varied in extent—of social reconstruction, of transition from one socio-economic formation to another, as historically obsolete or obsolescent relations are wound up, and have a social content corresponding to these processes.

Thus, national liberation revolutions in the epoch of pre-monopoly capitalism, an element of the anti-feudal and bourgeois-democratic transformation of social life in the Old and the New World, were as a rule variously bourgeois (bourgeois-democratic) in character. Their main social content was the fulfilment of bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic tasks.

But that is not to say that such revolutions—let alone other national liberation revolutions—can be simply or entirely identified with bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions, to say nothing of those which are usually designated as "classical". That there is a difference, and a substantial one, will be seen from the fact that although there have been no national liberation revolutions in the new period, or none to speak of, without a clearly bourgeois-democratic (bourgeois) content, many bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions were carried out without any national liberation content.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 62.

² See, V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 36.

This distinction depends above all on the importance of the *national* aspect, and the urge to ignore it springs from an epistemological underestimation of this aspect. Even when the national aspect is seen as no more than a *form* for the expression of the social content of national liberation revolutions—and that is an approach which I think is rather vulnerable—there would be need to start from the assumption that this is a form which is essential and which tends actively to develop into content. It would be safer to say that the national aspect is not mere form but tends importantly to modify the *character* of the revolution itself, investing it with a particular specifics and blending organically with its social substance. The task of overthrowing the national yoke, a form of social oppression exercised by a definite exploitative class or classes, however foreign, in itself has a social character and a direct bearing on the social content of national liberation revolutions. Let us recall in this context one of Lenin's ideas which, I think, may provide a methodological reference point in this matter. In his work entitled "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed up", Lenin said that the oppressed nation's struggle against the oppressing nation for its liberation was the "*real* social content" of uprisings in annexed countries.¹

The social content of national liberation revolutions in the epoch of pre-monopoly capitalism, while ultimately remaining bourgeois (bourgeois-democratic), also has essential distinctions when compared with the "conventional" bourgeois or bourgeois-democratic revolutions.

The social aspect is known to be crucial in characterising a revolution. Now and again, this unquestionable Marxist-Leninist thesis has been wrongly used as a basis for mechanically regarding the national factor in any revolution as being a subordinate one and no more. This approach may be true in the general historical sense and also in structuring a hierarchy of conceptions, but it fails to give the correct answer for practical politics, if one stops at this point.

The national aspect, while appearing as "secondary" with respect to the "purely" class aspect in the general historical and socio-economic plane, is not subordinate when one deals with

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 332.

the political aspects of national liberation revolutions. What is more, it is even capable of playing the leading role in such revolutions.

This is true of national liberation revolutions in our day, but it is also meaningful for revolutions in the past. Let us recall that Lenin characterised the American revolution at the end of the 18th century as a revolution aimed against colonial and feudal oppression, as "the national liberation war of the North American States".¹

A fundamental Soviet work, *Modern History*, says that the national liberation war led to liberation from colonial dependence, overthrow of British rule, and the establishment of a national bourgeois republic; it was also to have tackled the socio-economic tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and destroyed the pre-capitalist forms of exploitation: Negro slavery, indentured white labour, and the elements of feudalism in the agrarian system.² Let us add that these tasks did not have the leading role to play in the American revolution of 1775-1783, and it took another, bourgeois-democratic revolution in the USA in the 1860s to tackle them.

On the other hand, it would hardly be right to ignore the socio-economic aspects of tasks like the winning of independence and liberation from foreign rule and exploitation, if only because the national state provides "the best conditions for the development of capitalism"³ and is the best political form for developing the productive forces at a definite historical stage. It is not right to ignore the fact that these aspects are an organic component part of the content of national liberation revolutions.

The specifics of national liberation revolutions of the pre-imperialist epoch, as compared with "conventional" bourgeois-democratic or bourgeois revolutions, bear on many highly essential aspects of the revolutionary process: economic foundations, motive forces and their arrangement, class hegemony in the revolution, shifts in the sphere of power, etc.

The conflict between the new productive forces, developing

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 310.

² See, *Modern History*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1964, pp. 203, 204 (in Russian).

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 399.

within the entrails of the feudal system, and the old, feudal relations of production (and, accordingly, the conflict between the rising bourgeoisie and also the toiling classes, on the one hand, and the moribund class of serf-holding landowners, on the other) is the fundamental socio-economic basis of bourgeois revolutions.

At the same time, the main economic basis of national liberation revolutions is the conflict (which is, of course, mediated through socio-political relations) between the requirements of the productive forces, which need an *independent national framework* for their development, and foreign domination, which goes hand in hand with the plunder of the oppressed country, subjugation of its economic life to the purposes of this domination, and preservation of backward socio-economic forms. The social basis of the revolution is, accordingly, the conflict between the interests of the leading social force of the oppressed country and also of its people as a whole, and the interests of the ruling classes of the oppressor state, who get the lion's share of the benefits from exploiting the country. Lenin wrote: "For the complete victory of commodity production, the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, and there must be politically united territories whose population speak a single language, with all obstacles to the development of that language and to its consolidation in literature eliminated. Therein is the economic foundation of national movements."¹

For that very reason the epoch of capitalism has generated tempestuous and massive, national movements and national liberation revolutions involving the whole people. Indeed, the self-determination of nations slogan, the establishment of national states, was a political expression of these new requirements of the productive forces, which needed a national basis and a national framework for their progress. All these regularities continue to operate in our epoch as well, although the course of historical development and the concrete conditions may, as present-day experience shows, markedly modify the formation of nations and the emergence of national, anti-colonial movements.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 396.

The primary importance of the conflict of economic interests of the oppressed country and of the foreign oppressors is also quite evident from the experience of so-called classical bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions. Characteristically, the prelude to the revolutionary events in, say, the struggle of Britain's American colonies for independence is considered to be the so-called Boston Tea Party (December 1773), when the citizens of Boston dumped into the bay a large consignment of tea which had arrived on board British ships. The American settlers acted vigorously against Britain's attempts to stifle or at any rate to slow down the growth of industry and trade in the colonies of the New World. It was no accident that the 1765 Stamp Act and the Townshend Acts on new taxes on goods imported from Britain provided a powerful impetus for the settlers' liberation struggle.

The Netherlands revolution, the first of the bourgeois revolutions, tells the same story. The Spanish Government's oppressive policy and its tight grip on the country tended to undermine and destroy its economy and was the main drag on the development of capitalism. This policy became most harmful with the assumption of the Spanish throne by King Philip II. The Netherlands economy was dealt another series of heavy blows: a duty was imposed on raw materials imported from Spain, which was ruinous for the local silk-weaving industry, while Dutch merchants were barred from entry into the Spanish colonies. In addition, Spain's conflict with Britain disrupted trade ties with the British which were important for the Netherlands. A year prior to the largest national uprising of 1572, the Spanish Viceroy, the Duke of Alba, introduced the so-called *alcabala*, a tax which led to economic dislocation.

Other facts can also be cited from the history of the liberation struggle of Spain's colonies in South America. In 1809, a year before the start of the war of independence by the Spanish colonies in America, the Creole landowners of La Plata (and the Creole élite had subsequently a leading role to play in that war) presented a memorandum to the Spanish Viceroy on the need to allow the colonies to engage in free trade with foreign powers.

In national liberation revolutions, the arrangement of class forces is also somewhat different from that in conventional bourgeois-democratic (bourgeois) revolutions, where bourgeois forces and groups (in some instances, as in the 17th-century bourgeois revolution in England, also the bourgeoisified sections of the gentry, which, however, have a secondary role to play) and the masses of people are usually on one side of the barricades, and the feudal nobility, the landed aristocracy and the landowners, on the other.

Various other combinations are possible in the course of national liberation revolutions because there the "general class" and "general national" aspect of the revolution is much stronger not only in appearance but also *in substance*, for these revolutions frequently occur before the class hostility of the emergent bourgeoisie for the gentry and absolutism fully matures. Thus, in the 1848-1849 Hungarian revolution it was the middle gentry that had the leading role to play although it was to some extent affected by the process of embourgeoisement,¹ and had a stake in commodity relations and the commodity economy.

Marx and Engels drew attention to the peculiar pattern of class forces at the first stage of the Italian revolution in the 1840s. Engels, for instance, observed that the revolutionary national front brought together various classes and social forces, "from the princes and the gentry to the pifferari and the lazzaroni".²

The Polish gentry is also well-known to have led the national uprising of 1830-1831 in Poland, which Engels designated as the "conservative revolution".³ The leadership of the national uprising of 1863-1864 was largely in the hands of the "whites"—the landowning gentry—and also the bourgeoisie. On the strength of that experience of Polish national liberation revolutions, Lenin spoke of "gentry nationalism" and of "the liberation movement of the gentry in Poland".⁴

¹ See, R. A. Averbukh, *The Revolution and the National Liberation Struggle in Hungary. 1848-1849*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 36, 37, 38 (in Russian).

² Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 4, Berlin, 1969, S. 497.

³ *Ibid.*, S. 523.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, pp. 453, 433.

Finally, the gentry and the clerical elements played a primary role in the development of the Netherlands bourgeois revolution.

And here is the ostensibly paradoxical situation which took shape during the war of independence in the Spanish colonies in America in 1810-1826. The Creole élite, the landowners, took charge of the leadership in the war of liberation, and its triumphant completion and the elimination of the foreign oppression, which to some extent facilitated—in the broad historical retrospect—the development of capitalism, promoted the acceleration of economic, political and cultural development of the countries concerned, and here and there even led to the emancipation of the Negroes and proclamation of the equality of Indians, simultaneously enhancing the role and importance of the latifundists in many areas.

Let us recall that the feudal lords had an important role to play in the leadership of the national uprising in India in 1857-1859. The landowners were also prominent in the Filipino national liberation revolution of 1896-1898 and, together with the liberal bourgeoisie, acted as leaders of the revolution.

The participation of feudal forces and of the tribal aristocracy is also characteristic of some anti-colonial movements in the 20th century and national liberation revolutions in our own day, as in Indonesia, Malaya and Ghana. But what is most important is that many of these revolutions have gone forward in the presence of a markedly weak and sometimes virtually nonexistent national bourgeoisie, which opened up the way for hegemony by other social forces, including anti-capitalist forces like the proletariat and revolutionary democrats.

The Marxist-Leninist classics have shown that the question of power is the principal issue in any revolution. Lenin wrote: "The passing of state power from one *class* to another is the first, the principal, the basic sign of a *revolution*, both in the strictly scientific and in the practical political meaning of that term."¹ He also emphasised that "every revolution, if it is a real revolution, amounts to a class shift".²

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 44.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 25, p. 130.

Any social revolution, including a bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolution, is directed against a *class* which represents the historical past, a socio-economic formation on the way out.

The "classical" bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions directed their blows against regimes in which members of the gentry, and of the landowning and feudal forces either prevailed or predominated. They led to the installation in power of various factions of the bourgeoisie, as in the French bourgeois revolutions of 1789-1794 and 1830, in the English bourgeois revolution, etc. But, as a rule, they were not and could not be carried out against regimes epitomising the rule and interests of the bourgeois class.

Even on the question of power, national liberation revolutions take a different position. Considering the pre-imperialist epoch, we find that the variant closest to the "classical" bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions occurring in that period is a revolution aimed against the domination of alien feudal forces and one which, when triumphant, leads to the establishment of a regime in which power is shared—in varying degree—by the local nobility and the rising bourgeoisie.

But there have been instances in the history of national liberation revolutions when the overthrow of the rule of alien feudal forces led to the substitution for it of political prevalence and even domination of the local aristocracy and the landowners (Spanish America in 1810-1826, Brazil in the 1820s).

But it is more typical for the national liberation revolutions to be directed against the rule of a foreign *bourgeoisie*, although sometimes this rule had been exercised through a state in which pre-bourgeois groups and gentry and aristocratic elements still retained an influence, and to result in the installation of a growing local bourgeoisie (or pro-bourgeois forces) in the political leadership of society. A characteristic specimen of this is provided by the war of the North American colonies for their independence, and against the domination of the British bourgeoisie, culminating as it did in the installation in power of the local merchants, manufacturers and plantation owners.

This most generalised characteristic also applies to many¹ national liberation anti-colonial revolutions of the 20th century, but with the very essential distinction, of course, that these are aimed against the domination of a foreign *imperialist* bourgeoisie. Among the national liberation revolutions in the period of the crisis of the colonial system, illustrations are provided by the Kemalist revolution, which was aimed against the imperialist bourgeoisie of the Entente powers and which installed at the helm the Turkish bourgeoisie, chiefly the merchants. The Indian revolution is an example taken from the national liberation revolutions of the period of the disintegration of the colonial system. It was aimed against the rule of the British imperialist bourgeoisie and led to the installation in power of the Indian bourgeoisie, including its monopoly circles.

Every revolution is carried out primarily in the interests of definite class forces, which give a lead in the revolution, and whom it carries to the seat of power. Yet the people as a whole also tend to benefit from it in one way or another. Socialist revolutions apart, this "general class" aspect is much more characteristic of national liberation revolutions than of any other type of revolution.

The most important aspect of national liberation revolutions that needs to be brought out is that in the course of these revolutions there is a change not only in the social nature of power, as there is in "conventional" bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions, but above all in its national character. There is a change of ruling class both in social terms (although this does not always occur, as, for instance, in the substitution of the Indian bourgeoisie for the British bourgeoisie), and in national terms (in every instance without exception).

Ideological, cultural and psychological factors ("the psychology that is so important in the national question"²) are of

¹ The reservation ("many revolutions") has been suggested only by the fact that while *all* national liberation revolutions in the mid-20th century were aimed against the domination of monopoly capital, far from all of these have led to the establishment in power of the local bourgeoisie. Some national liberation revolutions have been carried out under the leadership of anti-capitalist forces.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 499.

especial importance in the origination and development of national liberation revolutions, and that is another distinctive feature. These factors are so important in awakening the national consciousness and rousing the people to national liberation struggle, they are so effective that they can lead to the development of the revolutionary process of national liberation on a scale which may be well in advance of any adequate formation of its objective economic and social premises.

The essential peculiarities of national liberation revolutions, meaning their economic and social foundations, the arrangement of classes, etc., make it possible for the revolutionary forces to be deployed and the liberation struggle to be conducted in a different pattern from that of the "conventional" bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions. This is doubly true of anti-colonial revolutions.

Let us note that when considering tactical tasks, one particular pitfall is to identify the national liberation revolution with the conventional revolution, to say nothing of the "classical" bourgeois or bourgeois-democratic revolution.

The whole of past experience of the liberation struggle in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America shows that this kind of identification, underestimation, to say nothing of neglect of the specific features of national liberation revolutions are always fraught with serious reverses for the revolutionary forces.

Such are some of the considerations which warrant the assertion that there is enough ground to bring out national liberation revolutions as a *special form of the revolutionary process*.

SOME FEATURES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION REVOLUTIONS IN OUR DAY

1. Socio-Economic and Political Aspects

The Marxist-Leninist classics have warned us that it is not right to deduce the concrete features of this or that revolution directly from the general conception of a definite type of revolution. Let us recall that Lenin warned the Marxists against considering social phenomena only in the light of rigid "general conceptions" structured in the course of past experience, and against their mechanical imposition on the living fabric of the historical process. He sounded the particular warning that attempts to deduce answers to concrete problems in the Russian bourgeois revolution in the first decade of the 20th century from the "general concept" of bourgeois revolution tended to "debase Marxism to liberalism".¹

This warning fully applies to national liberation revolutions. It is wrong directly to seek to deduce from the general conception of national liberation revolutions their specific features in *each* epoch, let alone a complex and peculiar epoch like the present one. I think it is right to say that our epoch, because of the unprecedented unity of the historical and the revolutionary process, and of the "internationalisation" of capitalism, exerts a vast influence on every aspect of national liberation revolutions in our day, giving them greater depth and diversifying their specific features. This, for its part, must make for important distinctions between these revolutions and

their predecessors in the epoch of pre-monopoly capitalism. Let us recall, in this context, what Lenin said about the national liberation movement in the period of bourgeois-democratic change in Europe: "The 1789-1871 era was of special significance for Europe. That is irrefutable. We cannot understand a single national liberation war, and such wars were especially typical of that period, unless we understand the general conditions of the period."¹

Apart from the general conditions of the epoch, the profound specifics of socio-economic and political conditions in the countries of the East and the consequent peculiarities of the revolutionary process there, as compared with European revolutions, something to which Lenin insistently drew attention when urging its study and consideration in practice, must also inevitably have an effect.

Of course, the reference here is not to that imaginable peculiarity which emerges from the writings of some analysts and which allegedly makes the historical regularities discovered by Marxist thinking "irrelevant" to the development of former colonies and semi-colonies. At the turn of the century Lenin already emphasised the fact that the development of the East had revealed features that were similar to those of the social process in the Western countries. Developments since then have again and again reaffirmed his observation and, accordingly, the total relevance of the general principles of historical development for the East as well. That is the only approach that will help to avoid exaggerating the specifics we find in the revolutionary process in the Asian and African countries and to determine its true extent.

Moreover, there is need to take account of a definite historical tendency in the development of revolutionary processes, with an eye to their objective and, especially, their subjective aspects. The revolutions of every epoch appear to unfold on the "shoulders" of past revolutions. They appear to start the struggle from a new bridgehead of which they had been assured by the victory of earlier revolutions, with the benefit both of their example, and of the maturity of

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 413.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 36.

their motive forces and the possibilities of the international support.

In view of this, the Marxist-Leninist classics warned against any mechanical imitation of past revolutions, and urged the full use of the new potentialities of the revolutionary struggle.

Of course, this is a process which is still about fully to unfold and which we have witnessed as living historical practice in our own lifetime. Quite naturally not all the specific features of this process have been fully clarified or established. The future is bound to introduce various and important modifications into our conceptions of it.

But much of what is most essential has already been fairly well clarified, and there is enough ground for an analysis of the specific features of national liberation revolutions in our day.

The first thing that needs to be said is that these are *anti-colonialist revolutions of the peoples which had been forcibly impressed into the colonial system of imperialism*. They are aimed against colonial oppression and exploitation by "capitalist imperialism".¹

Capitalism has always been inseparable from national oppression, although its development has simultaneously led to the awakening of national consciousness, intensifying the trend towards the consolidation of nations and promoting the establishment of national states on the ruins of the feudal system. Colonial plunder has been one of the main sources of primitive accumulation, and even pre-monopoly capitalism had already established its own colonial system.

However, imperialism has led to qualitative changes in colonialism. It has resulted in a vast extension of colonial and semi-colonial oppression in geographical territory, and in the *division of the world*. As far as the peoples of Asia and Africa are concerned, imperialism in effect ushered in the *era of their national subjugation*. Of the something like 80 independent countries now existing in the area, 25 were under the colonial domination of the imperialist powers by 1876, 57 by 1900, and 67 by 1914. The rest were semi-colonies.

But what is especially important is that under imperialism the socio-economic character of colonialism is substantially

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 263.

modified. Lenin wrote: "Colonial policy and imperialism existed before the latest stage of capitalism, and even before capitalism. Rome, founded on slavery, pursued a colonial policy and practised imperialism. But 'general' disquisitions on imperialism, which ignore, or put into the background, the fundamental difference between socio-economic formations, inevitably turn into the most vapid banality or bragging, like the comparison: 'Greater Rome and Greater Britain.' Even the capitalist colonial policy of the *previous* stages of capitalism is essentially different from the colonial policy of finance capital."¹ In his "Notes for Lecture on 'Imperialism and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination'", Lenin remarked that "imperialism is the era of the oppression of nations on a *new* historical basis".²

The main feature of the new type of oppression and exploitation is that its vehicle is monopoly capital, which has transcended the national framework, which operates as *international finance capital* and which has become the decisive force in all world economic, political and ideological relations. Lenin stressed that the then new epoch of *worldwide* colonial policy was "most closely connected with the 'latest stage in the development of capitalism', with finance capital".³ Colonial and semi-colonial subjugation became no more than a form of mankind's oppression and exploitation by finance capital, an element of its worldwide "operations", which was organically tied in and closely blended with the rest of its activity.

All these elements were expressed in the colonial system set up by imperialism, a system of political subjugation, economic exploitation and ideological oppression of Asian, African and Latin American countries, which were converted into agrarian and raw material appendages of the world capitalist economy. Although the colonial empires of the capitalist countries became a part of that system, it was in no sense a sum total of these, and could not be reduced to them. The establishment of the colonial system was, in a sense, the result of the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 260.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 39, p. 739.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 22, p. 254.

above-mentioned twofold process: an unprecedented extension of the zone of colonial and semi-colonial oppression, and the change in its character. Indeed, the colonial system resulted from a combination of colonial empires and other forms of national and colonial oppression and exploitation through which monopoly capital diversified its activity.

The colonial system meant:

In political terms—imperialist domination of the social life of the enslaved countries and, accordingly, the oppression of the larger part of mankind as an independently acting historical force, as a subject of international life, and its forcible exclusion from the natural course of worldwide development.

In economic terms—the inclusion of the subjugated countries, on the basis of the export of capital and the "transplantation" of capitalist production, into the world economic structure of capitalism as agrarian-raw material appendages, tied in every way to the metropolitan country and to the system as a whole in economic terms,¹ so that these countries' economic backwardness was entrenched and deepened. In its colonial expansion, imperialism expressed the objective tendency towards the internationalisation of the productive forces and the drawing together of nations, but did so in a form that was totally inadequate and, moreover, incompatible with the intrinsic meaning of the tendency towards unification.

In social terms—preservation in the colonial and dependent countries of backward feudal and pre-feudal relations because of the deliberate policy of imperialism aimed against the growth of the social forces capable of issuing a challenge to foreign domination and operating as the local rival of the

¹ The Portuguese imperialists also deemed it necessary to entrench this proposition in "legal" terms. Article 158 of the Constitution which was in force in Portugal until 1971 said: "The economic system of overseas territories shall be a component part of the economic system of the Portuguese nation and shall participate in the world economy through the medium of it." (*Le Monde diplomatique*, Paris, February 1969.) The new Constitution, which was in force until the April 1974 revolution, was introduced in Portugal in 1971. However, the provisions of the old Article 158 were written without any modification into several articles of that Constitution, and also into the Organic Law for Overseas Provinces of 1972.

imperialist monopolies. In this way, the subjugated peoples were doomed to growing backwardness and social stagnation so slowing down the rate and reducing the scale of worldwide social progress.

In ideological and spiritual terms—implantation of racism, artificial support of various relict forms of ideology, active resistance to the development of education in the oppressed countries, humiliation of the national dignity of the subjugated peoples, destruction of their cultural values, resulting in stagnation and even regress in the spiritual development of many peoples on the three continents, which cut across the interests of the progress of world culture and civilisation.

The changing nature of colonial oppression together with the overall qualitative swing towards the unity of the historical process have made the contradictions connected with colonialism not only much deeper and more acute but also much more broadly based and meaningful internationally.

The national question developed into the national and colonial question, becoming worldwide in importance as a question of the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the dependent countries and colonies from the imperialist yoke as part of the overall global contest between the revolutionary forces and imperialism.

That is why national liberation revolutions in our day which are aimed against colonialism are also *anti-imperialist* revolutions, and that is yet another and highly important specific feature. At the same time, the fact that these revolutions have an edge against obsolete pre-capitalist social relations in the former colonies and semi-colonies (feudal relations in some countries, and pre-feudal in others) makes no material difference, because imperialism is the main obstacle on the way to eliminating these relations.

As a result, while there is a very strong tendency for the basis of these revolutions and the antagonisms which generate them to be internationalised, they have also developed some important economic, social, political and ideological features which are specific. These may have been barely visible at the beginning of the epoch, but with the further development of the processes generating them have been expressed most fully in our day.

In contrast to the past, the *economic basis* of present-day national liberation movements does not boil down to the struggle for the establishment of a national market and its protection from foreign plunder, not only to the contradiction between the requirements of the national economy and the domination of various colonial powers, and not even, or so much, to the urge of the local bourgeoisie to secure control of the national market. It consists of the conflict between the requirements of independent economic development and the sway of the imperialist monopolies, a conflict involving the *whole system of the international capitalist division of labour*. What is more, this conflict is a part of the overall contradiction between the requirements of development of the productive forces in the capitalist world and the narrow framework of the socio-economic relations of imperialism.

The depth and grave consequences of these antagonisms will be seen from the vast gap between the developing countries which were made the object of colonial and semi-colonial subjugation, at the one pole, and the industrialised capitalist countries, at the other.

In this context, it may be interesting to note the level of socio-economic development of the former colonies and dependent countries, which is largely the result of imperialist domination.

Prevailing Socio-Economic Relations Among the Native Population in the Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries on the Eve of the Disintegration of the Colonial System

Prevalence of capitalist relations	Lebanon
Prevalence of semi-capitalist, feudal and semi-feudal relations	India, Egypt, Syria, Ceylon, Indonesia, Malaya, Philippines, Algeria and Tunisia
Prevalence of semi-capitalist and pre-feudal relations	Senegal, Zambia, Ghana, Liberia, Dahomey, Madagascar, Congo (Brazzaville), Ivory Coast
Prevalence of feudal and semi-feudal relations	Pakistan, Iraq, Jordan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Morocco, Nigeria, Cambodia, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Yemen

Continued

Prevalence of semi-feudal, pre-feudal and tribal relations	Niger, Chad, Mali, Cameroon, Sudan, Gabon, Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone
Prevalence of pre-feudal and tribal relations	Kenya, Malawi, Guinea, Upper Volta, Central African Republic, Tanganyika, Angola, Mozambique, Mauritania, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Somali *

* Slavery existed in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somali and some other countries.

By the time the colonial system fell apart, the subjugated countries were still, as a rule, at the stage at which feudal and pre-feudal relations were either predominant or prevalent (this was the main form of socio-economic relations in the life of the bulk of the population).

The data showing the scale of the economic lag of the former colonies and semi-colonies are also highly indicative.

GNP per Head in the Developed Capitalist and Formerly Subjugated Countries

(1967)*

US \$	Asian countries	African countries	Developed capitalist countries
Under 100	7	15	—
100-199	4	16	—
200-299	8	8	—
300-499	2	1	1
500-999	2	2	4
1,000-1,499	—	—	3
1,500-1,999	—	—	7
2,000-2,500	—	—	6
Over 2,500	—	—	1

* In view of their specific conditions, the table takes no account of Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Source: Calculated from *Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics*, Suppl. 1970, Geneva, 1970, pp. 50-53 (UN Conference on Trade and Development).

These data, in effect, give a statistical expression of the incompatibility of imperialist, colonial "integration" and the

requirements of development of the productive forces in the subjugated countries and in the world as a whole.

In contrast to the past, the *political basis* of national liberation revolutions consists not only of the antagonism between the subjugated people and the domination of this or that colonial power, but also of the conflict with the whole system of colonial oppression, the whole aggregation of inequitable relations between a handful of imperialist powers and the vast majority of the population of the non-socialist world. This political basis is rooted in objective reality and in our day is backed up by very essential subjective factors, which spring not only from the fact that the imperialist powers, despite the contradictions which divide them and which are frequently aggravated, seek to act in a common front against the liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. They are also reinforced by the fact that the USA, now the chief imperialist power, has, in effect, been acting as a universal guide and guardian of the neo-colonialist forms of oppression and exploitation.

In contrast to the past, the *social basis* of national liberation revolutions no longer consists of a competitive fight mainly between the bourgeoisie of the ruling and subjugated nation, but as a rule of the antagonism between all the main social forces of the enslaved country, the peasantry in the first place¹—in accordance with the typical level of development in these countries and the social condition of that class—and the monopoly bourgeoisie of the metropolitan country, and also world monopoly capital as a whole.

A tendency of historical development to note is the growing aggravation in the period of imperialism and the internationalisation of the contradictions which generate national liberation revolutions, and the interconnection and interrelation between these two processes. There can hardly be any doubt, for instance, that in this final third of the 20th century, with the worldwide scientific and technological, and social revolutions in full swing, the relegation of hundreds of millions of men and women into what may be called the margin of world progress,

¹ Or the peasantry's role in this respect is at least as important as that of the local national bourgeoisie.

the gulf between the condition of a handful of industrialised states in the capitalist world and the majority of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, together with the backwardness of the social relations prevalent in these countries, are more than ever before incompatible with the requirements of the historical process and the interests of mankind as a whole.

Indeed, that the situation is intolerable is being realised by millions upon millions of these people, who are fully resolved to put an end to this state of affairs.

In short, national liberation revolutions in our day tend at root to transcend the national framework and to be internationalised; as a result, in one way or another, these revolutions are aimed against the *whole* colonial system, against imperialism *as a whole*. The conflicts which generate them now appear not only as a part of the general contradiction between all the subjugated peoples and imperialism, but also as a part of the worldwide antagonism between the forces of democracy and socialism, on the one hand, and the forces of oppression and reaction, on the other.

National liberation revolutions in our day resolve the contradictions generating them not only on a national, but also on an international basis. As a rule, the national liberation movement has, from the very outset, also an *international aspect* and enjoys the support of all the revolutionary and progressive forces of the world.

National liberation revolutions in our day *are not confined to a winning of political independence* and the establishment of national states. In our day, the very problem of national liberation has, in effect, been importantly modified. It now covers a much more extensive range of tasks, including also the economic emancipation of the former colonies and semi-colonies.

This is due to the *nature of colonial and semi-colonial oppression*, under which the economic aspect is not confined to commercial or fiscal levies or downright plunder, but is expressed above all in the conversion of the subjugated country into an economic appendage of the metropolitan country and of the whole world capitalist economy, to which it is closely tied.

This is due also to *the nature of the oppressors, the imperialist*

monopolies, which operate on an international basis and which rely on the economic structure inherent in imperialism.

Finally, the fact that the national liberation problem is now no longer confined to political self-determination is also due to the *general growth of the importance in our day of the economic basis for state sovereignty*.

Of course, even in the pre-imperialist epoch national liberation revolutions had substantial economic foundations and economic consequences. But in that period the task of the national liberation revolution was mainly to create the political prerequisites for tackling economic tasks. As a rule, the economic dependence of the colonies was entirely or almost entirely determined by their subjugation to the metropolitan country, whereas now it is also determined by their position within the system of the international capitalist division of labour. In that period, the economic lag of the subjugated countries was not profound, for now and again the dominant type of social relations in these countries was the same as in the metropolitan countries. Accordingly, in the past the rupture of political ties between the colonies and the metropolitan country provided most of the solution for the national liberation problem. The national state and the spontaneous development of local capitalism were able to ensure relatively rapid release from economic dependence. That is what happened, for example, with Britain's North American colonies, following their successful war of independence, which ended with the establishment of the United States of America.

The situation, however, tended to change with the onset of the imperialist stage. The countries winning political independence *in this period* do not cease to be economically dependent and exploited. The imperialist monopolies frequently retain their foothold in these countries' economy, whose subordinate status in the capitalist economic system is preserved, so keeping them in the condition of a "world village".

Of course, the world socialist system and its support do provide the emergent countries, despite their flimsy economic basis, with opportunities for exercising real independence, *on the condition* that they rely on the socialist community and pursue a resolute anti-imperialist policy, and also develop close ties with each other. But it is also well known how the political

independence of many young states is limited primarily because of their economic backwardness and the influence exerted by the imperialist monopolies on their economic life.

The full importance of this factor will be seen from the experience of the biggest and most developed states which had once been colonies, like India. This country is usually — and with good reason — referred to as an effective specimen of the national state which arose on the ruins of colonial domination and enjoys real independence. Still, its experience, especially in the period which was marked by serious economic difficulties, clearly shows that the imperialist powers, making use of the survivals of the colonial past in India's economy, have sought to curtail its freedom of decision-making on domestic and foreign policy issues.

It is also quite obvious that the independence of most young national states in present-day conditions frequently rests on what cannot be strictly called their "own" basis. In many highly essential aspects, it is frequently not so much a natural reflection of the internal situation in these countries, as a product of the present balance of strength in the world arena and the support coming from the socialist community.

To all this one must also add the fact that the importance of the economic tasks of national liberation also tends to grow in consequence of the scientific and technological revolution, which adds an especially keen edge to the problem of the economic gap between the advanced industrialised capitalist countries and their former possessions.

However that may be, these countries' economic subjugation to international finance capital sets before national liberation revolutions the task of winning economic emancipation. At the same time, the emergence and consolidation of the socialist system and the elimination of the undivided sway of the monopolies in the world economy provide real opportunities for fulfilling this task.

While national liberation revolutions in our day continue to be *political* revolutions aimed at national self-determination, just as their historical predecessors had been, they also *have a special phase aimed to win economic independence, to secure economic release from imperialism*. This phase is pivoted on socio-economic progress.

2. A Component Part of the World Revolutionary Process

National liberation revolutions in our day unfold in a totally new world situation. Of course, every national movement is aimed to eliminate foreign oppression and exploitation but, as I have said, every epoch and its socio-economic relations and regularities leave an imprint on the liberation movement. That is why the social aspect of national liberation revolutions is most amply developed in the present epoch.

The preceding historical period was saturated with struggle between the two formations, capitalism and feudalism. It was the epoch of rising capitalism, with the bourgeoisie at its centre. That is why from the 16th to the 19th century, national liberation movements and revolutions were, in effect, an element of the worldwide establishment of capitalism. As a rule, they helped to clear the way for the development of national capitalism. Naturally, I have in mind the national movements which could be regarded as contemporary in the context of the given epoch.

As a result, the social horizons of national liberation revolutions were, as a rule, confined to the framework of the capitalist formation, helping to break down only one form of social oppression. This oppression was, *in part*, oppression by an alien exploiting class of the people of another nation, and *in part*, boiled down to relations between the exploiting classes of different nations. All these revolutions were a part of the transition from *one exploitative formation to another*, and in this sense did not transcend the framework of similar-type socio-economic relations.

Even in the 20th century, before the October Revolution, national liberation revolutions and movements were basically—and this is a point which Lenin drew attention to—a part of the worldwide bourgeois-democratic transformation. Let us recall that in 1912 Lenin said that Sun Yat-sen's efforts to keep China off the capitalist way were "utopian".¹

National liberation revolutions in our day face a special, imperialist form of oppression and, most importantly, unfold

¹ See, V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 165-69.

in a fundamentally different epoch, in which socialism has been growing into the decisive force of world development, an epoch with the proletariat at its centre.

How then is the impact of the regularities of the present epoch on national liberation revolutions expressed?

In contrast to the whole of past experience, national liberation revolutions in our day are an element of the worldwide revolutionary process, which ultimately leads to *transition from an exploitative to a non-exploitative formation*, from capitalism to socialism. That is the key characteristic feature of national liberation revolutions in our day, which gives rise to all or almost all the other features and which determines the development of these revolutions, their social content and social prospects.

National liberation revolutions today can have a new historical role to play, for their social potential and prospects are much richer and more progressive than those of their historical predecessors. In virtue of various economic, social and political prerequisites, which are reflected in concentrated form in the character of the present epoch, these revolutions also contain a tendency—more or less explicit—towards the elimination of every form of oppression. It is true that the political self-determination of nations and even the new task of the national liberation revolution—economic emancipation from imperialism—fall within the category of general democratic purposes, which in purely nominal terms may be achieved within the framework of capitalism. But in practice, the system of imperialist exploitation and the monopolies, by throwing up obstacles to their achievement, obstacles which can hardly, if at all, be overcome under capitalism, largely impel the revolution to take the path of social progress.

The capitalist prospect has ceased to be the only possible one, so that the collapse of colonial oppression can now open up the way for social development in another direction and in social and political forms which accord with that prospect. In other words, there is now the problem of socio-economic *alternatives*, the problem of *choice* of way for social development in the liberated colonies and semi-colonies.

Many speakers at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties dealt with the substantial

shifts in the social content of national liberation revolutions. Khaled Bagdash, General Secretary of the Syrian Communist Party's Central Committee, declared, for instance, that in some Arab countries the national liberation movement had been "enriched with a new social content". Almost the same formula was used by the head of the Lebanese delegation when he said, having the progressive régimes chiefly in mind: "This has imparted a new social content to the national liberation movement; it is directed both against imperialism and capitalism."¹

Incidentally, the special concern displayed by imperialism in developments in the Third World, its hostile attitude to the left-radical section of the national liberation forces and its strategy in the area are determined as much by the progressive social tendencies in the content of the national liberation movement as by economic considerations.

The new social aspects of national liberation revolutions and their tendency to develop into anti-capitalist processes were brought out with sufficient clarity even while the colonial system of imperialism was disintegrating, thereby demonstrating in practice the possibility of socially different ways of escape in the present epoch from the state of subjugation and development of national liberation, which could be designated as *socialist*, *revolutionary democratic* and *bourgeois*, respectively.

The changing social content of national liberation revolutions in our day is an expression of their close connection with the worldwide revolutionary process.

One of the qualitative specific features of the national liberation revolutions in our day is that they are all much more "subject" to the regularities of the period, for the character of the epoch tends to exert a much more profound, immediate and, perhaps, fundamentally different influence on these revolutions, so that its regularities leave a much more essential imprint on national liberation revolutions. This is due to the fact that in our day the historical process is more coherent than ever before, and also to the very nature of the new formation,

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969, Prague, 1969, p. 74.*

which is profoundly internationalist in substance and in the regularities governing its formation and development.

National liberation revolutions in the pre-monopoly capitalist period were a part of the worldwide bourgeois-democratic transformation only in the broad historical plane, and to some extent also of the advance towards national liberation. To a much greater extent than present-day national revolutions they remain a succession of local events which were chronologically and geographically separated. What is more, these revolutions were an element of the said worldwide process chiefly *in objective terms*, there being no important subjective ties between the national movements.

Today the situation is quite different. Development in the whole of our epoch has been marked by active, comprehensive and class-conscious struggle between the two antagonistic systems, with all the major world issues being decided in the context of this struggle. The national liberation revolutions themselves in effect present a "field of confrontation" between the ideas of socialism and capitalism, in the course of which the question of the extension of the geographical framework of definite social relations is ultimately being decided. This has a significant influence in determining the nature of the struggle for national liberation, frequently stimulating or feeding the tendency towards a deepening of the social content of national revolutions.

At the Second Congress of the Communist International, Lenin said: "In the present world situation following the imperialist war, reciprocal relations between peoples and the world political system as a whole are determined by the struggle waged by a small group of imperialist nations against the Soviet movement and the Soviet states headed by Soviet Russia. Unless we bear that in mind, we shall not be able to pose a single national or colonial problem correctly, even if it concerns a most outlying part of the world. The Communist parties, in civilised and backward countries alike, can pose and solve political problems correctly only if they make this postulate their starting-point."¹

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 241.

This idea, which was formulated in the early years after the October Revolution, is of great methodological importance today, when the multinational Soviet state has entered its second half-century and has grown into a powerful global force, and when its experience in solving the fundamental social and national problems is having an especially profound influence on the course of world developments.

National liberation revolutions are now a socio-political phenomenon of world importance and an integral part of the coherent revolutionary process which has a single basis. The motive forces of these revolutions operate along a common course of worldwide revolutionary struggle, of which the world socialist system and the international working-class movement are highly important streams, and of which the world proletariat is the leader. Speaking of the liberation movement which had started in the countries of the East, Lenin stressed that these countries "are being drawn into—have already been drawn into—the revolutionary struggle, the revolutionary movement, the world revolution",¹ into the "general maelstrom of the world revolutionary movement".²

An important historical tendency in the development of many national liberation revolutions in our epoch consists in their drawing closer together, through the enrichment of their social content, with the other forces of the world revolutionary process and in the full expression on that basis of their progressive role. This is determined both by the objective dialectics of the revolutionary process itself and its orientation against the common enemy and by the interaction of the streams of the worldwide revolutionary struggle and the impact of its proletarian vanguard.

From this follows a conclusion of fundamental importance: in present-day conditions, it is impossible to gain a correct understanding of national liberation revolutions—their specific features, their developments, their orientation, indeed, their very origination—in the light, exclusively, or mainly, of narrowly national conditions in the subjugated countries themselves. The international factor, the worldwide contradic-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 350.

² *Ibid.*, p. 499.

tions are of tremendous and frequently crucial importance in determining the specific features of national liberation revolutions, for these leave their own imprint on every aspect of these revolutions, an imprint which is "formative".

Of course, even in the past, national movements did not at all develop in isolation from the world situation, which frequently determined their outcome. There are many instances in history of feudal reactionaries hastening from abroad to help out those who were trying to stamp out national movements, while bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democrats gave these movements their support.

But in present-day conditions the role of the international factor has sharply increased *in quantity* and modified *in quality*. First of all, international relations are so closely interwoven, while the state and course of the whole revolutionary process has an active influence on the development and prospects of each of its contingents. Direct and indirect support from world socialism has an immediate effect on the development of the national liberation movement.

Furthermore, in the past the international situation could determine the success or failure of this or that national movement, but it was incapable of exerting a decisive influence on their social prospects. Finally, foreign intervention, whenever it occurred, sprang primarily from the interests of the powers and the ups-and-downs of their imperial policy, but was not a form of clash between the forces representing different, let alone antagonistic, socio-economic formations. That is why the Russia of the feudals and the landowners could support the rising bourgeoisie in the Balkans against feudal Austria-Hungary, or, like the France of Louis XVI and absolutist Spain, the North American bourgeois democrats fighting against Britain. Meanwhile, capitalist Britain was helping feudal Turkey to suppress the struggle for Egypt's independence and supported the sanguinary suppression of the national revolution in Hungary.

Today, *this type* of class combination is, as a rule, inconceivable. That is not to say, of course, that there is now no rivalry between the capitalist powers or that it has been relaxed. The rivalry is not only there but it has in many respects been intensified and is being frequently used by the forces of

national liberation for their own interests. This is exemplified by Anglo-American and especially Franco-American relations over the struggle for influence in the Middle East, the Maghreb, some African countries, and so on.

However, all the numerous expressions of rivalry between the imperialist powers in the national liberation zone are of a fundamentally different social-class character than those I have cited from past history. They *do not and cannot operate as factors of active support of the forces of another social system*, of another socio-economic formation, they do not and cannot lead to alliances with these forces, with the socialist contingents of the national liberation movement. Moreover, these contradictions taken together are not of any importance on their own, for they are influenced by the global interests of imperialism by which they are largely moderated and governed.

The whole of postwar experience shows that despite the contradictions dividing them, the imperialist powers seek to coordinate their actions in the major battles of the national liberation movement. Whenever truly important interests in the contest between socialism and capitalism are affected in the zone of national liberation, whenever the positions of imperialism as a whole are at issue, the imperialists are guided by the considerations of their global anti-socialist, anti-revolutionary strategy, and bend every effort to act in a common front. Indeed, this is reflected in the emergence of a phenomenon known as "collective colonialism", an important feature of neo-colonialism.

Of course, now and again, however rarely, some imperialist powers act against others in the course of conflicts in the Third World which are of important and, one might say, fundamental significance for imperialism, as in the 1956 Suez crisis. But this, too, is due largely or even above all to the urge to safeguard the "supreme" interests of the capitalist system.

Unless one takes account of the fact that national revolutions in our day are much more closely connected with the international situation, it is hard and perhaps even impossible to explain many of the most important phenomena in the development of the national liberation struggle, like the fact

that now and again national movements, in terms of origination in some areas, and in terms of programme, in others, appear to develop prematurely, outstripping the formation and maturity of the socio-economic foundations which had once been considered indispensable. It is in the light of the great role of the international factor that one comes to understand the establishment of organisations with an anti-capitalist platform of national liberation in countries with very strong survivals of pre-feudal relations, where the class stratification is embryonic, where there is virtually no proletariat or local bourgeoisie, and where there is only a handful of national intellectuals.

An eloquent illustration of this is the emergence of Marxist groups in some Arab countries which are dominated by early medieval relations. The establishment of a revolutionary democratic party in Mali, which has proclaimed Marxism-Leninism as its world outlook, is equally characteristic.

Consider also the striking discrepancy between the political platform of those who took part in the armed uprising in some parts of the former Congo (Kinshasa) led by Pierre Mulele and local socio-economic conditions which invested the movement, quite irrespective of the desire of its leadership, with something like a tribalist character. Their document, Political Lessons, together with the Guerrilla Order, which were circulated among the insurgents and which they constantly carried with them, for example, said that capitalist society was divided into two classes—the rich, or the capitalists, and the poor, or the workers and peasants, and that in the Congo, capitalism was divided into two categories: foreign, or imperialist, and local reaction, etc. At the same time, the insurgents were frequently swayed by tribal usages, superstitions and fetishistic notions.

The fact that now and again there is no correspondence between the level of socio-economic development in this or that emergent country and the scope, depth and general orientation of the national liberation movement after the winning of independence is also largely due to the impact of international conditions. Finally, if one takes the predominantly local standpoint, it is impossible to explain the broad spread of socialist conceptions in the once subjugated countries either.

While the emergence of the communist movement in the colonies and semi-colonies may be due to local situations and may be closely connected with national conditions, the vast importance of the international factor for the existence and development of this internationalist trend in the national liberation struggle is quite obvious.

The Communist parties of the developing countries have exerted and continue to exert an important influence on the social content and national liberation slogans by their platform and activity. There is unquestionable evidence of this in the political and social propositions not only of the revolutionary democrats but also of the much more "moderate" factions of the national movement.

Here, the Communist parties and progressive forces of the capitalist countries also have an important part to play. Some Communist parties of the metropolitan countries have used special organisational forms to extend ideological assistance to national liberation leaders, such as the groups for the study of Marxism set up by the French Communists. Deputies from the French colonies were included in a common parliamentary group with the Communists. Characteristically, many of the revolutionary democratic leaders of the national liberation movement were in close touch with the progressive circles of the metropolitan country.

The impact of the international factor on the national liberation movement is expressed through the Communist parties also because they have, as a rule, followed a common line closely concerted with the overall strategy of the worldwide class struggle as formulated and implemented by the communist movement.

From the qualitatively new stage in the internationalisation of the historical process, as also from the internationalisation of the basis of national liberation revolutions in our day and their overall orientation against imperialism and the colonial system as a whole, from the similar-type contradictions which engender them, there spring the strong objective and subjective bonds between the national liberation struggle in the various countries.

The Marxists do, in effect, take account of this aspect of the matter when they speak about the present-day national

liberation movement and its general features, and when they regard it as a special stream of the worldwide revolutionary tide, and national liberation revolutions in various parts of the Third World as component parts of that stream.

For all the contradictions and divisions between present-day national liberation movements and their participants, the latter are frequently already aware of their common interests and seek to establish direct ties with each other. The Afro-Asian solidarity movement, the movement for the solidarity of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the movement for African unity and the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the formation of the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations, the liberated countries' efforts to concert their economic policy, to set up various associations and regional organisations and to act together in resisting the imperialist monopolies, many aspects of the activity of the Arab League in its present form, etc.—all these are, in effect, nothing but an expression—however varied in degree and form—of the ties between the national liberation movements of our epoch.

Of course, one must be aware of the framework within which it is right to consider the unity of the national liberation process. Despite the similar-type and internationalisation of the contradictions generating the national anti-imperialist movements, only the *concrete* forms in which these contradictions are expressed can help to determine the nature and the course of development of the revolution in each country.

When considering the national liberation movement as a part of the world revolutionary process, one must reckon with the fact that the character and structure of the social system opposing them and the *liberatory, anti-imperialist* substance of these movements provide the objective basis for the interrelations between the component streams of this process, for the link-up of the working-class and the national liberation movement in the common struggle. One aspect of this basis is the absolute necessity to unite the forces of these movements for victory over imperialism.

Interconnection within the framework of the world revolutionary process is a fundamental premise for alliance and

interaction between the forces of national liberation and socialism. But while the objective interconnection between the leading revolutionary forces of our day in their struggle is secured spontaneously, by the very course of social development, alliance between them results from an *awareness* of the interconnection and community of interests. It is established by the *policies* pursued by these forces, and is not something that is given once and for all. It depends on their policies, on the extent of their awareness of the common interests, and on their readiness and ability to translate it into joint action and militant solidarity.

Neither the objective nor, in particular, the subjective aspects of the interconnection between the working-class and the national liberation movement within the framework of the world revolutionary process remain immutable, and from this it follows that the alliance of the revolutionary forces is itself *historically rooted and dialectical*.

While the unity of the world revolutionary process and the interconnection between its various contingents provide constant premises for their cohesion, alliance between them and its forms tend to develop and change together and in accordance with the development of these contingents themselves and of the revolutionary process as a whole. The historical tendency is for the diversity of the forms of this alliance to be multiplied to cover more and more new spheres of their relations with each other.

The distinction between the objective and the subjective aspects of the interconnection between world socialism and the national liberation movement is of practical importance in international affairs. Let us recall, for instance, the Soviet Union's role as a powerful factor of support for the liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. But this role has its *objective aspect* (the very existence of the USSR, its overall attitude of solidarity with the cause of national liberation and the influence of this factor on the balance of world forces and imperialist policies) and the *subjective aspect* (direct assistance and support from the Soviet Union on a state-to-state basis, through political parties, mass bodies, etc.), although it is hard to separate the two in practice.

The very existence of the USSR is in many ways the material, moral-political and frequently ideological—notably as an example in realising the right of nations to self-determination—mainstay for the struggle of the national liberation forces (even when their socio-political make-up and anti-communist prejudices may prevent the Soviet Union from giving them direct support). Indeed, the leaders of the young national states usually make a point of thoroughly considering this side of the matter when they start developing contacts with the socialist states. Commenting on the “determination” of the leaders of the Philippines to do some “bridge-building to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” and to establish trade relations with them, one magazine said that this was “just part of a moderate Philippine desire to be less dependent and closely tied to the US”. It added: “In the present Philippine context, the volume of such trade is of less importance than the simple fact that it is occurring.”¹ But the Soviet Union, as a powerful factor of national liberation, exerts a much more substantial influence when its objective role can be backed up by alliance and interaction with the forces of national liberation, active and direct assistance and concerted action.

In principle, there is the same distinction between the objective and the subjective aspects of the interconnection between the world communist and the national liberation movement. It is one thing for the international communist movement to play a part as the most influential political trend of our day and a powerful factor favouring the struggle of the national liberation forces, say, in the concrete context of the anti-imperialist movement of the Arab peoples. It is something else again when as a result of definite progressive advances in the position of some influential parties and forces in the Arab countries many Communist parties are enabled to arrange direct contacts with these parties, to coordinate important acts with them, thereby importantly enhancing support for the Arab peoples' just struggle against imperialist aggression.

The facts show the great importance of the interconnection between the struggle of the international working class, the

¹ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Hong Kong, February 13, 1969, p. 272.

vanguard of the revolutionary struggle, and the national liberation movement both for the successful advance of the worldwide revolutionary process and for the development of each of these forces, and especially for the national liberation movement.

The whole development of the national liberation struggle—its course and forms, chronological framework, major milestones and evolution of content—show that this struggle is connected with the unfolding of the world revolutionary process and the consolidation of socialism. What is more, there is some “parallel” development of these great revolutionary forces.

First of all, this is well illustrated, relatively speaking, by the quantitative aspect of the dynamic of the national liberation movement: the extension of its scale and the growing tide of *victorious* national revolutions, beginning with the October Revolution in Russia and the interwar period to the subsequent period, and from the 1940s to the 1950s and 1960s, with its obvious dependence on the balance of strength in the world arena, and on the might of the socialist community confronting the imperialist camp.

The peoples which became the object of colonial expansion are known to have persistently stood up for their independence. Their condition was especially complicated in the period of imperialism. Local capitalism, which was building up in the enslaved countries, despite all the obstacles erected by the colonial powers, still played its traditional role of stimulator of national self-awareness and extended the basis for a national movement. But in the consequent acute contradiction between it and world capitalism, which already operated as the greatest oppressor of the lagging nations, the balance of strength clearly was not in favour of the historical “late-comer”, local capitalism, especially because imperialism’s oppressive policy was an expression—however ugly in form and ultimately doomed to destruction—of the growing objective tendency towards economic integration and national approximation. At the same time, the inclusion of the colonies in the international capitalist division of labour also seriously hampered their separation from the oppressor countries in the purely economic sense.

Additional political obstacles also arose. Apart from the traditional social support of the colonialists (feudal-tribal élite, landowners, etc.), new social forces emerged in the subjugated countries which acted as direct agents of imperialism, like the commercial and comprador bourgeoisie. The economic growth of the emergent national bourgeoisie went forward not only in struggle against foreign capital but also to some extent in collaboration with it, though not on a basis of equality.

On the other hand, sizable sections of the population in the metropolitan countries found themselves involved in the colonial policy, something that helped to extend the socio-political basis on which the ruling classes relied on pursuing this policy. Technical progress and the unprecedented build-up of imperialism’s war machine gave the colonialists a vast superiority over the patriotic forces.

The result was a peculiar situation. Apart from some exceptional instances, there was now need not only for a marked rise of the movement itself but also and especially for the existence and support of forces ranged against imperialism if the national liberation movement was to score any important success, even if this did not transcend the framework of the old-type revolution, which had been bourgeois in character and leadership.

The October Socialist Revolution brought fundamental change to the development of history.

The main thing was that imperialism lost its *monopoly* of political, economic and military strength in the world. Henceforth, it was confronted with a class adversary organised on state lines and providing a powerful mainstay for the worldwide liberation struggle. Eloquent evidence of the effectiveness of this support comes from the geographical location of the early major victorious battles in the national liberation struggle of the 20th century: they were all fought close to the borders of the young Soviet Republic.

The October Revolution paved the way for an alliance of the working-class movement and the national liberation forces on a world scale and in a sense “created” the allies themselves. It finally awakened the peoples of colonies and semi-colonies, showed that the slogan of national liberation and equality

was more than a fine dream of the idealists, demonstrated that it could be realised and so blasted the paralysing myth that the colonial order was invincible and that the oppressed peoples were incapable of rising to an independent life.

At the same time, the October Revolution gave the decisive impetus to the formation of the forces capable of bringing organisation and purpose to the massive struggle—national revolutionary organisations and, in particular, the Communist parties. In the first decade after the October Revolution, 22 Communist parties emerged in Asia, Africa and Latin America. At the same time, it was the October Revolution that injected into the thinking of the politically active and freedom-loving sections of the public in the subjugated countries an understanding of the vital need for an alliance between the national liberation movement and the international proletariat. It was crucial in promoting the process of overcoming the mistrust which some nationalistic groups in the colonies and dependent countries had for the anti-colonialist stand of the working-class movement and of the progressive elements in the metropolitan and other developed capitalist countries as a whole.

The October Revolution resulted in a qualitative shift in the political consciousness and activity of the international proletariat and in the establishment of Communist parties, so giving the working-class movement a new look, and making it fully capable of giving a lead in the world revolutionary process and ensuring the necessary support for the national liberation forces. Besides, the lessons of the October Revolution also served to emphasise for the international proletariat itself the importance of an alliance between the working-class movement and the national liberation struggle.

The many-faceted and crucial influence exerted by the October Revolution on the cause of national liberation immediately after the revolution was epitomised in the start of the *crisis of the colonial system of imperialism*. Its most important manifestations were: *first*, the escape from the system of colonial and semi-colonial slavery and the national liberation and social emancipation of the oppressed nations of tsarist Russia, and the establishment of their own states, the Soviet

Republics; *second*, the awakening of national self-awareness and the rise of the liberation struggle which in one form or another and in varying extent ranged virtually over the whole colonial and semi-colonial periphery of imperialism; *third*, the successful outcome, for the first time in the 20th century, of major battles in the national liberation movement: the struggle of the Turkish and Afghan peoples, and the people's anti-imperialist revolution in Mongolia; *fourth*, the stopping in many semi-colonial and dependent countries of the process of their further enslavement, which was latent with their conversion into the colonies, and the emergence and ever more active operation of the opposite tendencies towards liberation and a strengthening of independence. *That marked the start of the era of victorious national liberation revolutions.*

The national liberation struggle rose to a qualitatively new stage in close connection with the onset of the second stage of the general crisis of capitalism and a new phase in the development of socialism. Its conversion into a world system was accompanied by the triumph of anti-colonial revolutions, and the worldwide and epochal triumph of the principle of national self-determination over the vast imperialist-enslaved areas of Asia and Africa.

It was the socialist system that ensured the situation in which "the imperialist powers cannot interfere, being paralysed", which Lenin had in mind, when he spoke about the "particularly favourable conjuncture of international conditions" that made it possible for national wars against the imperialist powers to succeed.¹

In the past, some suggested that the liberation of the peoples of Asia and Africa from the colonial yoke would most probably follow upon triumphant socialist revolutions in the leading countries of Western Europe and the USA. At the international scientific session to mark the centenary of the First International, the prominent Algerian Communist Bashir Hadj Ali reminded the words from the Manifesto of the Inaugural Congress of the Third International: "Liberation of the colonies can come only through liberation of the working class of the oppressing nations. The workers and peasants, not

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 312.

only of Annam, Algeria, Bengal, but also of Persia and Armenia, can gain independent existence only after the workers of England and France have overthrown Lloyd George and Clemenceau and taken power into their own hands."¹

If events have taken a different course, if the subjugated countries of Asia and Africa won their independence before the elimination of the capitalist system in the metropolitan countries, this became possible *only* through the establishment and consolidation of the world socialist system and the consequent sharp weakening of the imperialist system and the tempestuous rise of the national liberation movement. This fact has now been accepted by virtually all the major and influential forces and trends in the present-day national liberation movement.

More than 98 per cent of the population of the enslaved countries have risen to freedom. This occurred as a result of the elimination of the colonial regimes and also in consequence of the fundamental changes in the condition of the dependent countries as the socialist community emerged and the colonial system broke up.

The importance of the interconnection with world socialism is clearly seen—and in this context is additionally confirmed—also when we consider the example of the individual contingents of the national liberation movement, where the advantages arising from geographical proximity to the socialist system or the establishment of close ties with it were markedly reflected in the successes of the anti-imperialist struggle.

Thus, one of the main reasons why the colonial empires first began to break up in Asia was the geographical neighbourhood of the USSR and also the powerful impetus provided by the victory of the socialist revolution in a number of Asian countries.

There is no doubt, too, that the radical swing in the development of the national liberation movement in the Arab countries occurred just when it began to develop close ties with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and broadly to cooperate with them on concrete questions. This was

¹ *World Marxist Review* No. 11, 1964, p. 70.

emphasised by N. Chaoui, Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Lebanese Communist Party.¹

The specific features of the epoch, the existing balance of class forces in the international arena, and the development of the national liberation movement as a stream of the world revolutionary tide—all of these have also exerted a vast influence on the forms of the national anti-imperialist revolutions. Thus, in the international conditions roughly three-quarters of the countries of the old colonial periphery of imperialism succeeded in rising to independence without resorting to arms.

The development of the social aspect of the national liberation movement today likewise well illustrates its close dependence on the overall situation in the world. This will be seen not only from a comparison of the prewar and postwar periods, but also from the postwar period alone. Thus, the new social content of the national liberation revolutions became fully pronounced in the second postwar decade (the choice of socialist orientation by Guinea, Mali, the United Arab Republic, Burma, Syria, Congo [Brazzaville], Algeria, and other countries). This was due not only to the fact that in some countries these revolutions entered their second phase, but also to the marked consolidation of the world socialist system.

National liberation revolutions are not only influenced and supported by world socialism, but, for their part, help to consolidate its positions, advance the world revolutionary process and influence it. Practice has confirmed the Marxist-Leninist view that the national liberation movement does much to advance the struggle for the victory of the world socialist revolution.

After the October Revolution, the national liberation movement helped the Soviet Republic to win time to consolidate its positions by diverting the imperialist forces. In the postwar period, especially in the early years, the tide of national liberation revolutions dealt heavy blows at the imperialist policy of aggression, helped substantially to thin out the forces of imperialism and to create more favourable international conditions for the effort to rehabilitate the

¹ See, *World Marxist Review* No. 7, 1966, p. 27.

USSR's economy and build up the emerging socialist community.

The disintegration of the colonial empires and the rapid rise of the national liberation movement were an element in deepening the crisis processes within the imperialist system as a whole.

With the emergence of dozens of new independent countries in the international arena, cooperation both with the forces of national liberation organised on state lines and with the national liberation movement as a whole became an important element in the socialist community's struggle to weaken the positions of imperialism in international relations.

The national liberation movement has been exerting a fairly extensive and diverse reciprocal influence on the world revolutionary process. However, this is not a straight-forward effect, for in some respects it tends to complicate the development of the world revolutionary process. First of all, the national liberation movement gives rise to the most considerable and substantial diversity in socio-class and ideological terms within the world revolutionary process and leads to its uneven development, which may hamper relations between the component parts of the worldwide revolutionary struggle.

Once the national liberation movement develops into a global force, revolutionary development first acquires worldwide proportions. This enables the world revolution more fully to bring out its features of a *socialist and internationalist* revolution. However, there may also occur a temporary lowering of the ideological level in various sections of the revolutionary movement owing to the fact that the revolutionary process within the framework of the national liberation tends to involve vast peasant and petty-bourgeois masses in the former colonies and semi-colonies, which are steeped in backwardness and are the vehicles of a gigantic tide of nationalistic attitudes of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois stripe and also other ideological weaknesses and preconceptions. It can hardly be denied, for instance, that in many Arab and some Latin American countries the rise of the liberation anti-imperialist struggle has propelled to the political foreground more prominently than ever before

various forces with petty-bourgeois tendencies, whose conceptions and slogans have been spread about on an unprecedented scale.

The enhanced role of these forces implies the introduction and large-scale invigoration of the national aspect and also of nationalistic preconceptions, something that also tends to tell beyond the boundaries of the once oppressed countries, and is to some extent reflected within the framework of the worldwide revolutionary process and international affairs as a whole.

One should also take account of the role of the reciprocal influence exerted by the national liberation movement and the attendant revival of petty-bourgeois forces in the development within the world revolutionary struggle of the tendency to spontaneous rioting, to "leftist" adventurism and extremism.

A correct view of the role of the national liberation movement in the world revolutionary process is of essential theoretical and political importance. It is of theoretical importance because an analysis of this question helps to show the important aspect of the mechanism underlying the development and functioning of this process as a whole and of its component parts. It is of political importance because it bears on the interests of the principal revolutionary contingents of our day and may help to establish correct relations and stronger ties among them. It is not right to allow the question of the role of the various revolutionary forces in the world revolutionary process to be used for attacking the alliance of these forces.

That is all the more important because the growing role of national liberation revolutions in world development is a question on which the ideologists of left extremism and nationalistic forces of the liberated countries, on the one hand, and imperialist propagandists, on the other, have tried to speculate, even if they had done so in different ways.

For their part, Western ideologists have been issuing statements suggesting that the contradictions connected with the national liberation struggle are the principal ones in worldwide development. Such a view was repeatedly expressed by the well-known US publicists Walter Lippmann and James Reston. All these approaches are designed to divide and

contrast the various sectors of the world revolutionary movement.

The first thing to emphasise in this context is that because the national liberation movement as a whole is a component part of the process ultimately leading to transition to socialism there is no ground at all either to minimise or to ignore the specific features of this element of world revolutionary development and the peculiar *character* and *form* in which this contingent is linked with the world socialist revolution.

Today, the national liberation movement is mainly a *democratic* branch of the world revolutionary process in terms of the tasks it has been tackling and is, besides, virtually a relatively *autonomous* branch of that process.

The fact that the international working class has the vanguard role to play in the anti-imperialist struggle, that the socialist system is the leading force of the world revolutionary process, and that they exert an important political and ideological influence on the national liberation movement does not yet mean that they provide that movement with leadership or guidance, not in world-historical but in concrete political terms.

Talk about the "reserve role" of the national liberation movement with respect to the international working class is not only incorrect theoretically and clashes with the actual state of affairs, but can, in fact, do practical harm. Such talk tends to ignore the especially keen national feelings in the former colonies and semi-colonies and the nationalistic attitudes of influential public circles in these countries and cut across the interests of consolidating the alliance between the revolutionary forces of our day.

What has been said does not, in any sense, contradict the fact that a strong tendency to approximate and even ultimately to merge with the other contingents of world revolutionary development in a single tide is characteristic of the national liberation movement. Now and again such a merger of the chief revolutionary forces of our day is frequently treated as an established fact, as something that has already been achieved. But one should also bear in mind that this "merger" is still in process. It is, in effect, a process that is still on and still far from

complete, and is perhaps even a tendency with great potentialities for development.

There arises the following question: what is the relationship between the national liberation movement as a whole and the concrete national liberation revolutions in terms of their role in historical development and place in the world revolutionary process? Although in the overall historical balance of development, the national liberation movement as a whole is now a component part of the process ultimately leading to *transition from capitalism to socialism on a global scale*, that should not at all imply that *every* individual national liberation revolution, like one that does not go beyond the framework of bourgeois (bourgeois-democratic) transformations and paves the way for the establishment of capitalism in the given country, has *such* a role to play at the given phase and is a part of such transition.

It may thus be safe to say that close bonds with the world revolutionary process and a specific place in the process are characteristic features of present-day national liberation revolutions, that fundamentally important international factors actively operate in shaping the essential features of these revolutions and in determining their prospects, and that the impact of these factors is very much greater than and qualitatively different from what it was in the past.

THE MOTIVE FORCES OF REVOLUTION

Anti-imperialist, anti-colonial national liberation revolutions in the period of the general crisis of capitalism have essential specific features also in terms of their motive forces. These specific features spring both from the specific situation in the oppressed countries taking shape in connection with their colonial condition and expressed in the class structure of society and the political positions maintained by various social groups, and also in connection with international factors.

The class structure of the developing countries is a problem that has been scarcely studied in Marxist and bourgeois literature. However, over the past few years Soviet and other Marxist scientists have made considerable headway in tackling the problem.¹ I shall confine myself to some brief remarks only on some aspects of the problem in the light of the subject in hand.

Before the elimination of the colonial regimes, most oppressed countries had a profoundly backward social structure, with embryonic social differentiation and class contradic-

¹ I have in mind above all the fundamental work produced by members of the Moscow Institute of World Economics and International Relations, entitled *Classes and the Class Struggle in the Developing Countries*, the books by the Soviet scientists N. Savelyev, *The National Bourgeoisie in the Asian Countries*, V. Iordansky, *Dead Ends and Prospects of Tropical Africa*, by the Polish scientist J. Kleer, *An Analysis of Socio-Economic Structures in the Third World Countries*, and the works by the Soviet scientists G. Mirsky, T. Pokatayeva, N. Gavrilov, M. Cheshkov and others.

tions. This structure also had various other peculiarities, being a deformed and historically rooted "multitiered" social mosaic, representing social relations of many and frequently of all the known epochs, and also diverse forms of transition from one socio-economic order to another. All of this, though in varying degree, was primarily due to imperialist oppression. Another social product of this oppression was what came to be designated as the "colonial structure of society".

By the time of the colonial conquest, the countries of Asia and Africa were at different stages in the development of feudal and pre-feudal relations. Although the impact of colonial oppression and the export of capitalist relations in the colonies fortified the tendencies leading to a decline of the traditional social structures, the effect of this impact under exhausting exploitation and in view of the special "elitist" forms of capitalist penetration tended to result in a stagnation of the traditional structures rather than in their elimination. Besides—and this is perhaps most important—the colonial authorities pursued a policy of conserving backward relations by means of economic and political instruments and now and again of administrative bans, thereby hampering the rise of social groups which were not a part of the traditional social structure but were connected with the beginnings of a new mode of production.

Capitalism, which was introduced into the oppressed countries mostly by colonialism, exerted its effect on socio-economic relations along what might be called several lines. First, there was the subordination of the whole economy of the oppressed country and its economic activity to the interests and requirement of alien capital, of a foreign capitalist economic system. Second, there was a direct incursion of foreign capital into the economy of the oppressed countries through the establishment of enterprises and other seats of the capitalist mode of production which in most countries remained an alien growth on the local economy and the social organism. Finally, there was the slow penetration of capitalism into the traditional economic and social structure of local society and the life of the native population. This occurred in the form of a gradual and extremely drawn-out process in which this structure was adapted to the needs of the colonialists and which meant a

close interweaving and interconnection of the old and the new social relations.

One result of this peculiar process was the general stability and extremely low mobility of the social structure, a peculiar tenacity of archaic political, socio-economic and ideological forms, an abundance of stagnating intermediate and transitional social sections, a tiny intelligentsia, the emergence of specific anti-national groups engendered by the needs of colonial administration and the colonial economy, a great gulf between town and country, etc. Moreover, a strong imprint was left on the social face, political potentialities and inclinations and mentality of social groups and sections, with this imprint being favourable in some respects for the anti-imperialist potential of these sections and groups and, accordingly, for the advance of the liberation movement, and unfavourable in other respects.

While the division into social groups and classes, especially modern ones, is still fairly embryonic *objectively* in most countries to this very day, to say nothing of the period of colonial administration, this is even truer in *subjective* terms. Family and tribal ties, caste preconceptions, religious attachments and all manner of archaic notions for their part frequently obscure the full picture of class relations. Very frequently it is not the actual social condition but these ties and attachments that determine the behaviour of men.

Because of the "transitional" character of almost all the social sections of society in the developing countries and of the imprint left by them, by the interlaced diverse historical types of social relations and because of the other peculiarities stemming from the colonial past and from the struggle for national liberation, these sections are now and again profoundly original.

All of these elements taken together make up something of a background against which one should consider the stand taken by the various social forces in the countries of Asia and Africa and their role in the movement for national independence.

It is extremely difficult to give statistical expression to the peculiarities and deformed character of the social structure, especially in the colonial period or on the eve of independence. One of the chief obstacles is the extreme scarcity and

fragmentary nature of the relevant data, which besides are based on different starting criteria and now and again allow—especially in views of the overall scarcity of the data—for the most diverse and even contradictory interpretations.

Nevertheless, all the accessible direct and various indirect data indicate what are essentially similar *tendencies*, and this gives ground for some conclusions. Of course, one has to reckon here with the great diversity of conditions in the Afro-Asian world, but even this diversity, while it does create serious prerequisites for specific behaviour among various social forces and groups in the countries concerned, cannot serve as an insuperable obstacle for drawing general conclusions which are important for an understanding of the motive forces in the present-day national liberation revolution.

1. The Proletariat and the Peasantry

Just before the oppressed countries of Asia and Africa rose to independence, the development of their proletariat was highly uneven. In some colonies and semi-colonies (like India, Syria and Indonesia) the proletariat had already taken shape as a class and had become a political factor of national importance. In 1947, for instance, India had 2.2 million factory workers, 407,000 miners, and 825,000 railway men.¹ It is true that this added up to only 2 per cent of the working and 0.7 per cent of the total population. But in most other oppressed countries, the proletariat was still far from having become an organised and full-fledged class force distinct from other social sections. Its core—experienced industrial proletarians—was extremely weak and small. Finally, there was simply no proletariat at all in some African and Asian countries.

Statistical data on wage-labour in Asian and African countries and their distribution among the spheres of economic activity, and the sectoral structure of the labour force

¹ *The Indian Labour Year Book*, 1947/48, New Delhi, 1949.

on the eve and in the early years of independence give some idea of the development of the proletariat and its numerical strength.¹

What is indicative above all is the small share of wage-labour in the population as a whole. This will be seen from the following table, although it is not strict enough, notably in chronological terms.

Share of Wage-Labour in the Working
Population of Some African and Asian Countries

Countries	Years	Working popula- tion (mln)	Wage-labour		
			mln	per cent of working po- pulation	per cent of working po- pulation out- side agricul- ture
India	1961	188.7	24.1	13	43
Pakistan	1961	30.2	6.1	20	34
Philippines	1961	9.7	3.2	33	55
Malaya	1957	2.2	1.2	54	72
Syria	1964	1.3	0.4	32	48
Ceylon	1953	3.0	1.8	60	66
Thailand	1960	13.8	1.6	12	51
Algeria (non- European popu- lation)	1954	3.2	1.0	31	79
Morocco	1960	3.2	1.1	34	54
Tunisia	1956	1.3	0.5	38	76
Egypt	1960	7.8	3.8	49	69

Source: *Classes and the Class Struggle in the Developing Countries*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1967, p. 46 (in Russian).

¹ It is not only because of the scarcity of the relevant data and the large share—which differed from one country to another—of farmhands and day-labourers, who also worked on their own allotments, but also because in contrast to the state of things in the developed capitalist countries there was frequently a real gulf in the oppressed countries between the economic conditions and sometimes also the political attitudes of, say, the civil servants, the administrative personnel, engineers and technicians in industry, on the one

The situation is further clarified with the addition of data, however incomplete and fragmentary, dealing for the most part with the relatively developed countries of Tropical Africa,¹ on the whole the most backward area of the colonial world.

Share of Wage-Workers* in the Population
of Tropical African Countries

Countries	Years	Wage-labour	
		1,000	per cent
Ivory Coast	1960	169.8	5.5
Guinea	1957	109.4	2.7
Congo (Brazzaville)	1957	36.5	4.0
Senegal**	1957	83.2	3.0
Ghana	1956	267.4	4.0

* Non-Africans included.

** Officials and household servants excluded.

Sources: R. Barbé, *Les Classes Sociales en Afrique Noire*, Paris, 1964; *Ouvre-mer* 1958, Paris, 1960, pp. 208-09; *The Europa Year Book* 1960, Vol. 2, London, 1960, p. 523.

In the Upper Volta, Chad, Dahomey and Niger, wage-labour came to an average of two per cent of the working population, and in Mali to even less than one per cent.

The fact that the bulk of the labour force in most colonies and semi-colonies was concentrated in agriculture and also in

hand, and the working class, on the other. One must object, therefore, to the now and again pronounced tendency—apparently for the purpose of emphasising the role of the working class—to argue its large size on the strength of data concerning the number of wage-workers with an approach similar to that used for the developed capitalist countries.

¹ One should bear in mind that official statistics include only "registered" wage-workers. In the African countries, special importance attaches to the fact, which is characteristic for all the oppressed countries, that a considerable section of wage-workers consists of persons involved in the colonial administration or being used by it.

the sphere of the services shows that the formation of the proletariat in these countries was in its initial stages.

**Sectoral Structure of the Labour Force
in the Developing Countries
(1950)**

	mln	per cent
Total labour force	744	100
Industry	71	9.5
Agriculture	552	74.3
Services	121	16.2

Source: *International Labour Review*, Vol. 95, No. 1-2, Geneva, 1967, p. 99.

The overall picture becomes more concrete when supplemented with the data on the structure of the economically active population in the individual countries of Africa and Asia (including the least developed).

**Sectoral Distribution of the Economically
Active Native Population in Some Countries of Africa
Before Independence
(per cent)**

Countries	Agri- culture	Industry, construction, power, etc.	Trade and transport	Services	Other branches
Algeria (1954)					
men	75.4	7.0	6.1	2.1	9.4
women	96.3	0.6	0.2	2.5	0.4
Egypt (1947)					
men	62.5	12.8	12.8	11.8	0.1
women	74.1	8.3	11.2	6.1	0.3
Morocco (1952)					
men	65.2	11.4	17.4	4.9	1.1
women	83.8	8.6	2.0	4.9	0.7
Tunisia (1956)					
men	63.5	9.3	7.9	5.7	13.6
women	92.9	4.5	0.3	1.7	0.5

Continued

Countries	Agri- culture	Industry, construction, power, etc.	Trade and transport	Services	Other branches
Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1956, wage- labour only)	34.5	36.0	7.9	21.6	—
Belgian Congo (1955, esti- mate) men	69.8	12.9	6.0	1.2	10.1

Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. *Economic Survey of Africa Since 1950*, New York, 1959, pp. 45-46.

When assessing these and similar data, one should bear in mind that in many countries from one-half to two-thirds of the wage-labour army consisted of farmhands and day-labourers who in many cases had their own allotments, and also persons engaged in small-scale handicraft and artisan production. They were exploited in forms which were transitional and which sprang from the interlacing of pre-capitalist and capitalist relations, with the former frequently prevailing over the latter. Accordingly, these fairly numerous sections were themselves transitional and intermediate in nature, lying in social terms somewhere between the toiling peasantry (the peasant poor) and the actual agricultural proletariat, between the independent handicraftsmen and the proletariat in the usual sense of the word. Not only in their social connections, their every-day and mental attitudes, in their world outlook, but also in their socio-economic condition were the former still to separate from the peasantry and the latter from the mass of the urban lower classes.

Even today, less than 20 per cent of the wage-workers are involved in large-scale modern production, with the numerically largest sections being employed in the light industry, on the plantations and farms and latifundia. Only about one-tenth of them are employed in the heavy industries.

In 1948, of the total number of persons employed in manufacturing in the economically underdeveloped countries only 22 per cent were in the heavy industry (including 13 per cent in metallurgy and engineering) and 78 per cent in the light industry (including 48 per cent in the food and textile

enterprises).¹ On the whole, the industrial-type proletariat made up 4-5 per cent of the working population.

According to highly approximate data, the sectoral distribution of this part of the wage-labour army just before the 1960s was as follows:

**Sectoral Structure of the Working Class
in the Countries of Asia and North Africa
(late 1950s-early 1960s)**

Basic branches	Number of employed	
	mln	per cent
Manufacturing	8-9	40-45
including:		
heavy industry	2	10
light industry	6-7	30-35
Extractive industry	1	5
Transport and building	4-5	20-25
Plantations, capitalist farms and latifundia	6-7	30-35
Total modern proletariat	19-22	100

Source: *World Economics and International Relations* No. 12, 1965, p. 79 (in Russian).

Even in the most developed countries of the Afro-Asian world a sizable section and frequently the bulk of the working class was scattered among the small enterprises. In India, for instance, even after 15 years of independent development over 70 per cent of all workers—15.5 out of 20 million—were engaged in small-scale industry.² According to the 1959 industrial census, over 60 per cent of all industrial enterprises in Malaya were small establishments employing under 20 workers, while 20.5 per cent were tiny enterprises without any permanent labour force.³ In 1952, enterprises with ten or more workers in Egypt had 273,000 workers, and with 50 and more workers—220,000.⁴ Let us note that these data refer

¹ *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* No. 9, New York, 1964, pp. XII-XVIII.

² *Indian Labour Journal*, Vol. IV, No. 4, New Delhi, 1965, pp. 334, 343.

³ E. L. Wheelwright, *Industrialization in Malaysia*, Melbourne, 1965, p. 5.

⁴ *Federation of Industries in the United Arab Republic. Year Book*, July 1972, Cairo-Alexandria, 1972, p. 100.

only to the enterprises included in the census, which means that a vast number of tiny outfits is left out.

The lack of concentration, the dispersal of the proletariat is even more pronounced when we turn to the countries of Tropical Africa, whether the relatively developed countries like Ghana and the Ivory Coast, or the economically more backward ones like Guinea.

**Ivory Coast
(1956)¹**

Number of enterprises	Number of persons employed
88,000	1-10
850	11-20
320	21-100
150	101-300
45	301-1,000
14	over 1,000

**Ghana
(1963)²**

(mining and quarrying industry)

Number of enterprises	Number of persons employed
166	up to 50
26	50-99
11	100-499
8	500 and over

In Guinea, industrial proletarians, according to the country's standards, making up one-third of the total labour force—25,300 persons—were employed almost exclusively at small enterprises and in shops with under 50 workers.

Because the African and Asian industrial working class is young, its core of experienced proletarians is also relatively weak.³ A large section of it consisted of seasonal workers or

¹ *Economie et Politique* No. 84-86, Paris, 1961, p. 63.

² Based on *Directory of Industrial Enterprises and Establishments*, Accra, 1963, pp. 3-26.

³ In Mali, for instance, these made up under five per cent of all workers, but one should, of course, make special allowances for that country's particular backwardness.

workers who return to their villages after working in towns for a few years on a purely temporary basis, and mainly for the purpose of saving some money to set up on their own in the countryside.

However, even the bulk of permanent and experienced workers of the first and much less frequently of the second or third generations were still connected by what might be called an umbilical cord with their origins in the countryside. These men frequently had not only everyday and ideological but also property bonds with the countryside (and now and again, as I have already said, corresponding connections with handicraft production). All of this quite naturally tended to slow down the development of class consciousness, and made the proletarian susceptible to the petty-bourgeois ideology, hampering their escape from the grip of nationalistic attitudes, and caste, religious and—in many African and some Asian countries—tribal survivals.

These unfavourable elements were most pronounced at the small-scale enterprises, where relations between the owners and their hired labour are often permeated with a spirit of patriarchal and tribal intimacy, etc. Indeed, the very atmosphere of small-scale production and the relatively small gap in material conditions between the owner of an artisan or handicraft enterprise and his workers tends to promote this kind of intimate relationship.

For the African proletarian, his bonds with the tribe or patriarchal family are frequently crucial. Now and again he tends to regard the foreman and even the owner of the enterprise as being above all a member of this or that tribe or patriarchal family instead of a member of another social group or class. Majhemout Diop said in his report at the 1966 Cairo seminar that in Senegal the working people's attitudes in class conflicts were seriously influenced by their "allegiance to the extended family of the patriarchal type which gives rise to real or imaginary loyalties tending to reduce, even if they do not completely abolish, antagonisms between, say, the employer and the worker".¹

¹ Africa: National and Social Revolution. Collection of Papers Read at the Cairo Seminar, Prague, 1967, p. 100.

By comparison with the proletariat in the developed capitalist countries, that of the colonial and dependent countries has a large share of unskilled labour and a low level of literacy.

Share of Unskilled Labour in Some African Countries

Countries	Years	Per cent of unskilled labour
Cameroun	1957	57.6
Guinea	1957	47.5
Senegal	1957	36.3 ¹
Ivory Coast	1960	67.3
Mali	1957	70.0
Central African Republic ..	1957	62.2
Gabon	1957	62.4

Sources: R. Barbé, *Les Classes Sociales en Afrique Noire*, p. 71; *Outre-mer* 1958, p. 210.

The bulk of the proletariat in Algeria just before the start of the armed struggle for independence also consisted of unskilled or low-skilled workers.

The low skill and literacy standards, together with the meagre wages and the generally depressed living conditions have done nothing to stimulate the political activity of the emergent proletariat or its awareness of its class condition and class tasks.

The transformation of the young proletariat into a class "for itself" was to some extent also slowed down, apart from the lack of social differentiation, by the nature of the oppression directed against it, by the colonial condition of the African and Asian countries and, accordingly, the national character of the struggle in that period. While this has helped to involve some and even massive contingents of the proletariat in the anti-colonial movement, it has done little to provide it with experience in combating its "own" national bourgeoisie or substantially to help it rise to the adoption of class positions. In

¹ 50 per cent, according to M. Diop, who notes that in France the share is 14 per cent.

effect, at that stage the proletariat, involved in the struggle, acted with rare exceptions as a national, instead of a class force, now and again even merging with the local propertied sections in political terms.

Finally, active attempts by the imperialist monopolies, and in the most developed oppressed countries also by the local bourgeoisie, to foster and range against the bulk of the proletariat a relatively well-off section consisting of skilled workers or of workers employed at the largest enterprises of these monopolies (for instance, African workers in the Copper Belt, etc.) also had some effect on the militancy of the proletariat in some colonies and semi-colonies. For that purpose, some employers set up special trade unions, allowed higher wage-rates and various benefits, encouraged the purchase of stock, etc., for high-skilled workers.

Even the briefest characteristic of the state and level of development of the working class in the colonial period must refer to the unemployed. Despite the fact that the bulk, the vast mass of the unemployed and semi-employed in that part of the world was concentrated in the countryside, urban unemployment was also on a fairly high level. In some countries, the unemployed numbered tens and hundreds of thousands and even millions (as in Egypt, Ceylon, the Philippines and India). For obvious reasons, the general weaknesses of the young African and Asian working class were intensified among the unemployed proletarians (especially in view of the fact that many of them had either a small service record or none at all), this being combined with a special inclination to spontaneous, riotous and anarchist attitudes and a tendency to drop out of their class.

Of course, one should also bear in mind the great diversity of conditions over the vast Afro-Asian area and, in consequence, the far from similar condition and positions of the proletariat, as I have already said. Besides, the data on Tropical Africa may produce the impression of an even more backward condition than the actual one.

Nevertheless, even if we discount these aspects and the incompleteness and frequently also the clearly approximate nature of the available data, there is no doubt at all about the authenticity of the basic tendencies and specific features

suggested by all these facts, or their correctness with respect to the oppressed countries as a whole. When these countries are considered individually, what can, as a rule, be brought out is only the extent to which these tendencies and specific features are expressed.

When dealing with the characteristic features and the strong and weak aspects of the working class in the colonies and the semi-colonies, we are not interested in these in themselves, but mainly from the standpoint of the potentialities and positions of the working class in face of the other social forces, the bourgeoisie in particular. In this context, the proletariat in some countries has a number of indisputable advantages as compared with the local bourgeoisie. What I mean are not only the general historical advantages stemming from its class nature, but also some specific concrete aspects which are connected, like some of the unfavourable aspects, with the colonial conditions in which it has taken shape and has carried on the struggle.

The proletariat in the colonial and dependent countries takes shape in connection with the activity of foreign capital and is concentrated at its enterprises, so emerging and developing, as a rule, before the national bourgeoisie, now and again also taking shape ahead of it as a class. In the Afro-Asian zone there have been many countries, like Guinea or Mali, where tens of thousands of workers (even if employed at small enterprises) were already in evidence in the colonial period, without there being as yet virtually any national bourgeoisie. In some oppressed countries, the factory contingents of the proletariat were fairly highly concentrated and numerically close to the level in the imperialist countries.

The political potentialities and potential combat strength of the proletariat and the impact of its action are markedly enhanced — especially where its factory core is developed and concentrated — by the concentration of the working class in the towns, and especially in the capitals, which tend almost to monopolise what political life there is in the generally backward oppressed countries.

Under the colonial regime, foreign capital, backed by the machinery of colonialist violence as the vehicle of racial oppression and exploitation, is primarily the proletariat's

immediate class antagonist. The earliest economic demands of the working class lead it into confrontation with the colonial administration. That is why, the proletariat's action soon acquires a political character and develops into anti-colonial, anti-imperialist struggle.

The formation of nations in the countries of Asia and Africa has in some respects been taking place in more favourable conditions for the proletariat than in the West. There, too, joint action by the whole third estate was required to tackle anti-feudal tasks. However, the bourgeoisie was the only social force capable of giving a lead to national consolidation. The shaping of the proletariat as a class in the West took place within the more or less formed bourgeois nations. Not so in the colonies of the imperialist powers. The proletariat's class consolidation there has frequently gone ahead simultaneously with the process of national consolidation and now and again ahead of it. That is why the proletariat can give a lead in this process.

Although in most oppressed countries the proletariat was very young, even at the earliest stages of its development it frequently demonstrated in the course of the battles for independence its courage and patriotism and its combat qualities stemming from its capacity for class discipline and organisation. In the fight against the colonial regimes, against the imperialist monopolies and now and again also against its "own" bourgeoisie, the working class has made broad use of strikes, including general strikes, the traditional proletarian instrument. This action has frequently set in motion broad sections of the population, generating important political reverberations and serving as an effective means of pressuring the colonialists and markedly promoting the advance towards independence.

The proletariat, a class whose aspirations are totally alien to any oppression or exploitation, is capable of consistently giving expression to national goals and acting as the most steadfast and indomitable fighter against colonialism. Its aims in the national liberation struggle are not self-seeking. They are fundamentally distinct from the aspirations of the bourgeoisie and are incompatible with any partial victory over the colonialists or with any substitution of capitalist forms of

oppression for colonial and feudal forms. The class aims of the proletariat fully accord with the ultimate aims of the national liberation movement, because it has an interest in national consolidation on a socialist basis.

The proletariat's vast historical advantage in the colonial and dependent countries consists in the fact that even the earliest stages of its formation occur in a fundamentally new historical situation, in an epoch in which the role of the working class is vastly enhanced on a world scale. Accordingly, even at the earliest phase of its development it can have its own class organisations—Communist parties, revolutionary trade unions—while its vanguard contingents and groups are capable of adopting the Marxist-Leninist ideology. It can rely on the support of the international proletariat, the socialist states, and the world communist and progressive trade union movement. In the struggle for political influence, it is capable of using the overall radicalisation of the social situation in the world and at home, and also the prestige of the socialist states. Finally, it has the opportunity of assimilating the experience in the class struggle gained by its brothers in other parts of the world, the experience of the international working-class movement, to receive assistance in training personnel, spreading ideas, etc.

Another thing to note is that even the extremely weak and embryonic state of the working class does not always mean the total absence of the proletarian factor, particularly the ideological factor, in the social life of the oppressed countries. Quite apart from the influence of the international working class, there is also the existence of groups—mainly of the intelligentsia—which have adopted Marxist-Leninist ideas. In some countries, the importance of this factor is maintained and is now and again enhanced in the period after the winning of independence.

Even before the disintegration of the colonial system, Communist parties were set up and carried on a courageous struggle in 23 oppressed and dependent countries of Asia and Africa. This meant that the working class of these countries, however small numerically, and even if the bulk of it was still following the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois forces, was independently represented as a class.

Indeed, it is the existence of the Communist parties that has enabled the proletariat in some colonial and dependent countries, as in Vietnam and Korea, to become an organised class force on a national scale, before the local bourgeoisie managed to do so, something that had an important role to play in the revolutionary process in these countries.

In many instances, the revolutionary trade unions, especially in Africa, were an important instrument of the African and Asian proletariat. The trade unions not only provided effective support for the patriotic, anti-imperialist parties (for instance, in Guinea, Mali, Ghana), but also acted as a political organiser wherever such parties had yet to take shape (for instance, in many countries of French Equatorial Africa), and frequently (notably in Tanganyika and a number of other countries) provided cover for the banned patriotic parties to carry on their work among the masses.

Let us also note that the working class in the colonial and dependent countries has not experienced any substantial influence from the corrupting traditions of social democratic reformism, although one should not discount the monopolies' urge to set apart groups of privileged workers and the reformist leaders' attempts to secure control of some trade unions.

In virtue of these circumstances, the proletariat in a number of oppressed countries, even when numerically small, succeeded in establishing an alliance with the peasantry and rising to leadership in the movement for national liberation. The Communists have led the massive national liberation struggle in China, Vietnam, Korea, the Philippines, etc. In a number of other countries, like India, Syria, Algeria, Guinea, Ghana, etc., the working class acted not only as vanguard but also as the shock force in the anti-colonial struggle, without, however, assuming leadership. Thus, in India, says Ajoy Ghosh, the late Secretary-General of the Indian Communist Party, "the working class, though an important participant in that movement, was, in the main, under the political influence of the Congress. It was inevitable, therefore, that in 1947, when India won national freedom, power passed into the hands of the national bourgeoisie and its organ—the Congress".¹ In

¹ *World Marxist Review* No. 2, 1962, p. 2.

another group of oppressed countries—Burma, Kenya, Congo (Brazzaville), etc.—where the proletariat, small, young and poorly organised, failed to rise to the level of a vanguard and shock force in the national liberation struggle, but nevertheless made a tangible contribution to many of its major battles. Finally, in some countries there was virtually no proletariat, which is why it was unable to express itself in any way.

* * *

The scope of the anti-imperialist struggle in the colonial and dependent countries crucially depends on the attitude of the peasantry. The postwar experience of these countries has shown once again that the peasantry is the main social basis of the national liberation movement. Whenever the peasantry rises to struggle, that struggle becomes virtually nation-wide. That is why Lenin emphasised "the need in backward countries, to give special support to the peasant movement against the landowners, against landed proprietorship, and against all manifestations or survivals of feudalism, and to strive to lend the peasant movement the most revolutionary character".¹

The key importance of the peasantry's position is determined above all by the fact that it is the largest social group in the oppressed countries and is vastly superior in numbers, as will be seen from the following table which has been compiled on the basis of estimates.

Peasantry's Share in the Population
of Asian and African Countries on the Eve of
Independence²

60-70 per cent	70-80 per cent	80-90 per cent	90 per cent and over
Egypt, Iraq,	Ceylon, Ghana, Congo (Brazzaville),	Pakistan, Nigeria,	Tanganyika, Chad, Uganda, Niger,

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 149.

² The farm labourers are not brought out as a special section of the rural population, and this is acceptable because, as I have said, a sizable number of persons falling within this category continues to have and farm their own allotments, so that they can be called only semi-proletarians, at best.

Continued

60-70 per cent	70-80 per cent	80-90 per cent	90 per cent and over
Morocco, Malaya, Algeria, Syria	Tunisia, Senegal, India, Philippines	Cameroun, Indonesia, Somali	Upper Volta, Nepal, Dahomey, Mali, Togo, Guinea, Libya, Sudan

The UN data on the urban and rural population suggest the conclusion that the peasantry's share was even larger, in Africa, at any rate.

Urban and Rural Population in African Countries
(per cent of total population)

Countries	Urban population		Rural population	
	African	Non-African	African	Non-African
Algeria, 1954	7.1	5.8	82.5	4.6
Cameroun, 1957	5.5	0.3	94.0	0.2
French Equatorial Africa, 1956	4.4	0.3	95.1	0.2
French West Africa, 1956 ...	4.1	0.3	95.5	0.1
Madagascar, 1956	5.6	0.7	92.9	0.8
Morocco, 1954	15.6	3.2	79.1	2.1
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1956	5.5	2.7	90.7	1.1
South-West Africa, 1951 ...	9.4	6.7	78.9	4.8
Tanganyika, 1957	2.5	1.0	95.9	0.6
Togo, 1956	3.7	0.1	96.2	—
Tunisia, 1956	9.3	3.4	81.7	5.6

Source: *Economic Survey of Africa Since 1950*, p. 14.

In nearly all the developing countries, the countryside is the basis of the whole social pyramid, of the economic structure. In

1950, 74.3 per cent of the labour force in these countries was employed in agricultural production.¹

The peasantry's role in the struggle for independence is also determined by its revolutionary potential, especially in the context of the given, national liberation type of revolutionary process, because the peasantry is oppressed and exploited and can easily understand the slogan of national liberation.

The peasantry is the most deprived section of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples, living in conditions of the most backward social relations, and the most archaic forms of exploitation. Thus, in the early 1960s about one-third of all the farms in India's agriculture (mainly those whose property was valued under 2,500 rupees) did not grow any produce for the market at all. Meanwhile, in the African countries over one-half of the agricultural labour force was involved in subsistence or near-subsistence production. The number of persons engaged in regular wage employment in the total developing African labour force was of the order of 20 per cent; in West Africa, the figure was less than ten per cent, in East and Central Africa—about 15 per cent.² The social organisation among the nomad herdsmen in the countries of North Africa and West Asia, which are inhabited by over 150 million people and where nomad livestock breeding is the typical form of economic activity, also remained on the level of the tribal system even in the 1960s.³

Besides, it frequently turned out that the section of the agricultural population which was classified as being involved in commodity production was in fact scarcely so involved.⁴

The heavy oppression falling on the peasantry was, as a rule, at least threefold: it was exploited by foreign capital and the colonial authorities; the feudal and tribal élite and the landowners; and the usurers and merchants, and also here and

¹ *International Labour Review*, Vol. 95, No. 1-2, Geneva, 1967, pp. 99, 101.

² *A Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa*, UN, New York, 1971, p. 6.

³ *World Economics and International Relations* No. 10, Moscow, 1967, p. 46 (in Russian).

⁴ See, P. H. Gulliver, *Labour Migration in a Rural Economy*, Kampala, 1955, p. 17.

there by the already established social stratum of rich peasants (kulaks). It was this interlacing and interpenetration of all these forms of oppression, with the "new" capitalist and semi-capitalist relations subordinating, instead of ousting, the old feudal and pre-feudal methods of exploitation, that made the condition of the peasants especially hard and unbearable.

In many countries of Asia and Africa, the peasants suffered severely from lack or shortage of land, because most of the land or its best tracts had been concentrated in the hands of the landowners, foreign companies and settlers, and also because there was a growing agrarian overpopulation. In Indonesia, landless peasants made up 60 per cent of the total,¹ and in India, landless and land-hungry peasants—75 per cent.² In Algeria, 600,000 peasants had no land at all, and another 450,000 were poor. In Egypt, 80 per cent of the rural population was landless, being tenants and agricultural workers.³

In countries and areas still dominated by tribal and community relations and where the land problem was frequently less acute, the peasantry was the object of exploitation, open or veiled by traditional customs, on the part of the élite and the well-to-do members of the community, and also the victim of more intensive direct levies by the colonial administration. The peasants worked to exhaustion, using primitive implements and employing forms of economic activity which had come down from their ancestors and unchanged over the centuries. The general living and everyday conditions of the peasantry were extremely arduous.

In colonial society, whose political life was on the whole limited and suppressed in every way by the foreign rulers, the peasants were the most deprived and oppressed social group. Although the peasant could variously rely on the traditional community, tribal or caste mutual guarantee arrangements, in contrast to the proletariat he had no class organisations of his

¹ See, P. G. Ananyev, *Agriculture in Present-Day Indonesia*, Moscow, 1965, p. 17 (in Russian).

² *World Economics and International Relations* No. 2, Moscow, 1966, p. 44 (in Russian).

³ *Current History*, Philadelphia, Vol. 30, No. 178, June 1956, pp. 333-34, 336.

own, like trade unions or parties, who would stand up for his interests.

The peasants, living and working in arduous conditions, being driven off the land by foreign companies and settlers, subjected to oppression, arbitrary acts and levies by the colonial administration, exploited by the landowners, the tribal élite and the money-lenders, were driven to take part in the national movement which held out the prospect of obtaining land and a radical improvement of their condition. Involvement of broad sections of the peasantry in the national liberation movement was frequently facilitated by community and caste solidarity, and also by the fact that national liberation slogans in some countries also had a religious content or were translated into the idiom of religion.

Wherever the national liberation movement acquired large proportions (India and Indonesia, Burma and the Philippines, Algeria and Morocco, Madagascar and Kenya, Guinea and Mali, Vietnam and Laos, etc.) it involved sizable sections of the peasantry, who became the massive force of the movement. What is more, in some colonies where armed struggle for national liberation began (Algeria, Indonesia, Burma, Kenya, Morocco, Madagascar, South Yemen, Congo [Kinshasa], Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and even to some extent South Vietnam, and so on) this armed struggle was, in effect, a peculiar kind of the "peasant war". It was the peasantry which provided the backbone for the national liberation contingents and all the armed action against the foreign oppressors.

In Algeria, for instance, the peasants made up nearly 80 per cent of the National Liberation Army.

Bashir Hadj Ali noted that the principal army of the revolution was the peasantry. He noted, too, that the war in Algeria was a national-liberation war, a war for land ... the primary burden of which was borne by the poorest peasantry.

The armed action in Kenya, Madagascar, and elsewhere appear to have had a totally peasant make-up.

At the same time, the experience of the struggle for independence in the oppressed countries of Asia and Africa has confirmed the Marxist-Leninist proposition that the peasantry, while it does provide the social basis and the mass army of the national liberation movement, does not act within

it as an independent class force. In the countries of the colonial and semi-colonial zone—that is, in countries that were *agrarian*—there was possibly no political party in which the peasantry as such had the actual leading role to play, a party that was set up by the peasantry and represented its interests exclusively.

This is due to the general class features and nature of the peasantry in general, for it is scattered, is swayed by petty proprietary and patriarchal tendencies, frequently has a low level of political awareness, is inclined to take spontaneous action, and is little if at all habituated in organisation and discipline. But that is also due to the specific features of the oppressed countries, where these or at any rate some of them stand out in even greater relief, as if being emphasised by the conditions in these countries. The peasantry is not only the most deprived group of colonial society, it is also the most benighted and oppressed, totally illiterate and the most steeped in various superstitions and prejudices.

Even in the oppressed countries where the national liberation movement became massive, large sections of the peasantry and frequently the bulk of it remained uninvolved. Besides, many peasants were induced to take part in the struggle not by an understanding of the national-political platform of the movement, but frequently by local reasons.

As a result, when joining in the national liberation movement, the peasantry followed other social forces—the working class, the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, the political organisations expressing the interests of these forces or of several intermediate class groups. And it was the peasantry's *allegiance* that decided who exercised the social and political leadership in the national liberation movement, and its subsequent course and prospects.

That is not to say, of course, that the peasantry joined in the national liberation movement without its own social aspirations. On the contrary, it voiced these aspirations quite persistently, and this laid an imprint on the platform of the movement. While the peasantry has not, as a rule, set up its own political parties in the oppressed countries, there were also no parties in these countries whose slogans did not in one way or another reflect its class demands.

Some reflection of the peasantry's social interests in the platform of the national liberation movement was also characteristic of the movement in the period before the October Revolution and even before the imperialist epoch. However, in present-day conditions this is much more pronounced. Besides—and this is most important—the peasantry does not have to serve as a political appendage of the national bourgeoisie, but can act as an ally of the proletariat, the intelligentsia, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle strata, with an active political role to play. This is due both to the political awakening of the advanced section of the peasantry and the overall enhancement of its social and revolutionary potential, to the growth of social forces concerned with raising the political activity and initiative of the toiling people in the countryside, and the growing dependence of the prospects in the national liberation process on their involvement in the struggle.

The economic basis for the changing situation was provided by the growing colonial and imperialist oppression and exploitation, the development of social antagonisms in the countryside in many oppressed countries, and the deepening crisis of agrarian structures. In these conditions, the progressive forces intensify their efforts aimed politically to activate the peasantry, international factors exert an influence, and there is an influx of democratic and socialist ideas.

2. The National Bourgeoisie

It is safe to say that on the eve of independence the national bourgeoisie's political and economic positions in most oppressed countries were weak. Some of its other specific features were also connected with the colonial conditions in which it took shape.

Compared with its historical counterparts in the preceding epoch, the national bourgeoisie of the oppressed countries was in an especially unfavourable, and one might say, fundamentally different conditions due to the export by the foreign monopolies of contemporary and sometimes the latest forms of capitalism. In contrast to the preceding capitalist period and especially in contrast to the period of national enslavement, say, of North America by Britain, or of Holland by Spain,

capitalist production under imperialism is transplanted through the export of capital to the oppressed countries chiefly from the metropolitan countries, with the foreign entrepreneur operating in this sphere. That is why the national bourgeoisie of the colonies and semi-colonies has very much less room for enterprise than the Dutch or American bourgeoisie had. One could say that the local bourgeoisie is for the most part "unnecessary", with the exception of the smallest production, and commercial and middleman operations.

The main factors operating as an effective obstacle to the emergence and rise of the bourgeoisie were these: powerful competition from the foreign monopolies, which relied on the support of the authorities; the limited sources of accumulation in the oppressed countries plundered by imperialism and the consequent extreme narrowness of the domestic market; racial discrimination and prohibitive measures by the colonial administration; and finally, the general backwardness and also the strength of the various and interlaced pre-capitalist relations.

An additional obstacle in the way of the national bourgeoisie in many colonies and dependent countries consisted of strong bourgeois groups from other countries—India, China, Syria, the Lebanon, Greece, Italy—and in some African countries, groups from other parts of the continent. In Thailand, for instance, the Chinese before the Second World War controlled 90 per cent of the commercial enterprises. In 1951, in Malaya, the Chinese and Indians made up one-half (6,604 out of 13,420) of the persons paying income tax. In Liberia, the Lebanese owned 65 per cent of all the commercial establishments.¹ In Kenya, persons of Asian origin owned nearly 30 per cent (£1,825,000 out of £5,884,000) of the total capital of the companies registered in 1959. In the Ivory Coast, 75 per cent of the merchants were nationals of other African countries.

As a result, national enterprise failed to win a prominent place in the economic life of most oppressed countries in Asia

¹ *Development of a Middle Class in Tropical and Sub-tropical Countries*, International Institute of Differing Civilisations. Record of the XXIXth Session, Bruxelles, 1956, p. 272; J. Baulin, *The Arab Role in Africa*, Baltimore, 1962, p. 54.

and North Africa. In 1955, for instance, enterprises owned by Europeans in Algeria employed 320,000 workers, and enterprises owned by the local bourgeoisie—only 30,000.¹

In the early 1950s, local capital in Morocco owned less than 5 per cent of the assets of large capitalist trusts.² In Tunisia, local entrepreneurs accounted for only 33 out of the 311 enterprises with over 50 workers.³ In Indonesia, where the available data refer to the early 1920s, enterprises owned by national capital employed four per cent of the total labour force. From 1946 to 1948, only 0.7 per cent of the investments going into the Indonesian economy came from the national bourgeoisie. The positions of the local bourgeoisie were somewhat stronger in Burma. On the eve of the Second World War, its share in industrial investments came to 15-20 per cent, which, of course, went into small and tiny enterprises.⁴ However, even there the foreign monopolies held undivided sway. An American economist says: "Burma when it became independent had still a minute middle class."⁵

In this group of countries, the exceptions are India, Syria, the Lebanon, Egypt and several others where the national bourgeoisie became an important social force. In 1948, Indian companies and individual entrepreneurs accounted for 44 per cent of gross investments in the national economy. The local bourgeoisie accounted for 10 per cent of investments in the jute industry, for about 30 per cent in the mining industry, etc.⁶

In Tropical Africa, local enterprise was, as a rule, so weak that many economists believe—apparently with good reason—that it may be ignored.

In 1956, Senegal, one of the most developed countries in Tropical Africa in that period, had, according to the estimates of those who drew up the country's development plan, 5,000 entrepreneurs employing wage labour and 40,000 African

¹ *Economie et Politique*, October 1959, p. 25.

² A. Ayache, *Le Maroc*, Paris, 1956, p. 308.

³ *Démocratie nouvelle*, Paris, May 1957, p. 284.

⁴ See, N. A. Savelyev, *The National Bourgeoisie in the Asian Countries*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 40, 43, 95 (in Russian).

⁵ G. Wint, *The British in Asia*, London, s. d., p. 187.

⁶ Islam, *Foreign Capital and Economic Development: Japan, India and Canada*, Tokyo, Tuttle, 1960, p. 174.

traders. In 1962, of the 320 industrial enterprises Senegalese owned only 16, or about 4.5 per cent. That these were very small enterprises will be seen from the data available on seven of them: their aggregate capital came to 5,825,000 African francs, which made up only 0.60 per cent of the assets of one French company, Grands Moulins de Dakar.¹

In Mali only 0.06 per cent of the working population, mainly consisting of Frenchmen, was classified under the head of "entrepreneurs", which also included persons with household servants.² In 1950, the value of the product of that part of small-scale industry in the Ivory Coast which was owned by Africans came to only 270 million African francs, or just over \$1 million. The larger enterprises were almost entirely owned by non-Africans.³ In 1959, 1,722 local entrepreneurs in Ghana had an average annual income of £1,180, that is, under £100 a month. In Kenya, Africans owned about 4.2 per cent of the total capital of the companies registered in 1959. According to the data of the colonial administration, up until the mid-1950s, there was "no direct African participation in the manufacturing industry".⁴

It should be added however that the virtual absence of the national bourgeoisie is not tantamount to the absence in the social life of the countries concerned of pro-bourgeois and bourgeois tendencies, or of social and especially political groups (mainly consisting of intellectuals, officials, etc.) taking attitudes that would have been the bourgeoisie's if it had been there. The most profound economic basis for such tendencies is provided by petty-commodity production, the operations of the foreign monopolies, and the inclusion of the oppressed countries into the world capitalist economic system. The political basis is provided by the political effects of the above-mentioned economic factors and especially the influence of the world imperialist bourgeoisie and its ideology. These political and social groups could be designated as a "pre-bourgeoisie". Indeed, all, and even the relatively formed social

¹ M. Diop, *Classes et idéologies de classe au Sénégal*, Dakar, 1964, pp. 65, 46.

² *Outre-mer* 1958, Paris, 1960, p. 208.

³ S. Amin, *Le développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire*, Paris, 1967, p. 294.

⁴ *Some Notes on Industrial Development in East Africa*, Nairobi, 1956, p. 36.

sections in the oppressed countries have various "pre-class" features. In other words, they have yet to shed the specific features of the social groups from which they originated and have still a long way to go before fully acquiring new social features.

What needs to be especially emphasised is that as the data given above show local entrepreneurs in the oppressed countries, with a few exceptions, operated in the sphere of small-scale production, their enterprises being, in effect, midway between capitalist and handicraft-and-manufactory production. It is well known that capitalist production and the corresponding capitalist-type entrepreneur are fully established only when the employer of wage-labour is excluded from the production process and acts as its organiser. In the developing countries this implies the presence of at least 15-20 wage-workers. But in the light of the needs of political analysis and due consideration of the specific situation in these countries, it would be wrong blindly to accept the classical political and economic criteria in their "pure form". But in order to obtain a correct analysis it would also be wrong to forget this essential feature of local enterprise.

What is also important is that a sizable section of the national and not only of the comprador bourgeoisie was involved in the sphere of commercial operations, without, as a rule, acting as direct middleman between foreign capital and the local market.

It goes without saying that we are not dealing here with the great number of small and tiny merchants with insignificant amounts of circulating capital and meagre profits, which is a characteristic feature in many Asian and especially African countries. Now and again, this section may well act economically and politically as a peculiar reserve of the national bourgeoisie, but it would be wrong from every standpoint to refer to the bourgeoisie the small trading middleman, the stallkeeper, the owner of small retail shops, who—even with the maximum discount for the specifics of, say, African conditions—are at best no more than representatives of the petty bourgeoisie.

The weakness and specific character of the economic condition of the national bourgeoisie have, in effect, predeter-

mined its political potential. Of course, in the colonial and dependent countries the bourgeoisie retains some advantages in terms of *opportunities* in political education, and financial and other resources for setting up organisations and training personnel. The reprisals directed by the colonial administration above all at the most revolutionary and radical sections of the national liberation movement have also now and again served objectively to benefit the bourgeois groups and help them to consolidate their positions and influence in the movement.

Nevertheless, the national bourgeoisie was, as a rule, poorly organised in political terms. Only in a few countries did the parties and other political bodies it set up (the Indian National Congress in India, the Kuomintang in China, the Wafd and Saad in Egypt, the Nationalist and Liberal Parties in the Philippines, the National Congress in Ceylon, the Alliance Party in Malaya, the National Bloc in Syria, the Constitutional Party and the National Bloc in the Lebanon, etc.) have the character of efficient organisations enjoying important influence. In some countries of Asia and Tropical Africa, with the exception, perhaps, of Ghana, Madagascar and Senegal, the national bourgeoisie had no parties of its own at all.

Nor did it have any important political experience or established skills in nationalist propaganda and social demagoguery. Another political minus for the national bourgeoisie was the social and psychological marks left by its colonial origins. The political timidity and inertness, the lack of initiative and cohesion, the lack of purpose among the national bourgeoisie in many countries of Asia and Africa, the trepidation before and even adulation of imperialist capital and proneness to conciliation among some of its sections have been fed by the narrow economic basis, the close ties with landownership and land tenure, the "indistinct separation" from various forms of pre-capitalist relations and the consequent patriarchal and medieval tinge, and the frequent dependence on foreign companies.¹

¹ The national bourgeoisie, especially in the African countries, has in many instances in the colonial period—and frequently even after independence—to play the role of no more than an ancillary instead of an independent force with respect to the foreign monopolies.

Of course, the strongest factor operating in the same direction is the dual condition of the national bourgeoisie, which is determined by its deep-going contradictions both with imperialism and with the people.

The political potentialities of the local bourgeoisie have also been narrowed down because of the existence within it of a comprador section. Finally, one will easily understand that a society in which feudal and pre-feudal, patriarchal and tribal relations are still very strong and where "money-making" does not yet bestow a respected social status, as compared with the traditional types of activity, that such a society is far from ideal for the spread of influence by bourgeois groups.

In addition, at the stage of the struggle for independence, the national bourgeoisie was unable *in class terms* to have any serious support from international factors. Imperialism, as an international force within the framework of its world strategy, was not yet operating as a reserve of local capitalism in the oppressed countries, in their capitalist development. Although the USA, and frequently also the "traditional" colonial powers, flirted with the national bourgeoisie and encouraged it to some extent, this was not the main line of imperialism in the 1940s and even in the first half of the 1950s.

Its line as a whole was aimed above all to preserve the colonial system and only in exceptional cases to install patently puppet groups in power. As a result, this line, *objectively* at any rate, was aimed against the national bourgeoisie. With a few exceptions, for instance, in India and several other countries, the colonial regimes which were traditionally not habituated or adapted to pursuing a flexible line with respect to the local bourgeoisie, continued by momentum in their reprisals against the national liberation movement to strike out at the bourgeoisie as well, though not as severely as at other groups.

The colonialists had hastily to change their policy when it became obvious that power was bound to be handed over, while its traditional support—the feudals, the tribal élite and the comprador circles—were unable to go on playing the part. Britain, for instance, began to carry out the change in its East African colonies only in the mid-1950s, that is, some five or seven years before the winding up of the colonial regimes.

In 1955, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies H. Hopkinson, announced that the emergence of middle classes in the British overseas territories should be supported and encouraged by every means at the country's disposal. Among the numerous measures put through for this purpose, mainly in agriculture, were the abolition of regulations preventing Africans from growing export crops and establishment of various government agencies to help African farmers take part in growing these crops. In Kenya, a so-called Swinnerton Plan was adopted to step up the disintegration of tribal and community relations, introduction of private property in land, and development of a rural African bourgeoisie. Similar measures were also put through in Uganda and Tanganyika, where a special administration in the Department of Agriculture dealt specially with the introduction of export crops on African farms.

In the countries of East Africa, measures were also taken to stimulate the growth of the local industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. In the last few years before independence, the colonial administration in these countries set up all manner of funds and special banks to make loans and credits available to African entrepreneurs in industry and trade.

Another eloquent example of the same policy comes from the French Government's Constantine Plan in Algeria, under which 83 thousand million old francs went into Algeria's economic development in 1959 and 1960. Among the new officials recruited in 1959, 22 per cent were Algerians, for whom most of the vacancies in the colonial administration were reserved. Algerian officials, recruited mainly from the ranks of the bourgeois intelligentsia, together with Algerian businessmen who made fortunes on war contracts, were, in the opinion of the French imperialists, to make up the backbone of the "third force" to provide an internal social basis for the neo-colonialist regime.¹

But all these measures could not yield a rapid economic and political effect. The swing towards the new line with respect to the national bourgeoisie was frequently taken much too late to enable it sufficiently to fortify its positions.

¹ See, R. G. Landa, *The National Liberation Movement in Algeria (1939-1962)*, Moscow, 1962, pp. 237-39 (in Russian).

As a rule, the general radicalisation of the national liberation movement, stemming from the role and influence of international factors, the spread of anti-capitalist attitudes, and the growing activity of the proletariat and revolutionary democratic groups have exerted a vast negative influence on the strength and durability of the national bourgeoisie's political positions, on the character and content of these positions and on its political courage.

On the other hand, the bourgeoisie's political influence was favoured by the fact that class antagonisms in the oppressed countries were indistinct, that the main contradiction of their social development—that between imperialism and these countries—was of a national character, and that this tended largely to obscure the inadequately expressed internal social conflicts, which did not have any important competitive role to play. The bourgeoisie was also able to use the weakness of the parties and other organisations reflecting the interests of the working people.

Despite all these weaknesses and negative aspects, the national bourgeoisie appeared as *one of the motive forces* of the national liberation revolutions in many colonial and dependent countries of Asia and Africa, as a rule, where it already had more or less solid positions and, at any rate, as an *anti-colonial* and *anti-imperialist* force wherever it actually existed.

The weakness and shakiness of the bourgeoisie's positions and its political asthenia had the effect that, in contrast to the national liberation revolutions of the past, it acted as leader of the liberation movement only in a few countries like India, Syria, Egypt and Algeria. In Algeria, the local bourgeoisie proved to be incapable of maintaining its leadership just when the national liberation struggle led to the elimination of colonial rule and the emergence of an independent state. In Egypt and Syria, it lost its leading role in the second phase of the national liberation revolution, when it revealed its inability to tackle the tasks of national revival.

There has been no confirmation of some of the totally negative assessments of the anti-imperialist potentialities of the national bourgeoisie. Back in the early 1920s, the Comintern assumed that the bourgeoisie could act as the leader of the

national liberation movement and express the will of the nation for independent statehood.¹ Let us stress that the Sixth Congress of the Comintern rejected the views of some Communists, representing Communist parties in the metropolitan and in the colonial countries (Bennet, Rothstein, Narayan, and others), who believed that "the entire national bourgeoisie is simply counter-revolutionary and nothing else" and held nothing but anti-national comprador positions.² The Congress adopted the Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, which stressed that "the independence of the country in relation to imperialism, ... corresponds also to the interests of the national bourgeoisie", and that in this respect the "contradiction of interests between the national bourgeoisie of the colonial country and imperialism is objectively of a radical character".³

In his concluding remarks, Otto Kuusinen, who gave the main report on the colonial question at the Sixth Congress, rejected the sectarian amendments motioned by some delegates on the question of the national bourgeoisie, emphasising that it was not right to assert with certainty, in the general thesis of the Communist International, that "in all colonial countries, the possibility is excluded that a part of the national bourgeoisie, even if for a very short period only, would join up with the national-revolutionary camp" (emphasis added — *Auth.*).⁴

But the Thesis also said that "the native bourgeoisie, as the weaker side, again and again capitulates to imperialism", and that "the national bourgeoisie has not the significance of a force in the struggle against imperialism.... Its chief feature is that it exerts a *braking, retarding* influence on the development

¹ See, *Bulletin of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International* No. 32, December 9, 1922, pp. 17, 18, 19, 20.

² *International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 8, No. 39. Special Number, 1928, p. 1525.

³ *Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, Adopted by the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International, 1928*, London, 1929, pp. 24-25.

⁴ Kuusinen, "Concluding Remarks", *Sixth World Congress of the Communist International. International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 8, Special Number, 1928, p. 1526.

of the revolutionary movement" (emphasis added — *Auth.*).¹

This stand had apparently taken shape chiefly from the interpretation and excessive generalisation of the experience of the Chinese revolution² (above all the Kuomintang leaders' switch to the counter-revolutionary side), and also under the impact of various other factors.³

Of considerable importance also was the stand taken by some of those who represented the young Communist parties in the colonial and dependent countries. Their great enthusiasm over the triumph of the first proletarian revolution now and again made them overestimate the successes and immediate prospects of the liberation movement in their own countries. Besides, they were inclined to concentrate on the victory of the October Revolution rather than on the painstaking and arduous effort of the Bolsheviks, with their tactical flexibility and diversity of forms, which led to the victory. The Marxist-Leninist proposition which says that only a victory of the working class, only socialism can ensure the complete liberation of all the oppressed nations, was taken by them to mean that it was impossible to achieve liberation from the colonial yoke under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie, so that the only way was to establish the leadership of the working class. What is more, now and again they claimed that such leadership had already been established.

Some Marxists also drew the conclusion that the colonial regimes could be eliminated only if the national bourgeoisie was ousted from the leadership of the struggle or eliminated as an active participant, ignoring the important propositions of

¹ *Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, Adopted by the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International, 1928*, pp. 25, 31.

² L. Madyar, characterising the discussion of the colonial question at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, wrote that the "lessons of the revolutionary movements in India, Egypt, Indonesia, and mainly in China" (emphasis added — *Auth.*) made it possible to draw concrete conclusions "concerning the role of the national bourgeoisie in the revolutionary movements in the colonies" (see, *World Economy and World Politics* No. 11, 1928, p. 25).

³ See, *The Comintern and the East*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 139-42, 154-60 (in Russian).

the Thesis adopted by the Sixth Congress, warning that an underestimation of the "special significance which the bourgeois national-reformist, as distinct from the feudal-imperialist camp, possesses, owing to its mass influence on the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie, peasantry and even a portion of the working class, at least in the first stages of the movement, may lead to a sectarian policy and to the isolation of the Communists from the toiling masses".¹

There is obviously some similarity between the one-sided views of some Marxists and the stand taken by M. N. Roy, whom Lenin criticised. Let us recall that in his "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions", prepared for the Second Congress of the Comintern, Lenin said that "the Communist International must enter into a temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in the colonial and backward countries".² This view of Lenin's became the basis of the decisions adopted by the Second Congress and provided the Communists of the oppressed countries with a clear-cut tactical and strategic orientation.

Roy had opposed Lenin's view that the national bourgeoisie, to say nothing of the bourgeois-nationalistic forces in the broad sense of the word, are able to play a revolutionary role at definite stages and in definite conditions, and that the Communists should regard them as potential allies and should support them. In his memoirs, Roy said that he had disagreed with Lenin's view that the nationalist bourgeoisie played a historically revolutionary role and should, therefore, be supported by the Communists. He told the Fifth Congress of the Comintern that henceforth the anti-imperialist struggle could successfully develop only under the leadership of the working-class party.

The roots of this approach lay in an underestimation of the specific conditions in the oppressed countries and of the depth and acuteness of the economic and political contradictions between imperialism and the national bourgeoisie, and in

¹ *International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 8, Special Number, 1928, p. 26.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 150.

an overestimation of the pronounced nature of the class conflicts within the oppressed nations. They also implied inadequate consideration of the role of the national factor, of its psychological aspect, its unifying "supra-class" effect and, in this connection, also, of the role of nationalistic attitudes as a factor in the political behaviour of the bourgeoisie.

The profound contradiction between the urge of the national bourgeoisie to enhance its material and political condition, to rise to dominance in the country, set up a national state, develop the national economy, organise a national market and secure control of it, on the one hand, and the interests of the colonialists, on the other, determines the national bourgeoisie's participation in the liberation struggle. The fact that in certain conditions some of the aims of the national bourgeoisie (destruction of the colonial order, elimination of the sway of the foreign monopolies, creation of a national economy) coincide with the urge of the people creates for the bourgeoisie the possibility, in principle, also of acting as leader of the national liberation movement, and a vehicle of the nation's will to achieve independent statehood.

Of course, this possibility, like the readiness of the bourgeoisie to adopt *revolutionary* forms of struggle, is realised in the presence of a number of conditions, like the weakness of the working class, insufficient social differentiation, absence of any direct threat to the class interests of the bourgeoisie on the part of the working people, and, on the other hand, the weight of colonial oppression, active suppression of the bourgeoisie's activity by the colonial authorities, and so on.

The erroneous approach, which was considered above, in effect implied that the scheme of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia was applied to the social development of the colonies and semi-colonies, with unwarranted analogies being drawn between the stand of the Russian bourgeoisie and that of the national bourgeoisie in the countries of the East. This tended to ignore or underestimate the fundamental distinctions of the situation in these countries, which stemmed from their condition of *oppressed* and *exploited* nations, and the specifics of *colonial* revolutions.

Another fact that was underestimated was that from the very start of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, the idea had been to develop it into a socialist revolution, and that this was not just a slogan of some social group but a factor brought forward by the development of the revolution itself as a *practical* and *realistic* prospect, on the basis of the configuration of the class forces that was taking shape and the activity of the Bolshevik Party. In the oppressed countries, such a problem may not even arise at the stage of the movement to eliminate the colonial regimes, and that, too, was a fundamental premise for the national bourgeoisie's capability of leading the struggle.

The errors in approach to the national bourgeoisie were corrected on the basis of the material of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the documents of the International Meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957, 1960 and 1969, and the decisions of Communist parties in the developing, socialist and capitalist countries. These documents not only re-established the Leninist approach but also elaborated it in the new conditions after the Second World War, in the atmosphere of struggle between the two world systems, the disintegration of the colonial system and the rise of the oppressed countries to political independence.

A fundamental feature of the assessment of the national bourgeoisie in these documents is their dialectical character, for they start from the assumption that the contradiction between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism is at root fundamental, but that its expression and the corresponding political stand of the bourgeoisie largely depend on how acute and salient its antagonism with the working people and exploited masses of its "own" country is, on the stage of the national liberation struggle, on the impact of international factors and, finally, on the presence within the national bourgeoisie of sections with different economic interests. Hence the changing nature of the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist potential of the national bourgeoisie, ranging from ability to lead the national liberation struggle under colonial domination to the possibility of participating in it for the purpose of achieving political independence.

3. The Petty Bourgeoisie and the Middle Sections

A prominent place in the social organisation and social life of the oppressed countries, including the movement for national liberation, also belonged to the petty-bourgeois, nonproletarian and semi-proletarian intermediate sections: the civilian and military intelligentsia, the civil servants and employees, the small and petty traders, artisans, handicraftsmen, etc. Now and again, considering the stage of development of the countries concerned, these sections were disproportionately large with respect to the total population, a characteristic feature of the social structure of the oppressed countries. The authors of a Soviet monograph believe that the middle sections and the urban lower classes in the Asian and African countries make up roughly 65 per cent of all the urban inhabitants, with 26 per cent falling to the middle sections and 39 per cent to the urban lower classes.¹

While the term "intermediate sections" may be vulnerable, especially in the strict economic sense, it is politically highly appropriate, for it helps to designate by bringing out (always being mindful, however, of the *ad hoc* nature of this grouping) the sections which do not belong to the main classes but are inclined to hold similar or even identical political positions over a fairly long period, ranging over the first and a considerable part of the second stage of the national liberation revolution; they are also inclined to be moved by steadfast and militant nationalistic attitudes and easily and hotly to respond to nationalistic slogans.

In the conditions that have taken shape, primary importance in this conglomerate attaches to the *intelligentsia*, which in the former colonies and semi-colonies is now and again immensely more influential than in a society at a higher stage of development.

On the eve of independence, the social structure and social differentiation in many colonies was at a level of development

¹ See, *Classes and the Class Struggle in the Developing Countries*, Vol. I, p. 269 (in Russian).

that enabled the intelligentsia to play a special role in social life. Its political importance and positions could crystallise not only when it aligned itself with the stand of some class or was involved in its struggle, as it usually happens. The intelligentsia, as a stratum, had relative socio-political independence, with its social orientation emerging and being formulated within itself, in a manner of speaking. This situation was reinforced by the character of the national liberation struggle, and with respect to this struggle the intelligentsia was able at a definite stage to act more or less as a single force.

Education and culture is always an important trump card in social life and political struggle, but the power of this factor tends to multiply, as it does in the African and Asian countries at a definite stage of historical development when education and culture are in effect a virtual *monopoly* of one social group.

Under colonial regimes (and even to this day) the national intelligentsia, in most oppressed countries, at any rate, was, in effect, a microscopic islet of education in an ocean of illiteracy. In the oppressed countries, the percentage of illiteracy ranged from 70 per cent to 90 per cent.

The Share of Illiterates in the Population
of Some Developing Countries

Countries	Years	Per cent of illiterates
India	1959	92
Iraq	1959	90
Senegal	1964	90
Tanzania	1965	90
Uganda	1959	74.9

Source: UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook 1965*, Paris, 1966, p. 39.

Even in 1967, that is, after several years of independence and substantial successes in developing school education, the percentage of illiterate adults in Africa stood at 80 per cent, in

the Middle East countries at 59 per cent, in South Asia at 73 per cent and in East Asia at 42 per cent.¹

It is impossible to say precisely how numerous the intelligentsia was because of the lack of statistical data and also because there is not enough clarity on the relevant criterion to be adopted in the oppressed countries. Nevertheless, some fragmentary information available in various writings does provide a reference point. For instance, on the eve of independence the Belgian Congo, with a population of 13 million, had only about 1,500 native inhabitants with any education at all, including no more than five certified specialists.² According to the 1960 census, Ghana, with a population of 7 million, had 2,630 engineers and architects, 350 doctors, and 1,180 journalists, workers in the arts and writers.³ Throughout the whole of former French West Africa no more than 60 Africans received teacher and junior medical training every year. The Inter-African Conference on Higher Education, held at Tananarive in 1962, stated that 34 states and territories in Tropical Africa had only ten higher schools with a student body of 2,270.

Things were somewhat different in the more developed countries like India, Egypt and Syria, but there, too, the number of intellectuals, to say nothing of technicians, and also doctors and teachers, was small or even insignificant as compared with the total population.

Of course, one should bear in mind that, according to the standards of the oppressed countries, the intelligentsia also included the bulk of the officials and those employed by the colonial administration (now the state apparatus), and foreign and local bourgeoisie's enterprises, army officers, etc. What is more, it is safe to say that in the oppressed countries the bulk of the population consisted of wage-workers. Barbé even believes that "the African intelligentsia almost entirely falls within the

¹ OECD, *Development Assistance, Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, 1969 Review*, Paris, 1970, p. 204.

² Other sources put the number at 15 (*The Guardian*, Manchester, February 27, 1971).

³ 1960 Population Census of Ghana. *Advance Report of Volumes III and IV*, Accra, 1962, p. 68.

category of salaried employees (mainly public functionaries), persons of the liberal professions, constituting only an insignificant group. Whatever the specific problems arising before it, it is clearly distinct from the petty bourgeoisie".¹

This condition of the intelligentsia in the oppressed countries, which objectively approximates it with other labouring sections of society, quite naturally has highly important consequences for its political stand and attitude to imperialism. This is apparently connected with the fact that the intelligentsia in the colonial and dependent countries, although mostly originating from the well-to-do sections, is frequently less burdened with the acquisitive instinct than the bourgeoisie and stands closer to the masses and sympathises with their privations. Frequently, these intellectuals take the working people's standpoint. The growing role and prestige of the intelligentsia is also promoted by the fact that in virtue of its ties with the state apparatus and frequently also with the army it has additional instruments of influencing the course of events, which are of especial importance in the conditions of these countries. Of all the non-exploiting social groups, the intelligentsia also frequently has the widest experience in political struggle.

Finally, in many countries the intelligentsia enjoys especial influence to some extent because of the stability of the traditional tribal, caste and patriarchal bonds, because many intellectuals come from the aristocratic or tribal élite. This was due to the fact that in the colonial period only the scions of the opulent families, with a few exceptions, were able to obtain an education, however modest. In Ruanda-Urundi, for instance, where there were no secondary or higher schools, a young man wishing to study abroad had to pay a deposit of 50,000 francs.

Working in the same direction was the deliberate policy of the colonialists, which was dictated by their schemes with respect to the local intelligentsia. From the standpoint of the colonial powers (with only Belgium, perhaps, taking a specific

¹ R. Barbé, *Les Classes Sociales en Afrique Noire*, p. 110.

stand and pursuing its "direct administration" policy to the end), the formation of such a stratum, which was very narrow indeed, was also necessary to provide for the needs of the colonial administration, and to train local personnel loyal to the metropolitan country and adopting the outlook and preferences of its ruling classes, so serving as an important political and ideological instrument for bolstering the domination over the oppressed countries. This was quite frankly stated by the Governor-General of former French West Africa, Brévier, who declared: "Colonial duty, political and economic necessity set a dual task before our educational policy: on the one hand, to form local cadres called upon to become our assistants in all fields and ensure the development of a carefully selected élite; on the other, to educate the masses in a spirit of rapprochement with us.... From the political viewpoint, the issue is one of explaining our efforts and intentions to the natives, to attach them to French life."

The colonial authorities quite naturally expected that both these aims would surely be realised through social segregation, if the "intellectual élite" was shaped from the top section of local society, which mostly had traditional ties with the foreign oppressor regime. Another chief of the French colonial administration, Governor-General Roume, said: "We pick our pupils primarily from among the children of chiefs and aristocrats.... The prestige due to origin should be backed up by the respect which possession of knowledge evokes."¹

The same principle was applied in the British colonies. According to a 1953 study, 12 per cent of the students of Ghana's university college came from families with an annual income of over £600, 38 per cent from families with incomes of £250-600, and 50 per cent from families with about £250. These amounts were well above the annual average for Ghanaian families.

Indeed, some circles of the local intelligentsia, obtaining an education and corresponding training in the colleges set up by the colonialists and missionary outfits or in schools in the West, lost spiritual and political touch with their people, and tended closely to cooperate with and even to serve the colonialists,

¹ Quoted in *Africa: National and Social Revolution*, Prague, 1967, p. 206.

acting as apologists for the "civilising mission" of the imperialist powers.

But on the whole, the expectations of the metropolitan governments were not justified. The bulk of the local intelligentsia took up anti-colonial positions and joined in the liberation struggle, now and again sparking it off. What is more, many of the well-known and authoritative leaders of the national liberation struggle, in an ironic twist of history, came precisely from the élite on which the colonialists had put their stake and whose creation they had variously promoted, that is, the sons and grandsons of the well-to-do, the chiefs and the tribal and caste élite, whose loyalty did not appear to be in any doubt at all. Nor was this in any way impeded by the fact that some of these leaders had communed with the ideology and "values" of the bourgeois way of life and "Western civilisation".

Why did this happen? First of all, the literacy and education which the local intelligentsia variously enjoyed enabled it more clearly to realise the plunderous and oppressive character of the colonial system, the absurdity of colonial domination and its crying incompatibility with the stage of historical and social progress achieved by mankind and with modern legal and moral standards. Some education, the reading of the press and other writings, and also trips abroad¹—and this applied not only to civilians but also to the army intellectuals—enabled them to study the situation in other countries and learn of the major social changes taking place in the world. This, for its part, also helped to make the intelligentsia politically active and stimulated its opposition to the colonial regimes.

For the same reasons, international factors, the international class and ideological struggle, bourgeois-democratic, socialist and reactionary ideas as well, had the strongest effect on the stand taken by the intelligentsia, with the sections closest to the people being most profoundly influenced by the successes of world socialism, the scientific, technical and cultural advances in the socialist countries and the rise of the lagging nations.

¹ The first pockets and first organisations of the national liberation struggle frequently arose among the students who had studied in the metropolitan and other capitalist countries.

The idea of nation, of its grandeur and originality is one of those which patriotic intellectuals find the most attractive and stirring. They feel most keenly the colonialists' abuse of the national traditions and culture of the peoples of Asia and Africa, responding most acutely to the racist practices of the imperialists, their discrimination and segregation. What was also of considerable importance was that both the intelligentsia as such and the bulk of the officials and employees saw no special prospects before them, because the colonial regimes threw up all manner of obstacles to the development of science and education, while any senior administrative posts were reserved for foreigners.

In 1959, the year before Nigeria's independence, the senior posts in the administration were distributed as follows:

	Africans	Europeans
<i>Central institutions:</i>		
Senior posts	10	63
Permanent secretaries	1	13
Deputy permanent secretaries	2	18
Senior assistants of permanent secretaries	6	28
<i>Regional institutions¹:</i>		
Western region	70	117
Eastern region	43	90
Northern region	60	161

In the Belgian Congo, for instance, the training of Africans for senior government posts was started only ten weeks before the proclamation of independence. On the eve of independence in Ghana, 74 per cent of the 355 key government posts were held by Britons.²

All these, taken together, determine not only the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stand taken by broad circles of the

¹ K. Younger, *The Public Service in New States*, London, 1960, pp. 107-08.

² A. Rivkin, *The African Presence in World Affairs*, London, 1963, pp. 80, 82.

local intelligentsia in the oppressed countries, but also—with the proletariat and the bourgeoisie especially weak—its prominence in the national liberation movement. Patriotic, democratic-minded intellectuals have had an exceptionally active role to play in this movement, acting as the initiators, organisers or, at least, active participants in setting up in the oppressed countries anti-colonial and anti-imperialist parties and organisations, to which they conveyed their own socio-political orientation.

In most African and in some Asian countries the nationalistic intelligentsia may be said to have played a leading role in the national liberation struggle. In the struggle against colonial regimes in Tropical Africa, says Amath Dansoko, a spokesman for the Senegalese Marxists, "the political and ideological leadership of the intelligentsia was practically indisputable".¹ In some countries, including the Arab countries, the leading role in the struggle for national independence of the "middle sections represented by army officers and intellectuals" was noted by Khaled Bagdash, Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Syrian Communist Party.² Mohammed Harmel, Secretary of the CC of the Tunisian Communist Party, wrote about the national-democratic revolution "performed under the leadership of the middle strata".³

The African intelligentsia has played an important role in some countries by helping the proletariat organise and set up trade unions, and has exerted a marked influence on the shaping of its outlook, which had both a positive and a somewhat negative aspect, arising from illusions about the possibility of avoiding the class struggle. Within the framework of its political parties it also succeeded in uniting the urban population and the mass of peasants in the anti-colonial struggle. It should also be given a large part of the credit for the outstanding political role of the trade unions in the national liberation struggle.

All of this was an expression of the specific condition of the intelligentsia, and in a broader sense also of the intermediate

¹ *Africa: National and Social Revolution*, p. 211.

² *World Marxist Review* No. 11, 1964, p. 71.

³ *World Marxist Review* No. 1, 1972, p. 21.

sections as a whole in many, if not most, oppressed countries. As I have already said, these can be relatively independent in socio-political terms at a definite stage of social development and the national liberation movement, and actually play an autonomous role. But while operating as a national factor, the intelligentsia has never had—even at the first phase of the struggle—role of a "supra-class" force. On the contrary, as time goes on, it tends to express more explicitly the basic social tendencies of development: either the pro-bourgeois or anti-capitalist, however embryonic this may at first be. It is the intelligentsia and also the intermediate sections as a whole, that are the social groups whose internal tendencies, latent up to a point, do not warrant the conclusion that in the colonies and semi-colonies pro-bourgeois or anti-capitalist forces are absent or extremely weak even when there is no bourgeoisie or proletariat to speak of. This is also true of the period of struggle against the colonial regimes, although this applies rather mainly to the phase after the winning of independence.

However, it is characteristic that circles of the intelligentsia, roughly similar in origin and status, were the source from which sprang political groups and leaders of differing and even opposite political and social orientation, from pro-capitalist or pro-colonialist leaders like Philibert Tsiranana, Cyrille Adoula, Sutan Sjahrir and U Nu, to revolutionary democrats like Gamal Abdel Nasser, Sékou Touré, Kwame Nkrumah, Modibo Keita and Madeira Keita. This fact also shows that the direct social motivation of the political stand, of the political orientation of various groups of the intelligentsia and individual intellectuals is not as pronounced as it is in the developed countries. This may be due to the lack of differentiation in the social structure in the colonial and dependent countries, and witnesses to the great importance of other factors which are ultimately also, of course, of a social, class character, such as education, the political and cultural environment, the configuration of forces and the overall situation in the world arena, ideological influences in particular, and primarily of an international order, including the impact of progressive trends and organisations in the metropolitan countries.

Bourgeois analysts also put their own gloss on the importance of these factors. The US analyst Thom Kerstiens writes: "If the new élite in Indonesia and Ghana was conservative or progressive, pro-Western or anti-Western, religiously inclined or Marxist-orientated, much of this was due to the atmosphere and thinking which reigned in the organisation to which he belonged, the kind of European with whom he had been in contact, the kind of family which had received him into their homes—or did not want to receive him into their homes."¹

It should be said, on the whole, that in the colonies and semi-colonies the urge for socialism was widespread among sizable sections of the intelligentsia, although this, like their leftism and radicalism in general, was frequently not backed up with clear scientific views and corresponding political stand, but rested on fairly vague ideological notions. To a section of this intelligentsia may be applied the remark made by *The Guardian* about Antonio Arguedas, one-time Bolivian Minister of the Interior, who issued sharp attacks on US imperialist policy in the Western hemisphere: "Like 80 per cent of all Latin-American intellectuals he regarded himself as a Marxist—without attaching much importance to the definition of the term."²

Let us note in conclusion that the intellectuals who were employed as officials in the colonial administration naturally were less vigorous in the struggle against the colonialists and did not take an active and anti-imperialist stand.

Petty-bourgeois groups, above all those of the towns, and also the urban lower classes as a whole, had a marked role to play within the intermediate sections of the population in the colonies and semi-colonies. When dealing with the national bourgeoisie, I already emphasised, as a characteristic feature of many Asian and African countries, the existence of a large number of artisans, handicraftsmen, numerous small and petty traders, and dealt with some of their specific features. While the available data are scarce and apply partially to the

¹ T. Kerstiens, *The New Élite in Asia and Africa. A Comparative Study of Indonesia and Ghana*, New York, Washington, London, 1966, p. 186.

² *The Guardian*, Manchester, March 15, 1969, p. 10.

post-colonial period, they do give some idea of the size, and even to some extent of the character, of this stratum.

Thus, in Burma in 1957 cottage and home industry accounted for 96 per cent of the establishments and 43 per cent of the value of output.¹ That same year, 45,600 persons, or 34 per cent of the total number in manufacturing, were "self-employed".² In Thailand, this category made up 31 per cent, while another 17 per cent were listed as unpaid family workers.³

The situation was roughly similar in the Arab countries. In the early 1960s, Egypt had 46,000 handicraft workshops without wage-labour, 40,000 with one wage-worker, and over 36,000 with from two to four wage-workers. In 1954, Algeria had 120,000 small traders and handicraftsmen. In Morocco in the early 1960s, handicrafts were the main source of income for 250,000 traditional craftsmen with their dependants engaged in such activities, mostly on a part-time basis, producing articles valued at approximately £35 million per year.⁴ In the mid-1950s, over 25 per cent of the working population in Tunisia consisted of so-called "self-employed workers", of whom one-half were handicraftsmen, the rest being owners of small manufacturing and commercial enterprises.⁵ A selective study carried out in Amman in 1966 showed that handicraftsmen and unskilled workers made up 30 per cent of the working population.

Nor were the countries of Tropical Africa any exception, although the handicrafts and petty trade were especially weak and primitive because of the specific local conditions. Thus, in 1956 Senegal had 20,000 African handicraftsmen and 40,000 African traders (out of a population of 2.2 million). In Ghana, there were about a half-million mummies, market women whose annual income did not exceed £25. In the 1960s, the

¹ L. J. Walinsky, *Economic Development in Burma 1951-1960*, New York, 1962, p. 347.

² E. L. Wheelwright, *Industrialization in Malaysia*, p. 5.

³ R. J. Muscat, *Development Strategy in Thailand*, New York, 1966, p. 184.

⁴ *The Economic Development of Morocco. Report of a Mission Organised by the IBRD at the Request of the Government of Morocco*, Baltimore, 1966, p. 197.

⁵ G. Duwaji, *Economic Development in Tunisia*, New York, London, Washington, 1967, pp. 44-47.

Ivory Coast had about 20,000 petty traders, and in 1957 Uganda had 15,000 African traders with an annual turnover of £15-20 million a year. The circulating capital of African traders in Kenya and Tanganyika mostly never exceeded £10.

The usual difficulties of giving any quantitative characteristic of the class structure in the oppressed countries are especially formidable when it comes to the petty bourgeoisie, for the ceiling separating its better-off sections from the national bourgeoisie (with its peculiarities in these countries) is much too vague and indiscernible, and this especially applies to the floor, where it merges with the poorest section of the urban population. The material conditions of the bulk of the petty bourgeoisie are no better than those of broad sections of the working people, and are frequently worse than those of skilled workers and of the upper bracket groups of the proletariat as a whole. Now and again, these people belong to the lowest section of the urban population.

However, neither the direct "flow" of these social sections into other class groups, nor their hard material condition, nor even their ties with or subordination to pre-capitalist relations of production provides sufficient ground for saying that these sections are not petty bourgeois.¹

In this context, let us recall that Soviet scientists G. Mirsky and T. Pokatayeva have suggested² that in the classical sense of the word the petty bourgeoisie in the Asian and African and some Latin American countries was not as numerous as was usually assumed. They added that it was relatively small and in the countries of Tropical Africa very weak and virtually nonexistent here and there.

¹ Of course, considering that many habitual definitions at the present phase have to be applied to the one-time colonies and semi-colonies with a "tolerance", taking account of the profound peculiarity of the situation in these countries. While this is correct in itself, the lack of such "tolerance" may produce "European" associations and so be misleading and much too modernised. One should, apparently, always bear in mind that in many respects some of the present social entities in the developing countries are at the stage of shaping into classes, and in that sense are sooner to be considered as "pre-classes" (with the corresponding modern classes in mind).

² See, *World Economics and International Relations* No. 2, Moscow, 1966, pp. 44-45 (in Russian).

The two authors referred to the fact that the formation and growth of the petty bourgeoisie was connected with the "in-depth" development of capitalism, with the growth of local commodity production and the domestic market, and commodity-and-money relations. They said that in these countries the small-scale enterprises represented relations which were highly diverse in social content, ranging from primitive communal to bourgeois, including various transitional relations. The bulk of the so-called self-employed in agriculture and other branches of the economy did not belong to the petty bourgeoisie but was largely held in the grip of various pre-capitalist and neo-capitalist forms of dependence.

It cannot be denied that their arguments carry some conviction. Many other Marxist analysts take the same or similar approach to the question.

The social groups dealt with here are clearly, at the *present* stage of development, at any rate, *different* from the petty bourgeoisie in the countries with a modern class structure. Frequently, you might say, they have a peculiar touch both of medieval patriarchalism and lumpen-type pauperism. That is why the use of the term "petty bourgeoisie" to designate these groups is fairly relative, and there is certainly a need to seek a specific approach to them that is not confined to the framework of the notion of petty bourgeoisie, etc. But I should like to emphasise that all these considerations are meaningful only insofar as they are not treated as absolutes, only if there is a simultaneous understanding of the fact that these social sections, or a sizable part of them, at any rate, are petty-bourgeois in political behaviour, in socio-economic tendency and prospects of development. Indeed, it is they, together with some groups of the intelligentsia whose attitudes are not least importantly determined by their ties with these sections, that are the chief vehicles of the petty-bourgeois tendency in the oppressed countries. That is quite natural, for in the given political and socio-psychological context the petty proprietor in general stands closest to the petty bourgeois.

The petty bourgeoisie's dual position is well known. It is connected with private property and in virtue of this inclines to the bourgeoisie, to the pro-bourgeois elements. But it is also, as a rule, directly involved in the labour process, and this

approximates it with the working people, creates social, political and psychological bonds with them, and makes it possible for the petty bourgeoisie to join the latter in their revolutionary class struggle. All of this is even more characteristic of the urban petty bourgeoisie of the oppressed countries.

But the very close ties between the urban petty bourgeoisie in these countries and the working people, as a specific feature, is also due to its material condition and its continued connection with its social source, the peasantry in the first place. This, for its part, determines why it is fairly close to the working class, which frequently continues to have close ties with the peasantry. Tribal, religious, caste and other ties also operate in the same direction.

In virtually all the oppressed countries where the urban petty bourgeoisie has substantially developed, it has taken an active part in the national liberation movement. Indeed, its role was perhaps even more important than one could have expected, considering its share of the total population. It was induced to join in the struggle by the colonialist oppression, the exploitation and the ruinous competition from foreign companies, and also from the well-to-do compradors and the pressure from the money-lenders. There were also its close ties with the working people. Another important factor was the general political mobility of this social section, and its high sensitivity to nationalistic attitudes and also to religious fetishes.

In the national liberation struggle, the urban petty bourgeoisie mostly followed the nationalistic intelligentsia, some groups of which gave political expression to the aspirations of the petty bourgeoisie. In many oppressed countries, the urban petty bourgeoisie, together with other intermediate sections, took part in providing leadership in the liberation movement through these groups of the intelligentsia.

Finally, to complete this brief characteristic of the position and role of the chief social sections in the oppressed countries in the national liberation struggle and of their social features which have an effect on their stand and role, there is need to bear in mind that while the bulk of the tribal élite and feudals

sided with the colonialists, as was to have been expected, some elements in these social groups joined the anti-colonial movement, and this was another expression of the importance of the national factor in the oppressed countries.

* * *

What has been said suggests that the motive forces behind present-day national liberation revolutions at the stage of the struggle for political independence consisted of the working class, the peasantry, the national bourgeoisie, and the intermediate sections, notably the intelligentsia, which acts as the chief political and social spokesman. An alliance of these forces, in effect, took shape and operated in the course of the anti-colonial struggle in many countries.

Of course, because of the patchwork situation and diverse social structure in the various oppressed countries the role of these forces and their positions vis-à-vis each other in the national liberation movement were not the same. Different social sections acted as the chief motive force. Moreover, there were various combinations of these sections. In some countries, in view of the extreme weakness, embryonic state or even complete absence of the national bourgeoisie, it had virtually no marked role to play in the national liberation movement. Elsewhere, the working class was in the same position; finally, in other countries, the intermediate sections were relatively passive, while the proletariat played the leading role in an alliance with the peasantry.

However that may be, one must see the essential peculiarity of the motive forces of the present-day national liberation revolutions, as compared with the national revolutions of the past. This applies to the composition and specific features of these forces, their relationships, role and potentialities as moving and guiding factors in the revolution. In this connection, the central problem of leadership in the national liberation revolution has largely appeared in the new light.

The most general characteristic feature of the changes is the different balance of forces in the national liberation movement which has gone mostly against the bourgeoisie. This is the relative weakness of the bourgeoisie and the pro-bourgeois

groups as compared with the role they had to play in the national revolutions in the period before the general crisis of capitalism, and the growing role of the proletariat, the left-radical and frequently the right-radical petty-bourgeois, nationalistic forces. Here, the proletariat, as a rule, has some independent political representation, while the intermediate sections, the petty-bourgeois, nationalistic forces lay claim to it.

In earlier national liberation revolutions, the mass of people were unable to have any truly independent representation. Even where they succeeded in exerting an influence on the course of the revolution, the nature and scale of their influence was limited because of its bourgeois framework. Today, there are Communist and Workers' parties, whose influence ranges over sizable contingents of the proletariat, who operate under the banner of Marxism-Leninism, and have ties of solidarity with world socialism, and the international communist movement. As a result, the working class in many countries has the vanguard role and now and again acts as its leading force in the national liberation movement in many countries. Besides, in some oppressed countries, influential nonproletarian social forces taking an anti-capitalist orientation have taken shape. Those being the internal and international conditions, the working people's participation and their capability of leaving their own imprint on the course of the revolution may be qualitatively different, as compared with earlier national liberation revolutions.

The changing balance of class forces in the national liberation movement and in the world as a whole generates new potentialities and types of leadership in the movement, in addition to the traditional schemes. The example of a number of Asian countries since the Second World War has proved the Marxist conclusion that political forces representing the interests of the proletariat are capable of providing leadership in the national liberation revolution in our epoch.

At the same time, as I have already said, the idea that the proletariat is prepared *everywhere* to play such a role in these revolutions, and that the national bourgeoisie cannot provide leadership in the anti-colonial movement leading to independence has not been confirmed.

Indeed, the experience of the first postwar decade has provided the basis for the idea that the break with the colonial system of imperialism and the establishment of independent national states can take place under the leadership either of the proletariat—when the movement takes the socialist way—or under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie—when movement develops along the capitalist way.

The subsequent development of the anti-colonial movement, in an atmosphere in which international factors favouring it were being consolidated, and the development of the movement on the continent of Africa, together with a deeper analysis of the whole postwar experience of the national liberation struggle have made it necessary to correct these notions as well. It has turned out that the intermediate social sections, chiefly the intelligentsia, of whatever orientation, acting as a representative of these sections, and also the peasantry can provide leadership in the national liberation movement.

Ultimately, it is this "variant" of hegemony, this type of arrangement of class forces that has proved to be the most widespread in the present-day national liberation movement. Of the more than 70 colonial and semi-colonial countries which have risen to independence during the disintegration of the colonial system, in roughly 30—including the largest and most developed—leadership in the struggle for political independence was provided by the proletariat and its allies, or by the bourgeoisie and its allies. In all the other countries, it is the intermediate social sections, and frequently, also coalitions with other bourgeois or proletarian forces, that had the role of leader.

The very fact that the "third variant" of hegemony has prevailed on the continent of Africa sheds light on its main sources: the low social differentiation, the social and also the political weakness of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and frequently also their virtual nonexistence. With a more or less pronounced social differentiation and some level of class awareness in the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, either of these forces assumes leadership of the movement, and the "third variant" more often becomes impossible.

The representatives of the intermediate social forces providing hegemony in the national liberation movement frequently claim—often quite sincerely—that they are the vehicles of a “specific”, non-bourgeois and nonproletarian “third” way of development. Actually, regardless of their illusions or demagoguery, as the case may be, they are, of course, not representatives of any fundamentally specific social line of struggle.

Experience shows that the intermediate social forces are usually headed by the intelligentsia, both civilian and military, together with closely allied petty-bourgeois groups: intellectuals taking either a revolutionary democratic orientation, and ultimately looking to socialism, or those with pro-bourgeois tendencies and oriented—frequently only in the final count—upon capitalism. Depending on the orientation of the leading forces, the line of development of the national liberation revolution sooner or later points towards *only two* possible and socially antithetical variants: either socialism or capitalism.

But precisely in virtue of the *intermediate* character of the middle sections and their class peculiarities, they have not revealed this orientation of theirs—whether capitalist or anti-capitalist—all at once, directly or in a “pure form”, but only gradually, seeming to incline towards that orientation in the course of *further* development, and only *in the final count*. Wherever pro-bourgeois positions were ultimately adopted, this was now and again not a demonstration of the real face that had for the time being been covered up with a demagogic mask, but a natural expression of the social condition and corresponding orientation.

International class forces have a tremendous role to play in the shaping of the social orientation of the intermediate sections, acting something like a substitute for the absence of such factors at home or compensating for their weakness.

This peculiar, “drawn-out” form in which the social orientation of the intermediate sections is expressed with great vacillation is one of the key reasons why there are still many countries in the Afro-Asian world whose way of development (in terms of *conscious* policy of the ruling regimes, and not

social and economic elements) has yet to be determined even at the present stage.¹

This is also to some extent connected with the fact that the revolutionary democratic forces provide leadership in the national liberation movement, rise to power and assume an anti-capitalist orientation not only at the phase of the struggle for political independence, but also at the second phase, with the bankruptcy of the bourgeois and pro-bourgeois forces and frequently the collapse of their illusions with respect to these forces and also to the international bourgeoisie.

Although the countries where the proletariat or the revolutionary democrats provide leadership in the national liberation movement are in a minority, the fact that they do provide such leadership is of exceptional importance politically and theoretically, for it shows the emergence of new social tendencies and prospects, which constitute an essential feature and characteristic of present-day national liberation revolutions.

¹ In view of this, such countries are frequently regarded as taking an intermediate position between the young states of other social orientation.

CHAPTER FOUR
SPECIFIC IDEOLOGICAL FEATURES
OF PRESENT-DAY
NATIONAL LIBERATION REVOLUTIONS

Present-day national liberation revolutions also largely have different ideological equipment as compared with national liberation movement of the past. Here, the spirit of the epoch has an especially profound influence. That is understandable, because ideological forms, for all the stability of many of their traditional and archaic aspects, are perhaps the most mobile part of social processes, especially in present-day conditions. It is here that the ongoing changes are most pronounced and the influence of general historical tendencies is most keenly felt.

Nationalism is the traditional ideology for any national movement, and virtually the natural one in the epoch before the October Revolution. Only the national movements developing within the general framework of the October Revolution first took a different path, that of patriotism and internationalism. This example, demonstrated by the October Revolution, had a profound effect on the subsequent development of the ideology of national liberation revolutions, something no national movement of our day has escaped.

This great role of internationalist, patriotic ideology also highlighted the national liberation revolutions of the postwar period which were led by the Communist parties and which developed into the socialist reconstruction of society. That was, in fact, an expression of the specific features of present-day national liberation revolutions in the sphere of ideology.

At the same time, nationalism was the dominant ideology in the development of the other present-day national liberation

revolutions, that is, of their majority. The massive forces of the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist struggle acted under the banner of nationalism, which was the basis of the ideology, slogans and practical activity of virtually all the non-communist political parties and organisations in the oppressed countries. Even the patently pro-colonialist, pro-imperialist groups did not escape its influence to some extent.

Many leaders of the national liberation movement have characterised nationalism as the cornerstone of the ideology and policy of the patriotic forces. In 1952, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote that "any other force, any other activity that may seek to function [in Asia—*Auth.*], must define itself in terms of this nationalism".¹ Seven years later he emphasised again that "nationalism is still the strongest force in Asia"². Sockarno spoke out in the same spirit: "The world is passing through the period of Asian and African nationalism.... For us of Asia and Africa, nationalism is a young and progressive creed.... It is the mainspring of our efforts."³

Nasser also repeatedly emphasised the great importance of nationalism for the destiny of the Arab peoples. In August 1960, he told Woodrow Wyatt, a member of the British House of Commons, that nationalism in Egypt was a motive force, and that the people stood for nationalism and regarded it as a desirable and firmly established ideology.

However, there are new elements in the ideology even of these national liberation movements. Here the bourgeois, petty-bourgeois and patriarchal ideology, which is widespread in the most backward oppressed countries, no longer enjoyed their erstwhile monopoly with the growing ideological crisis of capitalism, and with the ideals of equality and friendship among nations established in practice in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, democratic and anti-imperialist, and socialist ideas have made ever greater headway in the national movements.

¹ *Asian Nationalism and the West*. Ed. by W. L. Holland, New York, 1953, p. 353.

² *A.I.C.C. Economic Review*, New Delhi, March 15, 1959, p. 7.

³ The Foreign Minister's Report to Parliament on President Sockarno's Tour, May 14-July 3, 1956, Djakarta, s. d. pp. 50, 51.

In the present-day national liberation movements there is an internationalist trend, which is frequently strong. It is represented mainly by the Communist parties and the social forces under their influence, and has been exerting an influence on the advanced public circles in their countries.

What is also equally important is that the nationalism of the nations oppressed by the colonialists has itself been under the influence of both that trend and of the internationalist stand taken by the socialist world.

This needs to be considered in greater detail. Let us recall that the character and peculiarities of nationalism in the oppressed countries of Asia and Africa, first and foremost at the phase of the struggle for independence, not only provided the impetus to the working out in the second half of the 1950s, mainly after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, of an attitude to it on the basis of Lenin's propositions about the nationalism of oppressed nations.¹ They also provided the stimulus for some specification of the general theoretical conceptions of nationalism contained in various other scientific publications.

Up until then, the view was fairly widespread in literature that nationalism was a reactionary ideology and a policy of fanning mistrust and hostility among nations, and no more. This view was one-sided and imprecise in theoretical and epistemological terms, and politically considered virtually only *reactionary* nationalism, to which it reduced nationalism in general.

Lenin's propositions imply a broader and dialectical approach to nationalism. This is an ideology and policy, and also a mentality which regard the national as the highest form of social unity that is above history and above class, in face of which all other forms of social unity, including class connections and class divisions, recede into the background and are obliterated; it is seen as a harmonious whole with an identity of basic interests of its constituent social sections and individuals, in which these are dissolved and levelled out. What is here set up as the national interest is the aspirations and purposes of

¹ See, V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 411-12. This Lenin's proposition has been elaborated in the CPSU Programme (see, *The Road to Communism*, p. 493).

the class or social group which in the given concrete historical conditions acts as a vehicle and bearer of the nationalistic ideology and policy: the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and so on.

Substantiating this approach, the ideologists of nationalism frequently claim that social condition and class bonds are mobile (most frequently assuming that classes are groups with different incomes), while national bonds are allegedly "everlasting", originating in ancient times and determined by all manner of extra-historical or similar factors: biological, psychological and religious. In other words, the objective fact that national bonds are highly stable is used by the ideologists of nationalism, bourgeois sociologists in particular, to present them as "natural" and as being more essential than class relations.

Nationalism, ultimately an ideological derivative of exploitative social relations, is always latent — alongside the principle that the nation is the supreme form of social unity — with ideas of national superiority and national exclusiveness, which are more or less developed, depending on the historical situation, on the relationships between that nation and other nations, and also to some extent on tradition. In epistemological terms, nationalism is based on the treatment of the national factor as an absolute.

Although in political practice, nationalism has been used directly as an instrument by various class forces acting as its vehicles and bearers, it does not always express only narrow class interests. The character of nationalism and its socio-historical role as ideology and policy tend to change with the social position, social nature and role of these class forces, their ties with the people, the historical state of development in progress, and the balance of class forces not only in the given country, but to some extent also on a world scale, and on the position held by that nation within the system of international relations.

All these factors can determine and modify the form and fullness of expression of the fundamental ideas of nationalism. What is most important is that these factors determine the concrete political meanings of these ideas and the social role of nationalism as a whole. From this follows not only the fundamental distinction between, say, the nationalism of an

oppressed and an oppressor nation, or the substantial distinction between bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalism, and the nationalism of a big and a small nation. From this also follows the dialectical character of these "nationalisms" among the same, concrete nations and the possible and even inevitable dynamic of their role, ranging from progressive to reactionary, and now and again, conversely, the possibility of their mutual transition and transformation, and the corresponding need to take a dialectical approach in assessing them.

The extent to which national, patriotic interests are *also* reflected in nationalism at a given period determines its potential and relative progressiveness, and the preponderance within it of the general democratic content over reactionary tendencies.

Let us consider, for instance, bourgeois nationalism in the period in which the nation takes shape. The establishment of national bonds was simultaneously a process of deep-going socio-economic changes: the collapse of feudalism, the establishment of capitalism, and the triumph of bourgeois democracy and bourgeois freedoms. It was this inner interlacing and merger of the social and national process that determined the social role of nationalism, which while providing the slogans for democracy was also the ideological banner of the rising bourgeoisie in its fight against feudalism.

Although democracy, for which the bourgeoisie fought, did not go beyond the framework of the relations of commodity production, it was also of concern to the mass of people, including the working class, for whom it implied the elimination of feudal bondage and frequently also of national oppression, and in consequence variously involved them in politics, paving the way for their grouping into classes and for the class struggle. Lenin stressed: "The awakening of the masses from feudal lethargy, and their struggle against all national oppression, for the sovereignty of the people, of the nation, are progressive."¹

The character of nationalism changed with the entry upon the epoch of fully established capitalist relations and the growth of capitalism into imperialism. In the new epoch under

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 34.

capitalism there is "...the development and growing frequency of international intercourse in every form, the break-down of national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc."¹ This objective tendency in which the nations are drawn closer together is expressed under capitalism through the subordination of weak nations by the strong, through colonial enslavement and plunder of the great bulk of the globe's population by a handful of "civilised" nations.

Accordingly, bourgeois nationalism in the imperialist countries has gradually lost all its progressive content: it has become aggressive, bellicose chauvinism, and the nationalism of oppressor nations. In our day, the imperialist bourgeoisie seeks to use nationalism in order to distract the proletariat from its class purposes, to split the international unity of the working people and to harm the cause of socialist and communist construction.

But while bourgeois nationalism in the developed capitalist countries now has on the whole a reactionary role to play, that does not mean that it cannot ever develop "in reverse" (to say nothing of the petty-bourgeois nationalism in these countries) within various limits, however circumscribed, in certain historical conditions which invest the national factor with a special meaning, and *in the given historical period and within a definite framework* can invest even the idea of national exclusiveness with an additional and not so reactionary meaning. An example is offered by the nationalistic stand taken by that section of the French bourgeoisie which refused to collaborate in the period when Hitler occupied Western Europe, or its anti-American nationalistic tendencies in the postwar period, which were most vividly expressed in de Gaulle's policy. There, bourgeois nationalism's edge directed against nazism and then also against the expansion of the US monopolies invested that nationalism with a definite progressive content. There was good reason why the French Communist Party duly appreciated this nationalistic tendency, taking account of it in its activity, and believing that it could serve the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 27.

But the very same idea of France's "mission" and "grandeur", when directed against the peoples of Asia, Africa and Central America enslaved by French imperialism, and serving the interests of the exploiters, continued to have its old and unquestionably extremely reactionary meaning.

We find the same historical mobility of the social role and possibility of mutual "transition" when considering the nationalism of the big and the small nations. Just as in the case of the nationalism of the oppressed and the oppressing nations, this nationalism operates at one time and within one system of relations as the nationalism of a small nation expressive of general democratic content, and at another period—and frequently also at the same time—and in a different hierarchy of international ties plays the part of the nationalism of a big nation aimed to ensure the privileges of *that* nation and its ruling élite. The Third World abounds in facts of this kind. If, say, present-day Brazilian nationalism in face of imperialism can play the role of the nationalism of an oppressed nation, in other international, inter-state relations this is a nationalism that is already capable of acting in the opposite capacity, as the nationalism of a big, oppressing nation. The oppressive policy pursued by the former ruling circles of Pakistan with respect to the people of Bangladesh and their urge to suppress its national liberation struggle and fan chauvinistic attitudes in the western part of the country is even more characteristic in this context.

Another circumstance needs to be emphasised. Classes and social groups infused with nationalistic ideology unquestionably act as vehicles and bearers of nationalism and variously leave their imprint on it. That is the sense in which one can and must consider not only bourgeois, but also petty-bourgeois and even feudal, etc., nationalism. What is also incontestable is that there is a need, which has long been there—not least importantly in connection with developments in the zone of the national liberation movement—for a special consideration of petty-bourgeois nationalism, particularly as a *political phenomenon*, especially since one can rely here on Lenin's original proposition on this matter.¹

¹ See, V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 549; Vol. 20, pp. 453-54; Vol. 21, p. 403; Vol. 31, pp. 148, 150.

However, the starting point here should apparently be that the basic ideological framework of nationalism as such—nationalism "proper"—is more or less similar to bourgeois nationalism. Nationalism is ultimately always the same in its fundamental tenets, its basic ideological and theoretical positions, and not, of course, as a concrete politico-economic programme or in its social role. Petty-bourgeois nationalism, as an ideology, cannot be regarded as a totally specific social phenomenon, but should be more correctly seen as a phenomenon that is ideologically not independent or, at any rate, dependent with respect to bourgeois nationalism. So that when bringing out petty-bourgeois nationalism and making a study of its specifics, one should constantly bear in mind the legitimate boundaries for this separation, whenever it comes to the fundamental substance of this ideology.

For petty-bourgeois nationalism, the same cornerstone principles are characteristic: it also sets up the nation (and national rights) into an absolute, holding it up over and above class divisions, putting forward the task of constituting and perpetuating national divisions and national distinctions at any price, loudly or tacitly assuming the superiority of its own nation. It is true that in view of the specifics of the petty bourgeoisie these principles are frequently, especially in words, not carried to the end (for instance, the stand taken is not that of national superiority but of national narrowness, egocentrism). Besides, and this is now and again of primary importance, petty-bourgeois nationalism bears the marks of opposite, including progressive influences.¹

Is this fundamental similarity a spontaneous derivative of the social nature of the petty bourgeoisie, a copy of the relations which determine its life? Or is it the result of a mere borrowing, the result of influence exerted by bourgeois political groups and the bourgeoisie as a class? All these factors are apparently important. What is most important is that the petty bourgeoisie, in consequence of its social condition, has no

¹ This is especially true of petty-bourgeois nationalism in Asia and Africa, with its tendency to unite with socialist slogans.

true social independence either in the sphere of ideology or in the sphere of politics.

Petty-bourgeois nationalism is engendered by the same relations of private property, relations of exploitation in antagonistic society, and these relations—and, consequently, their ideological reflection as well—are most fully developed under capitalism.

Nor does any dependent ideological importance attach to feudal and the whole of pre-bourgeois “nationalism”, although it is important to note its existence in contrast to the once prevailing conviction that nationalism is *entirely* a product of capitalist relations and of bourgeois society. Actually, it is rather a peculiar “pre-nationalism”, containing definite elements and beginnings of that which is to unfold into a special ideology. That is quite natural. The extensive development of nationalism is as a rule, or was in the past, at any rate, connected with the process of the formation of nations, and it obtained great scope during the disintegration of feudalism and the rise of capitalism.

By putting forward the idea of the nation as a category over and above class (“all citizens are equal”)—at the time the bourgeoisie was in need of this attitude not only to counter the attempts on the part of the working people to realise their own class interests, but above all to fight feudalism and the aristocracy—bourgeois nationalism *in that period* linked up with democratic slogans and the elimination of the estates. The feudals were unable to take this approach because of the nature of the relations on which they relied. For them the hierarchy of the estates—with the knighthood and nobility at the top—was paramount. For the French feudal lord in the epoch of the High Middle Ages, the German count was much more kin than the French “rabble”. This proximity of the *social positions* was extolled ideologically.

This starting general theoretical and political view of nationalism is necessary for a correct characteristic of the nationalism of the oppressed nations, and for an analysis of the specifics of nationalism in present-day African and Asian national liberation revolutions, so as to clarify its social role, notably at the stage of the struggle for political independence. But it is also important to take into account that the

fundamental propositions that I have set forth bear on nationalism in general and its various brands. Meanwhile, the concrete specifics of the conditions, of the time and place may leave a strong imprint on the content and forms in which nationalism is expressed. In the oppressed countries of Asia and Africa, their colonial condition, imperialist oppression, the weakness or even absence in many instances of the local bourgeoisie, the relatively independent political role of the petty bourgeoisie and the intermediate sections, which is of importance for a long time, and various other factors necessarily had an effect on the character of nationalism. The influence of the socialist world has also had an important role to play.

The first thing that needs to be said is that African and Asian nationalism in that period¹ had the fundamental features which were characteristic of the nationalism of any oppressed nations, with the general democratic content fully represented and, what is more, as a rule playing the leading role.

At the same time, a key feature of nationalism in present-day national liberation revolutions, which distinguishes it from the nationalism of oppressed nations in the earlier epoch² and also creates something of a divide between them, is *the edge against imperialism and colonialism. This is anti-imperialist and frequently*

¹ This nationalism, despite the vast diversity of the conditions in the Asian and African countries, is treated here as a single whole. This approach *with respect to the phase here considered and for the given concrete purpose*, bearing in mind the character and specifics of national liberation revolutions, appears to be legitimate. Of course, nationalism had its specifics in each country in consequence of their different political and economic conditions and the arrangement of class forces. These specifics were also determined by the different social forces acting as its standard-bearer. However, they do not bear on the main thing. The colonial and semi-colonial condition of these countries, the same stage of development through which they were going, the profoundly expressed general national character of the liberation struggle and, as a rule, the less than full expression of social differentiation *in that period* determined the common basic and fundamental features of nationalism and its socio-political importance in the countries of Asia and Africa.

² To say nothing of nationalism in the period of bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions in various West European countries and also to some extent in the USA, where its development was far from always directly connected with responses to foreign oppression, but merely operated as an

revolutionary nationalism. Its edge—and this is highly essential—was directed not only against “its own” metropolitan country, but also against imperialism as a whole.

In addition, this nationalism (in the ideological field and not in the individual mentality of the vehicles of nationalistic attitudes, of course) was less prone to “personify” its enemy (against the “French”, the “English”, etc.) although this has undoubtedly occurred. That is the result of a clearer understanding of the socio-economic and political sources of oppression and the responsibility for this falling on the social system concerned.

Besides, there was also the effect of the specific feature of nationalism in present-day African and Asian national liberation movements which is connected with the character of the contradictions from which they stem, and its formation in socio-historical terms on a different basis than in the past. It was not confined to the sphere of *international* ties of some countries or peoples, but bore on the relations with imperialism as a whole.

The anti-imperialist and anti-colonial basis on which nationalism took shape in the oppressed countries of Asia and Africa and the impact of the world situation reinforced and intensified within it the general democratic content which is inherent in the nationalism of oppressed nations, and determined a number of its specific features in this sense, exerting an effect on the tenor and expression of the fundamental features of nationalistic ideology. Take the proposition about national unity as a sovereign entity obliterating social divisions which was put forward by nationalist leaders and ideologists in the countries of the East.

Thus, Nehru stood for the unity of the nation and regarded India's unity as being the most important, and all the rest secondary. He also emphasised that India's future would be quite secure through a combination of nationalism and modernism.

ideological expression of the formation of the nation under the sponsorship of the bourgeoisie, providing it with a banner in the fight against feudalism, for the establishment of capitalist relations and domination over its “own” people.

In that period, President Nasser repeatedly declared that every Arab believed in Arab nationalism, and spread the idea of affection for one's compatriots, condemning the system of political parties, notably for spreading the seeds of division among the “children of Egypt”.

Similar statements also came from Soekarno, who said that the word “national” means a big family. Sastroamidjojo, Indonesia's ambassador to Argentina, formulated his country's “national conception” as meaning that all the strata of society, without exception, should cooperate with each other for the welfare of the nation, and that the emphasis on acute political differences could lead to civil war.

However, the concrete historical conditions in the colonial and dependent countries, where national ties are formed in the struggle against colonialism and the feudalism it supports, and where there is an anti-imperialist struggle for national liberation, invested this idea with considerable progressive significance. It acquired an explicit anti-imperialist, anti-feudal tenor, operating not only as an idea of class cooperation, but above all as an idea of the anti-imperialist sovereignty of nations in political and economic terms. This is expressed in many statements by prominent leaders of the national liberation movement.

Remarking on the impact of nationalist ideas, Nehru said: “Modern nationalism has been reaction against foreign imperialism and racialism.”¹ The same idea was emphasised by Soekarno: “For us, nationalism means the re-building of our nations; it means the effort to provide equal esteem for our peoples; it means the determination to take the future into our own hands. For us, nationalism is the love of country and the determination to improve it.... We are nationalists, for it is our right to win back the worthy place in the family of nations torn from our forefathers three and a half centuries ago.”² In this context, interest attaches to the remarks made by Roeslan Abduhgani, Secretary-General of the Bandung Conference, who said that most delegates at the conference kept emphasising

¹ A.I.C.C. *Economic Review*, New Delhi, April 1, 1959, p. 5.

² The Foreign Minister's Report to Parliament on President Soekarno's Tour, May 14-July 3, 1956, pp. 51, 55.

ing that nationalism and anti-colonialism in Asia and Africa were irrevocably linked together.¹

In his statements, Nasser also insisted that Arab nationalism protected the Arab peoples from imperialist plots, being a potent weapon in the struggle against aggression and foreign domination. It gave the Arabs strength in the protracted struggle which they carried on for freedom. Nasser also stressed that the idea of Arab nationalism meant the brotherhood of the Arab peoples in the fight against exploitation and imperialist domination, the sovereignty of the entire Arab nation, the independence of the Arab peoples and the raising of their living standards. Nasser characterised unity of all the sections of Egypt's population as the primary means for ensuring security as the nation took shape. And here is how the nationalist credo was characterised by Jacques Rabemananjara, a leader of the Malagasy national movement and subsequently the country's Vice-President. He said: "They became nationalists because they want to enjoy the plenitude of national sovereignty, because they seek the dignity of being major nations."²

Thus, one of the cornerstones of the nationalistic ideology in the African and Asian nationalism of oppressed nations—the idea that national entity was over and above class—was directed mainly against the system of enslavement imposed by the imperialists and also against their feudal and comprador allies. In this context, nationalism itself acquired the essential features of an anti-imperialist ideology.

It goes without saying that none of this killed the reactionary element of the principle. The idea of the national entity was also variously used to hamper the class self-determination of the masses, like the advocacy of class peace and class cooperation, which is to be found in the writings and speeches of nationalist leaders.

¹ *Foreign Affairs Reports*, Vol. 4, No. 8, New Delhi, 1955, p. 105. One could remark that it is wrong to start only from the statements made by nationalistic leaders and ideologists, but it is hardly correct to ignore the objective content which may be discerned in the statements which are similar among the nationalists of all countries. The important thing is what precisely they declared and spread when they addressed the masses.

² J. Rabemananjara, *Nationalisme et problèmes malgaches*, Paris, 1959, p. 83.

Meanwhile, nationalist leaders and theorists in the oppressed countries of Asia and Africa have always denied that their ideology of nationalism included the idea of national exclusiveness and national superiority, another central plank of nationalism. Thus, Soekarno repeatedly stressed that his nationalism was free of chauvinism,¹ and that "nationalism cannot flower if it does not grow within the garden of internationalism".² Roeslan Abdulgani, a compatriot and associate of Soekarno, insisted that one of the "more important ingredients" of this nationalism was "a consciousness of the world", which, it is true, had a subordinate role to play, so long as colonialism was still there and national independence had yet to be fully realised.³

We find similar statements made by Nehru, Nasser, Panikkar, Sastroamidjojo and others. Nehru repeatedly came out against national narrow-mindedness, and for internationalism. For his part, Nasser used to say that Arab nationalism was not aimed against any country that did not interfere in the Arab countries' internal affairs and respected their independence. Rabemananjara stressed that hostility to other peoples was necessarily alien to Malagasy nationalism, because it ran counter to the "consciousness of a cosmic fraternity which is the essence of our civilisation".⁴

Of course, from the Marxist standpoint there is no question about nationalism in the present-day national liberation movement of the Asian and African countries being a fundamentally special nationalism free from the tendencies of national antagonism and chauvinism. In virtue of its social nature, nationalism is always latent with national and class antagonisms, chauvinism, etc.

While emphasising this aspect, one cannot altogether ignore the statements by the ideologists of nationalism about the "internationalism" which is said to be inherent in nationalism in Asian and African countries. Behind these statements lies a

¹ See, *New Times* No. 30, Moscow, 1956, p. 5.

² *The British of Pantjasila. An Outline of the Five Principles of the Indonesian State*, Jakarta, 1958, p. 24.

³ *Foreign Affairs Reports*, Vol. 4, No. 8, New Delhi, 1955, p. 101.

⁴ J. Rabemananjara, *Nationalisme et problèmes malgaches*, p. 149.

definite content which is of special importance in the context of the struggle against the colonial regimes. The point is that the development of the idea of national superiority and national exclusiveness was slowed down by the anti-colonial tenor of nationalism, the conditions of the liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples, which induced an awareness of the objective place of that struggle as a component part of the world revolutionary process and the strengthening of ties with the worldwide anti-imperialist forces and consolidation of these peoples' mutual solidarity.

Indeed, the impact of the idea of anti-imperialist solidarity stemming from the anti-colonial struggle on the ideology of nationalism is unquestionable. This idea is also obviously akin to those connected, especially at the stage of the struggle for political independence, with the ideology of nationalism in the oppressed countries, like the idea of national anti-colonial unity and national sovereignty. That this is the right conclusion will be seen from various statements and writings.

Roeslan Abdulgani has said, for instance, that "Asia and Africa are united by a common nationalism" and that "...throughout that vast area ... there is a common anti-colonial outlook and a common pro-national sentiment. That sentiment is a strong cementing factor which, at this stage of development, binds the area together".¹ For his part, K. M. Panikkar spoke about "Asianism" and added that it sprang from "the common experience of a hundred years".² Similar views have been expressed by many West European, American and Japanese sociologists.³

The tendency towards national exclusiveness was also contained by the fact that in the oppressed countries racism and chauvinism had been compromised, for they had been used by imperialism for decades as one of the chief ideological weapons for suppressing the peoples in these countries.

Let us note, in this context, the statement made at the Bandung Conference by Syria's Khaled el-Azem. He said: "We harbour no motives of imperialism for, at times, we were the

¹ *Foreign Affairs Reports*, Vol. 4, No. 8, New Delhi, 1955, pp. 102, 101.

² K. Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance*, London, 1954, p. 494.

³ See, *Asian Affairs*, Vol. I, No. 4, Tokyo, 1956, p. 394.

victims of foreign domination.... We favour no discrimination of race, of colour, of language or of creed for, at times, we were and still are targets of discrimination. We aim at no exploitation, no intimidation and at no conquest, for our resources had been subjected to exploitation, our political life to intimidation and our countries to conquest."¹

At the same time, the idea of national exclusiveness and superiority made itself known at the first phase of the national liberation struggle, even if not in such loud terms as in the subsequent phase. Now and again, the actual explosion of national sentiment, which occurs in the vast zone of the former colonies and semi-colonies, also assumes the form of spreading attitudes akin to chauvinistic ones.

However, the important thing is not to consider solely from this angle the tendency which is fairly widespread among nationalists, including left radicals—and accordingly in nationalistic ideology—to insist on a totally unique way of life, social institutions, outlook and mentality of their peoples, the unique character of their civilisation and contribution to world history, and even on "special mission" of these peoples in the modern world. This is largely an expression of the need for national self-assertion (even after the elimination of colonial regimes) in face of the oppression and inequality, in contrast to national nihilism, which was spread by the colonial administration and which infected some social groups in the oppressed countries. It is a kind of "response" to the colonialists' policy, and their mockery of the oppressed peoples' dignity and culture.

The well-known British Africanist, Basil Davidson, says: "So great has been the down-thrusting impact of colonial rule that many Africans have come to share this denigration of their own historical achievements. Both inside and outside the continent, people have agreed (or feared they should agree) with the dictum of a recent Governor of Kenya: that Africans are 'so primitive that for civilising purposes they are almost a clean slate'. It is an important part of the African renaissance of these latest years to have challenged this judgement, thrust it aside, and laid claim to Africa's possession of modes of social

¹ *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. 21, No. 16, June 1, New York, 1955, p. 1278.

thought, action and belief that are unique, valuable and fruitful of civilising virtue."¹

The proneness to radical socio-transforming tendencies is a highly important feature of nationalism in present-day African and Asian anti-colonial, anti-imperialist revolutions, and it is stimulated by the socio-economic aspects of the problem of national liberation of the oppressed peoples which emerged in our epoch, by international political and ideological influences and also by the tendency, which is widespread in the colonial and dependent countries, to associate colonialism with capitalism. In present-day national liberation movements, nationalism frequently contains within itself anti-capitalist motives, and elements of rejection of capitalism as a system of national oppression. It is frequently tied in and even interwoven with ideological conceptions of "national type" socialism. Besides, the left radicalism of some circles in the national liberation movement frequently degenerates, on a nationalistic basis, into a leftist and even extremist stand, which the revisionists have tried to use for their own ends.

In summing up, one could assert that nationalism in the present-day African and Asian national liberation revolutions has essential specific features, as compared with nationalism in national liberation movements in the past. This nationalism to some extent reflects the democratic character and anti-imperialist tenor of the national liberation movement, the universal urge in the oppressed countries for national independence and even for social progress—among that part of the people and social sections which have yet to rise to a class awareness, to a more progressive ideology.

The specific features of nationalism in present-day national liberation revolutions are undoubtedly determined by the same social, economic, political and ideological factors of a domestic and international order which determine the specific features of these revolutions themselves. Without enumerating them once again, let me note only two points.

First. The fact that in present-day national liberation revolutions nationalism is much more and frequently even predominantly petty-bourgeois, than it ever was in the past.

¹ *Africa. A Handbook.* Ed. by Colin Legum, London, 1965, p. 408.

Without resulting in any fundamental change in the character of nationalism, this ensures, especially in present-day conditions, more substantial premises for the development of progressive tendencies within it. Indeed, in virtue of its own intermediate character and—what is most important—of the social section which is its vehicle—petty-bourgeois nationalism is more "open" for progressive ideological and political influences. It should be pointed out, at the same time, that it is in many instances also especially sensitive to the influence of religious fanaticism.

Second. The anti-imperialist tenor, as the main factor determining the specific features of nationalism in present-day national liberation movements and its specific features, suggests a definite conclusion. We have seen that the character, content and social role of nationalism are determined not only by whether it is the nationalism of an oppressed or an oppressor, a big or a smaller nation, by the interests of which class or social sections it expresses, or any of the other factors noted above. It is determined, in the present conditions at any rate—and this has turned out to be highly important in the present case—by the direction of its edge: *against which type of oppression*, against which *social phenomenon* it is directed and on what socio-political basis, in that context, it takes shape.

The fact that we have considered African and Asian nationalism in present-day national liberation revolutions as a single whole does not, of course, mean that the various social forces involved in the national liberation movement and acting under the flag of nationalism invested it with the same content. On the contrary, in a sense it is right to say that the bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the peasant, semi-proletarian masses and some sections of the proletariat, on the other, had different "nationalisms". The bourgeoisie saw nationalism as its *own* ideology, which it sought to use not only to win independence and liberation from imperialist oppression. Relying on the idea of national entity, which it interpreted as class cooperation and solidarity, it tried to use it also for the purpose of winning and consolidating its domination over its "own" people and to contain the class struggle.

Among the working people, the mass of peasants and petty bourgeoisie, and some sections of the proletariat who had

succumbed to nationalistic influences, nationalism was profoundly, if not entirely, anti-imperialist and anti-colonial, although it was not, of course, altogether free of various national prejudices and national narrow-mindedness. It was an initial and embryonic form of anti-imperialist consciousness hammered out in the struggle against colonialists.

The existence of socialist slogans and ideas in the ideological arsenal of present-day national liberation revolutions is a new and extremely important feature. The first thing that needs to be noted here is, of course, the penetration of the ideas of scientific socialism under the influence of the socialist world and the activity of the Communist parties in the oppressed countries. But there are also conceptions which are designated as "national socialism" and are put forward by other political parties in these countries and by various leaders of the national liberation movement.

Of course, socialist slogans did appear in national liberation movements in the past, however rarely, but these were mostly an expression of petty-bourgeois responses to the growth of large-scale production and big business. Today, socialist slogans amount to more than that. They are conceptions, which for all their different ideological sources (ranging from existentialism to some elements of the theory of historical materialism), their social vehicles (from bourgeois elements to petty-bourgeois and peasant revolutionary democratic forces) and the policies pursued under their banner (from a sincere urge for socialism to a veiling of the pro-bourgeois line), have an *anti-imperialist and anti-colonial* tenor, however different these may be. What is more, these theories as a rule are also influenced by the ideas of scientific socialism in varying extent and form.

The conceptions of "national socialism" spread extensively—and in most countries appear for the first time—after the winning of political independence. I shall deal with them in greater detail later. Let me emphasise this here as a *new* ideological element which is inherent in present-day national liberation revolutions and is an organic part of the ideological atmosphere, which is generally anti-imperialist, anti-colonial and to some extent also anti-capitalist, and is yet another specific feature of these revolutions.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE CHARACTER OF NATIONAL LIBERATION REVOLUTIONS IN OUR DAY

What has been said in the preceding chapters shows that present-day national liberation revolutions differ very importantly from their historical predecessors in economic, political and social foundations, tasks, motive forces, ideological equipment and, of course, international conditions and ties. Taken together, all these specific features give reason to qualify present-day national liberation revolutions as revolutions of a different character than similar revolutions in the preceding epoch. In effect, in the new historical epoch and on the basis of the essential changes in the conditions of the oppressed countries themselves and fundamental changes in the international situation, a *new type* of national liberation revolution emerges. In social content, as a type of revolutionary process, these revolutions have a pronounced tendency to go beyond the framework of bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions. These are *democratic* revolutions capable of fulfilling a different historical mission from that of their predecessors in the pre-imperialist and pre-October Revolution epoch.

This conclusion would already have been warranted because of the appearance of a special phase in the struggle for economic independence pivoted on socio-economic progress but the social tendencies in these revolutions are even more important. The crucial factor expressive of the new character of present-day national liberation revolutions is that they are not "doomed" to lead only to capitalism, but are capable of resolving their contradictions on a higher socio-economic basis

and may pave the way towards socialism. In contrast to the national liberation revolutions of the previous epoch, which were elements of bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic transformation, and transition to capitalist domination on a global scale, they are a part of the world revolutionary process leading to a rejection of capitalism, to the victory of socialism as a world socio-economic formation.

Their specific historical feature is that in the course of these revolutions not only are the colonial obstacles removed and important premises for socio-economic development in the various countries are, you might say, spontaneously formed, but also the question of two socially opposite *orientations* for development is *consciously* decided (naturally, in the context of the existing objective premises). Depending on the course and results of the clash between the contending social tendencies, the present-day national liberation revolution can develop either as a national-democratic (or popular-democratic), or as a bourgeois (bourgeois-democratic) one.

The fundamental propositions concerning the important changes in the social content and character of national liberation revolutions, first put forward by the CPSU, have been widely accepted in the international communist movement. They have been confirmed and elaborated in the documents of international meetings of Communist parties, in the materials of the Communist and progressive parties, especially in the zone of national liberation, and in publications and speeches by their prominent leaders. Secretary-General of the Lebanese Communist Party's Central Committee, Nicolas Chaoui, wrote: "In the matter of cooperation, we proceed not from old concepts which no longer correspond to the nature of the national liberation movement and its level of development but from the new content of this movement and the serious turn towards socialism that has taken place in the thinking of the masses."¹

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Jordanian Communist Party, Fuad Nassar, stressed: "The awakening of the toiling masses, their revolutionary activity, their rising

¹ *World Marxist Review* No. 7, 1966, p. 29.

political consciousness, their long experience in the various forms of struggle and their lack of confidence in the capitalist system, gave a strong momentum to the revolutionary potential of the national liberation movement, provided it with a deep social content and transformed the national revolution from a democratic-bourgeois revolution into a national-democratic revolution."¹

Addressing the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Mohammed Harmel, declared: "What is new is that the movement is directed against imperialism and is, moreover, acquiring an anti-capitalist content in some countries."²

The "national-democratic revolution" conception has itself been accepted by the international communist movement and is used in its documents and platforms of the Communist parties, and Marxist organisations of the working class in the countries of Asia and Africa. This revolution is dealt with, for instance, in the Programme of the South African Communist Party, which was adopted at its Sixth Congress (the main content of this "national-democratic revolution" is defined as "the national liberation of the African people", and the main task is that of establishing "an independent state of National Democracy in South Africa ... as a stage of transition to socialism"³), in the Manifesto of the Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party of Nigeria (which sets the aim of realising "a socialist Nigeria through the process of national-democratic revolution"⁴), in the Rules of the Party of Progress and Socialism of Morocco, in the Programme documents of the Communist Parties of India, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Lesotho, among others.

The term "national-democratic revolution" was extensively used at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties.

¹ *Ibid.* No. 8, 1967, p. 36.

² *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 186.

³ *The Road to South African Freedom*, London, s. a., p. 52.

⁴ *The Manifesto of the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party of Nigeria*, s. I., s. a., pp. 1, 16, 27, etc.

The introduction by the Communist parties and the international communist movement of the category of "national-democratic revolution" into their militant political vocabulary, and—what is most important—the use of its socio-economic and political content as an important starting point for elaborating strategy and tactics resulted from the generalisation of the new features of national liberation revolutions in our day.

What are the distinctive features of national-democratic revolutions? These are revolutions which lead to the elimination of colonial and semi-colonial oppression and are also latent with an anti-capitalist tendency, instead of paving the way for the establishment of the capitalist formation in the country concerned. They not only weaken the imperialist system at that point—this is also true of all national liberation revolutions—but also pave the way for a breakthrough at that point. When leadership comes from political forces representing the interests of the proletariat, these revolutions are popular, develop like popular-democratic revolutions and grow directly into socialist revolutions. When leadership comes from nonproletarian democratic forces taking a socialist orientation and frequently with the participation of forces representing the interests of the working class or starting from Marxist ideology, these revolutions produce, alongside important anti-imperialist and anti-feudal changes, anti-capitalist transformations, paving the way for transition to socialist reconstruction.

In contrast to national liberation revolutions of the past, national-democratic revolutions are not carried out primarily in the interests of the bourgeoisie or the exploiting classes as a whole, and their social orientation cuts across the aspirations of these classes.

Practice has shown that it may take a long time for national liberation revolutions to determine their social orientation since this is not an instantaneous and irrevocable action but a consequence of contradictory processes, progressive movements and retreats. In other words, it may be drawn out over virtually the whole period of the revolution and take place at both its phases. The national-democratic (and also the popular-democratic) tendency of development in the revolu-

tion can gain the upper hand either at the first or at the second phase of the revolution.

Up to now leadership of the forces representing the interests of the proletariat has been established at the phase of the struggle for political independence, and of the revolutionary democrats also at the second phase of the revolution.

The strong national-democratic (to say nothing of the popular-democratic) tendency operating in the present-day national liberation movement is, in effect, a key premise for its approximation with other forces of the world revolutionary process.

That is apparently the kind of tendency and the new character of national liberation revolutions that Lenin had in mind when he told the Third Congress of the Communist International that "...in the impending decisive battles in the world revolution, the movement of the majority of the population of the globe, initially directed towards national liberation, will turn against capitalism and imperialism".¹

If present-day national liberation revolutions are democratic revolutions in social content, if they *can* acquire an anti-capitalist orientation, does this mean that all such revolutions—or even most of them—are bound to develop as national-democratic? Both theoretical premises and practical experience show that this is not so. In present-day national liberation revolutions, the national-democratic (and popular-democratic) orientation is present only as a *possibility*, even if a real one, as a *tendency* making headway—or suffering defeat—in conflict with the other, contending tendency backed by domestic and external class forces seeking to confine these revolutions to a bourgeois or bourgeois-democratic framework. It is only in struggle that the ultimate line of development of every national liberation revolution and its character are determined. The clash of contending tendencies on this issue, which begins in various forms at the first phase of the revolution's development and unfolds to full scale at its second phase, in effect ultimately constitutes the pivot of the *internal* conflicts in the national liberation movement at both phases.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, p. 482.

Defeat of the national-democratic tendency or the lack of its expression for various special reasons results in a situation in which the national liberation revolutions concerned do not transcend the bourgeois (bourgeois-democratic) framework in their main content, although even then they are very different in many highly important respects from the national-bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions of the past.

While the clash of these tendencies determines the social orientation of the national liberation process, it also determines its dynamism, and the possibility and probability of changes and turns, and repeated ones at that, either towards reaction or progress.

Thus, *the struggle between the two antagonistic tendencies of social development taking place in the course of the present-day national liberation revolutions and the corresponding fact that these revolutions may develop as national-democratic constitutes their main specific feature, which warrants their consideration as democratic revolutions of a new type.* The national-democratic revolution itself may go forward under the leadership of political forces acting on behalf of the working class, under the leadership of a proletarian party (when it develops as a popular-democratic revolution and its growth into the reconstruction of society on socialist lines is assured), or under the leading role of revolutionary democracy (when such "escalation" of the social orientation of the revolution cannot be considered guaranteed).

These basic conclusions about the character of present-day national liberation movements are suggested and confirmed by the disintegration of the colonial system and the development of the emergent countries. China, North Korea and North Vietnam have provided examples of the popular-democratic process led by the Communist Parties; in Ghana, Guinea, Mali, South Yemen and Tanzania, and at the second stage of the revolution in Egypt, Syria, Burma, Somali and other countries the liberation struggle was given a national-democratic tenor, under the leadership of revolutionary democrats. By contrast, in India, Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon and Kenya (and also at the first stage in Burma, Sudan, Syria and Egypt) and some other countries, the national liberation process had on the whole a bourgeois (bourgeois-democratic) character under the

leading role either of the bourgeoisie or coalition social forces which differed from one country to another and were held together by a capitalist orientation.

The experience of a number of countries demonstrated the "mobility" of the national liberation revolution, and its potential for qualitative changes on the basis of struggle between the antagonistic class forces, from the bourgeois to the national-democratic orientation (as in Egypt, Burma, Syria and other countries at the second phase of the revolution) and in the opposite direction (as in Ghana, Iraq in the 1960s, etc., again at the second phase of the liberation process).

Available experience also shows that the "popular" element in national-democratic revolutions depends on the nature of the leadership—not only in terms of programme but also of the *extent and forms* of participation and influence of the masses as the revolution develops. In national-democratic revolutions in which the leadership comes from nonproletarian forces, the political superstructure does not, as a rule, "trust" the masses and restricts their initiatives. It seeks to monopolise the practical opportunities for revolutionary initiative, and looks to the development of revolution from "above", assigning to the masses the role of no more than executive of the "revolutionary will" of the authorities.

A fundamental dividing characteristic of the main ways of development of the national liberation revolution may also be provided by the result from the standpoint of the worldwide contest between the social systems of capitalism and socialism. National liberation revolutions, developing as national-democratic (to say nothing of popular-democratic) ones, do not only strike out at imperialism but also at the positions of the world capitalist formation as a whole. They lead, or have a tendency to lead, to a further territorial limitation of the framework of the world capitalist formation, and the creation of decisive premises for separating the countries concerned from the capitalist system.

Other national liberation revolutions, while now and again dealing palpable blows at the positions of imperialism, ultimately lead to an extension of geographical boundaries of the capitalist formation and may operate as a reserve of world capitalism, when the matter is considered in the long term.

Here one important reservation needs to be made. The enhancement of the social aspect of national liberation revolutions, the close interweaving of the national and social aspects in the revolutionary process, the reduction of the period between national-democratic and socialist revolutions and a growing similarity of some of the aspects of their historical "effect" should not induce one unjustifiably to extend the social boundaries of national revolutions, or to regard as socialist the measures being put through by progressive regimes as the process of national liberation gains in depth. However close or dialectical the ties between national-democratic and socialist revolutions, the dividing line between them—however fine at the moment of transition—is of fundamental importance, and it is wrong and dangerous to ignore it.

When dealing with the character of national liberation revolutions in our day, one must consider the question of the socio-economic and political substance of their basic historical tasks. This question boils down to the following: is it right to insist that the tasks tackled by these revolutions are exclusively bourgeois and can have no other character, even if leadership in these revolutions belongs to forces expressing the interests of the proletariat and other working people?

In this context, a few other more general problems need to be considered. First of all, there is the question of how justified it is, even today, in the context of our epoch, to qualify the formation of nations and the break-up of obsolete feudal and pre-feudal relations, and the elimination of national and colonial oppression (to say nothing of the winning of economic independence and the attendant tasks of socio-economic progress), etc., as being inevitably *bourgeois* tasks, and indeed, virtually only because such tasks were usually realised in the past in the course of bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions.

In my view, there is nothing in theory, and even less so in politics, to induce one necessarily to assess these tasks, like those tackled in the process of non-capitalist development in Soviet Central Asia and Mongolia, as bourgeois or bourgeois-democratic. It would be more correct to regard these tasks as *democratic*. After all, there is nothing intrinsically or specifical-

ly bourgeois about their content, which is only *democratic*. Their bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic character in the past was determined by the fact that they were, as a rule, tackled under the leadership of the bourgeoisie and mainly in its interests, which paved the way for the establishment of bourgeois society.

The substance of the problem is, therefore, that one and the same democratic task acquires a different character, depending on *which* class, *which* power implements it.

A key feature of present-day national liberation revolutions lies precisely in the fact that at their second phase the issue is, above all, one of way of social development along which the outstanding democratic tasks are to be fulfilled, and consequently, of orientation—capitalist or anti-capitalist—which these tasks and their solution are to acquire. In present-day conditions, even in the colonial countries, for all their backwardness, "democratic" is in no sense a synonym of "bourgeois" or "bourgeois-democratic".

Let us note in this connection, that the question of the character of national liberation revolutions is a component part of the more general question of democratic revolutions as a whole at the present stage of the historical process and, besides, of the question of the relationship between democracy and capitalism, bearing in mind not only political forms.

There are many indications that with the struggle between the two world systems, the inevitable anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly tenor of *any* democratic revolution and the growing reactionary character of the monopoly bourgeoisie, most or even nearly all such revolutions do not fit into the traditional framework.

It is characteristic that not only in the African and Asian countries, but also in Latin America, the Communist parties, seeking to establish the anti-imperialist and agrarian, anti-feudal tenor of the forthcoming revolution, do not call it bourgeois-democratic. Nor is this merely a matter of terminology, but a reflection of the assessment of the new character of the revolutionary process and its changing orientation. This was quite unequivocally stated by Luis Corvalan, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Chile, when he said: "Upon abandoning this sectarian line [about the immediate

establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the formation of the Soviet power—*Auth.*], we defined the Chilean revolution as a bourgeois-democratic revolution, but realised in 1945 that even this non-sectarian definition had been rendered unsound by reason of the worldwide changes—advance of the working class, the content of the new epoch and the decline in the revolutionary ardour of the bourgeoisie.”¹

The Programme of the Communist Party of Chile, approved at its 14th Congress in November 1969, stressed that “the Chilean revolution, in essence and objectives, is an anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly and agrarian revolution *looking towards socialism*” (emphasis added—*Auth.*).² The Theses of the Brazilian Communist Party for its Sixth Congress spoke about a national-democratic revolution, a *new type of revolution*. The approach is the same in a joint statement issued by the Communist Parties of Argentina and Brazil in mid-December 1968.³

Incidentally, it would be inadequate and wrong to regard as “bourgeois-democratic” the programmes for democratic change put forward by the Communist parties and backed by the anti-monopoly forces in the advanced capitalist countries. There again, the democratic changes, the “democratic” as a whole, are not in any sense identical in content with “bourgeois-democratic”. There is good reason why the Communist parties’ documents ever more frequently use terms like “new”, “advanced”, “renewed” democracy, etc. None of these amount to terminological or tactical subtleties but are propositions dictated by life itself and filled with real socio-political content. This is determined by the character of present-day capitalism and its historical place at the present phase of the social process, the political role and positions of the chief social forces, and also their ideological attitude.

The democratic changes which in the period of the rise and undivided domination of the capitalist formation generated

¹ *World Marxist Review* No. 7, 1967, p. 26.

² *Programa del Partido Comunista de Chile*, Santiago de Chile, 1970, p. 13.

³ *Resoluciones y declaraciones del CC del Partido Comunista de la Argentina* 1968, Buenos Aires, 1969, pp. 122, 125.

capitalism or, at any rate, paved the way for it, can now carry an *anti-capitalist* charge. These changes can even provide not only a stepping-stone for broader and fuller development of capitalism, but also for its rejection.

Here is another important point. That the balance between democracy and capitalism has changed simultaneously means that the balance between democracy and socialism has not remained the same either. If democratic changes now can or do pave the way for development towards socialism, and not only in the long term, not only in the world-historical sense, but *immediately*, this entails an approximation of democratic and socialist aims, an approximation of the social forces acting on a democratic platform and forces also setting themselves socialist tasks.

Thus, in our epoch at any rate, the tasks of the national liberation revolution dealt with above are *democratic* tasks. They can be fulfilled on the basis of both capitalist (when their realisation is not guaranteed) and anti-capitalist processes, with their very fulfilment serving as an instrument of this or that social orientation of the emergent countries.

It would be unjustified to assume that the objective content of present-day national liberation revolutions is a kind of procrustean bed which allegedly makes it impossible for them to transcend the bourgeois framework, with that content also being regarded as identical with the content of bourgeois revolutions in the past. It is quite obvious that the objective content of the process of national liberation has itself undergone important changes, with all the consequences that this entails in terms of involvement in deep-going conflict with world capitalism, and of tendencies enhancing the social content of revolutions. Furthermore, the objective tasks of the national liberation revolutions do not yet predetermine the *social* orientation along which these tasks are fulfilled, and that is a new element. The objective content of these revolutions makes it possible to advance in different social directions. Today, one might say that the “basis” of the national liberation revolutions leads to capitalism only perhaps with the *spontaneous* socio-economic development of the colonies and emergent countries in mind.

Of course, the chaotic element of small-scale production and

commodity exchange in these countries, combined with the activity of national enterprise and foreign monopoly capital, constitute a sufficiently impressive force impelling the country towards capitalism, especially in view of the fact that world imperialism and influential class forces in the emergent countries themselves—an important subjective factor—also operate in the same direction. All of this testifies to the complicated conditions and arduous and far from always successful struggle in which the anti-capitalist tendency has to make headway. But this is no indication that the objective content of national liberation revolutions today dooms them to a capitalist orientation.

Indeed, even the "orientation" of spontaneous development in the emergent countries can hardly be regarded in isolation, outside the context of the world revolutionary process, the present stage of capitalism and the process of its historical decline. As I have already said, the ties between the national liberation revolutions within the framework of the world revolutionary process with its other contingents exert a profound influence on the content and prospects of these revolutions.

Besides, it is fairly well known that the subjective factor can have an important influence on the objective tasks and even now and again modify them. Of course, it cannot nullify the objective tasks, or "leap over" them, but it can subordinate their fulfilment to the interests of achieving *definite*, more advanced aims, a *definite* line of development, and fill these tasks with *this* or *that* class content. Indeed, that is precisely what is happening, for instance, under non-capitalist development when the fulfilment of democratic tasks is oriented upon the victory of socialism and the limitation of the elements generating capitalist relations.

What is more, it appears to be obvious that the possibilities and role—in determining the social orientation of the national liberation process—of the subjective factor, both revolutionary and anti-capitalist, and conservative, pro-capitalist, now tend sharply to increase. In other words, not only the objective basis of present-day national liberation revolutions but also their subjective factors and the balance between them have undergone an important change.

The identification of present-day national liberation revolutions, regardless of the character of the class forces at their head and their course of development, with bourgeois (bourgeois-democratic) revolutions of the past is, in effect, entirely based on the experience of the preceding epoch of historical development, *which* is assumed to be universal and is applied to a *different* epoch. No due account is, in effect, taken of the changes characteristic of the epoch in which there are two world systems locked in struggle with each other.

This approach equally underrates the peculiar situation in the oppressed countries connected with the level of their development and their colonial condition, as compared with the European countries in which the bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions took place and whose experience is usually regarded as standard.

Such views obviously run counter to the experience arising from the disintegration of the colonial system and the struggle of the oppressed peoples over the past 25-30 years. In effect, they ignore the fact that at this or that stage the process of national liberation in more than one-quarter of the colonies and semi-colonies has gone beyond the bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic framework, acquiring an anti-capitalist tenor. Nor did it acquire a capitalist orientation in all the other countries, meaning, of course, the conscious policies of the political superstructure and not just spontaneous socio-economic development.

A special question which arises in the context of the character of the present-day national liberation revolutions is whether the "reverse development" of the national-democratic revolution or the confinement of the process from the outset mainly to a bourgeois-democratic framework entails defeat for the national liberation revolution as a whole and makes its tasks unfeasible. Here we should turn to the problem of the view to be taken of the framework of that revolution and the conditions in which it can be completed. I think that the correct approach to this problem may be found in the light of Lenin's statements about the "consummation" of bourgeois revolutions. He held that such "consummation", in the broad sense of the word, implied a solution by that revolution of the objective historical tasks, the "consummation of the *entire cycle*

of bourgeois revolutions"¹, in other words, very definite and fully formed capitalist development of the given country.

We regard present-day national liberation revolutions as a process whose content consists of qualitative, revolutionary changes not only of superstructural elements, but also of the economic basis. This is determined by the nature of the socio-economic laws and tasks of these revolutions, and the existence of a whole stage aimed to secure their economic emancipation from imperialism.

The revolution in the production relations, which is characteristic of national liberation revolutions, and the qualitative changes in the basis it causes boil down to a substitution of a nationally independent economy for the dependent economic structure, subordinate to foreign and international finance capital, and the needs of the economic system of a foreign state; to a limitation and ousting of the property of private and state capital of the imperialist powers by the property of the national state and local enterprise.

In contrast to the conventional bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions, the qualitative political change in the superstructure in the course of present-day national liberation revolutions must, as a rule, precede revolutionary changes in the basis.

Historical experience shows that the socio-economic tasks of this or that revolution (for instance, of a bourgeois or bourgeois-democratic revolution) being *in the aggregate* a qualitative leap, can be realised by various social forces, social coalitions and in various political forms: the reformist way or by means of resolute struggle, which frequently leads to political revolution (that is, revolution in the narrower sense of the word). Thus, the bourgeois transformation of society was ensured as a result both of the process of revolutionary break-up (the American way of capitalist development), which was frequently accompanied by "explosive" changes in the political superstructure, and of evolutionary changes (the Prussian way of capitalist development). In both cases, there

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 202.

ultimately emerged *in the aggregate* a new quality, with transition to a new socio-economic formation, which meant that a *revolution* had taken place. Concerning the aim of that revolution and from the theoretical point of view, it is immaterial which way the change leading to the necessary final result had taken place. But that is far from being a matter of indifference for the country's progressive development, for its social structures and social life, which for a long time bear the heavy imprint of the evolutionary way.

This, with the necessary reservations, having in mind the framework of an analogy which is possible in this case, also applies to the national liberation revolution. If our initial assumption is that in the war and postwar period the task of mankind's national liberation and the elimination of colonial and semi-colonial dependence had finally matured and become strident as a necessary premise for social progress, and that the fulfilment of this task in *whatever form* had become an imperative of the whole of present-day world development, then everything revolves round the question of *how* it is to be tackled. The possible approaches to the fulfilment of this task correspond to the stand of the two contending trends in the national liberation movement: bourgeois reformist and revolutionary. The fundamental importance of this contest is determined by the fact that while these ways, in a manner of speaking, may be more or less equivalent with respect to a definite task *in itself*, like the achievement of political independence, they have a very different significance for the social process and for its progressive development.

Political independence, as the aim of present-day national liberation revolutions, may be achieved as a more or less instantaneous qualitative political shift, crowning a protracted liberation struggle, armed or unarmed, as in India, Tunisia, Guinea, Algeria, Ghana, and so on. It may also appear as the aggregate result of several political explosions and even of a series of them, as, in particular, in Iraq, Egypt, Nigeria, etc. Finally, it is wrong to rule out the assumption that in some countries this aim will be realised to this or that extent—even at high cost and with serious delay—as a result of a peculiar-type of process: through the protracted reformist and ultimately nationalistic evolution of the present pro-imperialist

regimes. Of course, this will be a curtailed and skin-deep anti-colonialist revolution, but a revolution *nonetheless* in terms of its ultimate results.

However that may be, the course of events shows that in present-day conditions and under the existing balance of strength in the international arena, the national liberation revolution which in main social content does not go beyond the bourgeois-democratic framework is also capable of leading to political liberation. It is quite a different matter when we consider the tasks of the second phase of the national liberation revolution—economic emancipation from imperialism—and this will be dealt with in the next section.

In conclusion let me say once again that the specific features of anti-colonial, anti-imperialist revolutions, which are clearly visible in the 1950s, to say nothing of the 1960s and the 1970s, are inherent, potentially, at any rate, in the anti-colonial revolutions of the epoch of the general crisis of capitalism as a whole.

I should also like to stress that the fact that present-day national liberation revolutions have a number of common features which are of fundamental importance does not at all tend to "standardise" these revolutions and make them uniform. On the contrary, the extension of the historical potentialities of liberation revolutions and of their social framework adds diversity to the situation, the ways and means of struggle, the arrangement of class forces, and the forms of progressive development in the one-time colonial and semi-colonial world.

Nevertheless, the common factors, which I have been dealing with, operate and are of great importance for all national liberation revolutions and movements. They provide the historical background and the socio-political framework for the struggle of the peoples of the developing countries against imperialism, for determining the future of these countries. Unless these features are taken into account, it is impossible correctly to assess the tendencies and prospects of development of the national liberation revolution in any country.

SECTION TWO

NEW PHASE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION REVOLUTIONS

I have said that a key feature of present-day national liberation revolutions is that they are not completed with the winning of political independence but enter a new stage, the stage of struggle for economic emancipation from imperialism and for economic independence, and for consolidation of political independence and social progress on that basis.

As a result, the revolutionary process of national liberation can continue even after the elimination of colonial regimes. The solution of these problems has become the main element of social development not only in countries which have already secured actual political independence. It is also increasingly important where the problem of independence has yet to be really solved.

This uniformity in the development of present-day national liberation revolutions has been shown in CPSU documents. The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union stresses: "A national liberation revolution does not end with the winning of political independence. Independence will be unstable and will become fictitious unless the revolution brings about radical changes in the social and economic spheres, and solves the pressing problems of national rebirth."¹ M. A. Suslov, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said in a report on the 150th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx: "The struggle for

¹ *The Road to Communism*, Moscow, 1962, p. 492.

economic independence constitutes the main content of the present phase of the national liberation movement."¹

The same view is taken by other Communist parties, as will be seen from their theoretical and political documents and the programme documents of the international communist movement. Thus, the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969 declared in its Main Document: "In many *Asian and African* countries the national liberation movement has entered a new phase."² This means that: "In most of the independent Asian and African states, along with the task of consolidating and safeguarding political independence and sovereignty, the central problems of social progress are to overcome economic backwardness, set up an independent national economy, including their own industry, and raise the people's standard of living."³

The following section deals with the main tasks of the general democratic programme in the second phase of the national liberation revolutions, and their interconnection with the problem of socio-economic progress and orientation in the development of the emergent countries. There is also a characteristic of the motive forces and the configuration of class forces, the ideological struggle and the international conditions at this new phase of the revolutionary process, all of which are importantly modified.

¹ M. A. Suslov, *Selected Speeches and Articles*, Moscow, 1972, p. 544 (in Russian).

² *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 27.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

CHAPTER ONE

NEW PHASE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION REVOLUTIONS AND ITS GENERAL DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

The conclusion about a second phase in present-day national liberation revolutions stems above all from an understanding of the specific nature of the type of national oppression against which these revolutions are aimed, and from an assessment of the machinery of exploitation of the enslaved countries set up by the imperialist monopolies.

The acute socio-economic contradictions, which are at the root of national liberation movements and revolutions, are not resolved with the elimination of colonial dependence, but continue to operate and exert a profound influence on social development in the newly liberated countries. All the main social forces in these countries are variously interested in carrying through to the end the process of national liberation. The alternative to this is not only the continuation, however modified, of the economically dependent and exploited condition of the young states, but also their gradual political enslavement to this or that extent, a process *fundamentally* similar to that through which the Latin American countries went after escaping from Spanish and Portuguese domination. However, such a turn of events is totally incompatible either with the requirements of social and economic progress in the newly independent countries themselves and in the world as a whole, or with the course and character of present-day historical development.

The problem of final liberation of the one-time colonies and semi-colonies is, in effect, a part of the more general problem bearing on the importance of a solid and nationally indepen-

dent economic foundation for preserving political independence by countries in the capitalist world today. Besides, with all the inevitable reservations about the specifics of the capitalist world, the problem of economic independence is allied with the problem, raised by the October Revolution, of the actual equality of nations as its specific and concrete expression.

Although industrial growth rates in the formerly oppressed countries have in most cases noticeably gone up after independence, the gap between them and the imperialist countries in economic development level has at best not increased, but the gap in output per head has been steadily growing.

**Gross Domestic Product of Developed
Capitalist and Developing Countries**
(1970 prices)

	Volume (in thousand million dollars)			Per head (\$)		
	1950	1960	1970	1950	1960	1970
Developed capitalist countries	874.0	1,296.0	2,093.0	1,570	2,060	2,970
Developing countries of Africa	22.0	36.0	55.0	110	140	170
Developing countries of Asia	78.0	120.5	206.0	105	130	175

Source: *World Economics and International Relations* No. 3, 1972, p. 150 (in Russian).

The Economic and Scientific Research Fund of India has carried out an interesting analysis,¹ which shows that if the rate of development of the 1950s is maintained, India, one of the most developed countries in the former colonial world, with on the whole fairly fast growth since liberation, will take over two centuries to reach the level of the US national income. With a doubling of the growth rate, it would take 110 years. In the 20

¹ The accuracy of the data may be only relative for many reasons, but it does well show the general tendency.

years from 1948 to 1967, India reduced its lag in economic development level behind Britain by 2.9 years (from 47.5 to 44.6 years) and behind the USA by 1.3 years (from 54.8 to 53.5 years).

The developing countries of Asia and Africa, with a population at least 2.2 times those of the USA, Western Europe and Japan, have only one-twelfth of their gross domestic product in industry. Africa's extractive and manufacturing industry (South Africa excluding) accounts for only 1.35 per cent of world industrial production. These countries also lag in agricultural production, despite the fact that they are agrarian countries. The French scientist Pierre Pradervand has estimated that the annual income of the "average" American is larger than the amount spent on consumption by more than 70 people in Upper Volta or Somali which means that 205 million Americans can consume more than 14 thousand million inhabitants of Upper Volta.¹

The gap in the productivity of social labour itself puts the economically lagging countries into a disadvantageous and exploited condition within the system of the world capitalist economy. The monopolies sharply compound this economic inequality, hiking prices for their products while pushing down the prices for the developing countries' exports. The monetary and trade privileges of the imperialists also operate in the same direction.

These figures testify not only to one of the gravest crimes of capitalism and its offspring, colonialism, but also to the most complicated and difficult problem inherited by the once enslaved countries as a "legacy". Indeed, present-day national liberation revolutions have socio-economic aspects which are indissolubly connected with that problem.

In broad historical terms, the national liberation movement is, in effect, the beginning or the starting point of a process which is to be completed with the elimination of the gap between the economically developed and the lagging nations, carrying the once oppressed countries, with a modified social structure and political forms of life, to a level in the development of productive forces which is characteristic of the epoch.

¹ *Développement et civilisations* No. 39-40, Paris, 1970, p. 17.

Of course, there is still a long way to go from the statement that there is an indisputable connection between the socio-economic aspects of national liberation revolutions and the historical problem of eliminating the backwardness of the oppressed countries—a connection which is highly important for the course and character of these revolutions—to the assertion, which has been made sometimes, that they have the task of tackling this problem. Indeed, national liberation revolutions are incapable on their own of solving this vast problem, nor is it one of their functions. But they can ensure some of the key political, social and economic premises, which make it possible to solve it. In present-day conditions, this implies not only political independence, but also the winning of economic independence and effective resistance to neo-colonialism, the laying of the foundations of a national economy and closure of the avenues used by foreign monopolies to plunder the emergent countries at home and abroad, and other democratic changes. *That is one of the key lines of the anti-imperialist and social battles being fought in the second half of the 20th century.*

While stating that with the collapse of colonial regimes national liberation revolutions enter a new phase, Marxists also assume that as a result a whole historical period comes to an end in the life of the once oppressed peoples and their anti-imperialist struggle. In the course of that struggle, premises, in the form of anti-imperialist national gains, have been created for a rise of the movement to a higher level, with emphasis on the socio-economic aspects of the liberation struggle.

The Marxist-Leninist classics always regarded the winning of political independence as a natural phase in the oppressed peoples' struggle for social emancipation. Engels said: "So long as a viable nation is fettered by an alien conqueror, it necessarily directs all its efforts, all its aspirations and all its energy against the external enemy; so long as its internal life is paralysed in this way, it is incapable of fighting for social emancipation."¹

¹ Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 18, Berlin, 1969, S. 574.

Finally, perhaps the most important indicator of the entry of national liberation revolutions upon the new phase is the modification of the main tasks of the revolution, its principal motive forces and contradictions, and also of the factors operating against it.

Let me add that anyone analysing the main aims of national liberation struggle at the second phase has to face difficulties which spring from the lack of any clear-cut scientific criterion of economic independence, although various considerations have been expressed on this score. Among Soviet scientists the most important contribution to the elaboration of this complicated question has been made by R. A. Ulyanovsky and L. V. Stepanov, who have put forward their own interpretations. Ulyanovsky has formulated, I think, an interesting and correct thesis about the possibility of relative economic independence for a less developed country in the specific conditions of the struggle between the two world systems.¹ In other words, he has stressed the fact that in the presence of world socialism the problem of the economic independence of the former colonies and semi-colonies tends to be modified, and in consequence of favourable international factors these countries can enjoy such independence while still having fully to overcome the weakness of their economic basis.

Stepanov deals, in effect, with "full"² economic independence, although the dividing line between it and "relative" independence remains fairly vague. He says that the key indications of economic dependence of the former colonies and semi-colonies is their loss of control "over a part of their national resources, which fall under the control of highly developed capitalist states", and limits on their freedom to use even that part of the national resources which remains at their disposal, the latter, for its part, being closely connected with "the level of national and sectoral labour productivity in the developing countries". Stepanov makes an important advance towards an in-depth consideration of the problem, when he

¹ See, R. A. Ulyanovsky, *Socialism and the Newly Independent Nations*, Moscow, 1974, p. 407 (in Russian).

² See, L. V. Stepanov, *The Problem of Economic Independence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 126 (in Russian).

says: "Thus, the unequal and subordinate condition of the former colonies and semi-colonies within the world capitalist economic system has a twofold basis: economic and social. The main economic factor is the low national productivity of labour. The main social factor is the inclusion in the world capitalist system. Elimination of either one of these factors provides a solution, full and final, of the problem of economic dependence in the sense in which it now faces the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America."¹

However, Stepanov's interesting analysis would stand to gain a great deal if the author had taken due account of the new situation arising from the struggle between the two world systems, because this tends to modify the mandatory factors in realising economic independence, so relatively enhancing the role of the international situation. In that case, the introduction of the social aspect of the problem into the analysis—and that is an important advantage of Stepanov's analysis—would not impel him to make the attainment of economic independence *directly* contingent on a break between the developing countries and the capitalist system, which tends to narrow down the general democratic content of the problem. Indeed, because of the support coming from world socialism and the contest between the two systems, such independence is largely possible even *before withdrawal* from the world capitalist economic system, provided, of course, that an anti-imperialist policy is pursued. It is safe to say, for instance, that for the socialist-oriented countries the lag behind the developed capitalist countries is *not as important* in terms of economic independence as for other emergent countries, in view of the weakened effect of the social factor of dependence arising from inclusion in the capitalist system, and in view of the nature of the transitional socio-economic relations taking shape in these countries.

In addition, while the national productivity of labour is undoubtedly of tremendous importance for economic indepen-

¹ See, L. V. Stepanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 15, 23, 85, 122. Ulyanovsky also deals with the "national level of the productivity of social labour" in the context of the question of economic independence (see, *World Economy and International Relations* No. 4, 1964, p. 122).

dence, it is still not clear—and this, of course, applies not only to Stepanov's work—*where* the dividing line is beyond which its level ceases to be a factor of economic dependence and, conversely, becomes the basis of economic independence. Why is it that, on the strength of this criterion, the problem of economic independence does not appear *in the same* plane, say, for Greece or Portugal, as, say, for Egypt, Syria and India. Here, importance apparently attaches to factors connected with the character and specific features of capitalist development in countries which have undergone colonial and semi-colonial oppression, as "dependent" and "backward" capitalism, with narrowed-down socio-economic potentials, so that in the context of these countries the problem of economic independence should be considered with an eye to these factors.

Another thing that needs to be reckoned with is that important factors are introduced with the scientific and technical revolution, above all, with the growing importance of the scientific and technological aspect of the matter. This, for its part, can well lead to the emergence of new international aspects of the problem of economic independence, both favourable and unfavourable for the developing countries.

In this connection let us recall that backwardness is a concrete historical conception. Development levels which were regarded as advanced 50 years ago would now appear as sheer backwardness. This naturally fully applies to the problem of the Asian and African countries' lag and also of the gap in economic development between them and the industrialised centres of capitalism.

It is hardly right to say that the nature of this lag and this gap has remained invariable. On the contrary, today, at the start of the final third of the 20th century, both appear in a different light as compared, for instance, with the 1940s. The backwardness appears to be "shifting" into a new plane, being measured not only in terms of GNP but also in terms of the relation between development levels in the most advanced areas of science and technology—for that is where the economic dependence of the emergent countries may well be entrenched and deepened. It may be assumed that neo-colonialism will make ever greater use not only of the "absolute" lag of the

former colonies and semi-colonies, but especially of their technical lag, of the concentration of the modern and leading industries in the imperialist countries through their usurpation of the principal advantages of the scientific and technical revolution in the capitalist world.

When dealing with the new aspects of the economic independence problem, one cannot discount the developing countries' attempts also to use collective economic, scientific and technical cooperation to achieve such independence.

However essential these obscurities and outstanding questions, it is not the complete and all-round definition of economic independence or its mandatory indications that are of utmost importance within the framework of this analysis in accordance with its purpose. The important thing here is the internal political, social and economic mainsprings which are connected with the problem of economic independence, their workings and their political results.

At any rate, the achievement of economic independence from imperialism implies the establishment of full sovereignty over the economy and natural resources, the gearing of their development to the national interest, the elimination of imperialist interference in the internal economic life of the young states, an end to their exploitation via foreign-trade channels, and the ability on the part of these states to enter into external economic ties on a mutually advantageous basis and through their own choice. This also implies the creation of a national economy and important socio-economic premises for eliminating the backwardness and the lopsided agrarian raw material specialisation of the economy, and the training of national personnel capable of taking over in every sphere of life.

On the other hand, these tasks cannot, *in any case*, be fulfilled without the realisation of a whole complex of deep-going socio-economic transformations which, in effect, constitute a *general democratic programme of the revolution in its new phase*.

Among these transformations are:

- elimination of the dominant influence of imperialist monopolies in the economy and nationalisation of enterprises constituting its basis, establishment of effective control over the

activity of foreign capital and institution of new forms of relations with it in the national interest;

- concentration in the state sector of the commanding heights of the national economy in order successfully to combat foreign capital and create a national economy, and adoption of the practice of drawing up development plans;

- establishment of some control over the activity of local capital to give it a national orientation, increase investments in production, and involve local capital in the creation of an independent national economy;

- institution of definite forms of state control over foreign-trade ties and the financial system within the country, restriction of parasitic consumption and adoption of measures to cut off some channels for private-property accumulation;

- measures for creating and developing a national industry in accordance with the requirements and potentialities of the given country;

- solution of the agrarian question, elimination of feudal and pre-feudal agrarian relations, encouragement of cooperation in the countryside to bring about a substantial increase in agricultural production, provide emergent industry with manpower, and involve the peasantry in tackling urgent social tasks;

- marked enhancement of the living standards of the people in order to expand the domestic market for developing industry and agriculture, and ensure massive support for national revival;

- establishment of a ramified public education and technical training network, and scientific establishments required for training national specialists, and ensuring an overall cultural "climate" promoting the use of scientific achievements and modern advances of civilisation;

- transformations in the political and spiritual sphere designed to release the people from the survivals of patriarchal, feudal and colonial relations, to democratise social life, and muster the social energy of the masses for national construction;

- establishment of a state apparatus capable of exercising, in the light of the national, anti-imperialist interest, the key political, economic and ideological functions falling on it at the

new phase of development, a radical reorganisation and purging for that purpose of administrative agencies coming down as a "legacy" from the colonialists;

— an active anti-imperialist foreign policy designed to ensure favourable international premises for the struggle for economic emancipation, development of all-round cooperation with the socialist countries, and coordination of action by the national states against neo-colonialism.

Although, as the above enumeration shows, socio-economic problems become crucial at the new phase of the revolution, the struggle in the political sphere continues to be decisive.

In the old days, national liberation processes tended, as a rule, to develop "from below", in defiance of the existing authority. With political independence there has appeared the possibility of using the national state for anti-imperialist purposes. That is a key distinctive feature of the new phase of the revolution.

The struggle to convert the young states into an instrument of national democratic development becomes of primary importance in the activity of the patriotic forces. Here, one should bear in mind that the structure of power, its social basis and the character of the state apparatus in the liberated countries variously reflect their mosaic social structure, which is insufficiently differentiated and transitional. This now and again makes it possible, where, of course, the regime is not extremely authoritarian, to work for the use of the instruments of the young state even by the forces which are not in power.

In contrast to the previous phase, the forces of national liberation now have to tackle not only destructive but also constructive tasks: the building of a new way of life, economic and political structures of the young states, etc. Indeed, the remnants of the colonial empires apart, the destructive tasks have also become different. It is now a matter of eliminating the obsolete social relations and forms of ideology in the liberated countries.

At the new stage of the national liberation revolutions the concrete specific features of the various zones and countries of the one-time colonial margin of imperialism tend to stand up more clearly, determining the forms and methods in tackling its tasks.

A specific feature of the new phase is that the question of the orientation of social development in the former colonies and semi-colonies is resolved in the course of the struggle for economic emancipation and on the platform of that struggle. This takes place both when the issue had not been settled in the course of the struggle for independence and when a new decision is taken, with the social orientation adopted at that phase being reviewed.

In the course of the new phase of the national liberation struggle in the former colonies and semi-colonies two key processes, in fact, take place: *the process of their formation as national states, with the laying of an economic foundation—adapted to meet their national needs—for the political independence that has been won, and the process in which the main line of their social development is crystallised.* Of course, these processes can be separated only in analysis, because in actual life they are interwoven and blend into a single stream of development. Indeed, it is the combination of these two processes—naturally, together with the specific conditions in which they unfold (the marked socio-economic backwardness of these countries and continued imperialist pressures)—that determines the uniqueness and complexity of the present phase of the national liberation struggle.

The question is whether it is possible to fulfil the tasks of the new phase of the national revolutions along the capitalist way. The answer cannot, of course, be regarded as adequate if it is based only on general theoretical and ideological considerations about the decline of world capitalism and its development along a downgrade. While such an approach is well grounded, it lacks concrete content.

One can also be hardly satisfied with the one-sided and narrowly economic standpoint, which stems virtually altogether from a statement of the difficulties, financial difficulties in the first place, which confront the development of capitalism in the countries concerned. Such an approach fails to take account of the fact that in the former colonies and semi-colonies capitalism has some internal reserve, which it can place at its service. But what it especially tends to underestimate is the fact that the opportunities for capitalist development in the formerly oppressed countries today are not at all

identical with those of local capital. These largely depend on the policy of imperialism, which regards capitalism in the developing countries as a long-term social reserve in the worldwide class battle. The implantation of capitalist relations in these countries has already become a matter, and one of primary importance, for the whole of world capitalism.

Moreover, this approach fails to take due account of various other factors, including economic factors. On the other hand, it is not right to say that a substantial contribution to the consideration of this problem is being made by emphatic references to countries like the Ivory Coast, Cameroun (and Madagascar until recently) in Africa or Malaysia in Asia, by a comparison of their financial and economic condition with that of some states taking the socialist orientation.

There is no doubt, for instance, that industrial and agricultural production has increased in the Ivory Coast: in the years since the proclamation of its independence, its gross product in cash terms went up from roughly 140 thousand million to 400 thousand million African francs and GNP per head from 38,000 to 75,000 francs.

But the question is — and it happens to be crucial — what has been done there towards economic independence and social progress, and what effect have these economic advances had on the solution of these problems? Here it turns out that the positions of the foreign monopolies have not only been maintained but are being consolidated. They control banking, timbering, construction, industry, foreign trade and transport. In 1963, foreign monopolies owned almost 90 per cent of the aggregate capital of 61 major companies, each with assets of over 75 million African francs.¹ The positions of foreign capital are not as strong in agriculture, but even there its share (together with timbering) increased from 9 per cent to 23 per cent.

The magazine *New Africa*, writing about the “economic miracle” in the Ivory Coast, says that industrial development there depends mainly on foreign investments, and that because of its generosity towards foreign investors the government is left with too little profit to satisfy the requirements of its own

¹ *Bulletin de l'Afrique Noire* No. 331, Paris, 1964, pp. 6723, 6724.

people. In 1965, foreign owners repatriated in the form of profits 25 thousand million francs, or double the influx of private capital and “aid” into the country. In 1970 the figure reached 50 thousand million francs. The British bourgeois scientist L. Barnes in his analysis of the situation in the Ivory Coast came to the conclusion that there is economic growth without social development.¹ Another magazine has commented on the “typical form of growth without development”, with the Ivory Coast in mind.²

Professor Samir Amin of Dakar University says that foreigners retain absolute control over all economic decisions, and thereby over the country's economic future. He draws the conclusion that while it could be said that capitalism has been developing in the Ivory Coast, it would be wrong to say that national capitalism has.³

The situation in Madagascar is equally indicative. One French journal says that in the four years of the first five-year plan (1964-1968), 95 per cent of the new enterprises were set up by foreigners, and that “the local bourgeoisie, which took over in 1958, continue to play the role of guardian of the social status quo, which goes to benefit mainly the foreign circles”.⁴ Another French journal has characterised the situation in Madagascar as follows: “Under the cover of Malagasy socialism and regained national independence, the colonial structure has been perpetuated and has remained almost the same.”⁵ An even more relentless conclusion from the state of affairs in Madagascar has been drawn by Jacques Delepine: not a single sore of the colonial economy, including extreme dependence on foreign countries, has in fact disappeared.⁶

These assessments have been completely borne out by the tempestuous events on the island in 1972. One of the main slogans of the mass movement, which led to the ouster of

¹ See, L. Barnes, *African Renaissance*, London, Gollancz, 1969, p. 182.

² *AfricaAsia* No. 57, Paris, January 23, 1972, p. 15.

³ S. Amin, *Le développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire*, pp. 193, 279.

⁴ *Revue française d'études politiques africaines* No. 41, Paris, 1969, pp. 79, 97.

⁵ *Les Temps Modernes* No. 281, Paris, 1969.

⁶ See, *Esprit*, Paris, October 1974, p. 409.

President Tsiranana's regime, was a demand for genuine national liberation and elimination of dependence on the neo-colonialists.

In other words, the countries taking the capitalist way, to which bourgeois analysts love to refer as being "prosperous", have not made any substantial advance towards economic independence, or a solution of mature social problems (they have, in effect, even gone back in this sense).

It would apparently be wrong in principle to deny the possibility of solving some problems of the second phase of the national liberation struggle along the capitalist way, in some of these countries, at any rate. Nor can it be said that in the young states, set up by the bourgeoisie, nothing is being done in that sense.

At the same time, there is no doubt at all that the solution of the problems of the general democratic programme in the capitalist-oriented countries has met with tremendous difficulties, and the bulk of these problems are a long way from any real solution. It can hardly be doubted that within the framework of the former colonial and semi-colonial world as a whole, capitalism, as applied to most countries in the area, is incapable of providing a reliable basis for tackling the tasks of the new phase of the national liberation process.

Of all the variants of capitalist development on record, with an eye to the results in terms of tackling the tasks of winning political independence and establishing a national economy, in countries formerly under colonial dependence or on the threshold of colonial enslavement, the "Latin American way" is in practice the most probable one. This is, of course, a most general analogy, and applicable only in principle, for it requires the corresponding correctives in the light of the specific features of the present historical situation and the specific conditions in the Asian, to say nothing of the African, countries.

When we say, as a rule, that the "North American" or "Japanese" ways of development are unrealistic, we do not forget that the extrapolation of past historical experience has limited scope because of the very different conditions.

Not only is it unlikely that the capitalist development of former colonies and semi-colonies as a whole will be a complete

analogy of the way travelled by states which are now imperialist. It will assume other forms, and does not necessarily have to go through all the phases of the past, so that the highest forms of activity by local monopoly capital may operate simultaneously for a long time alongside strong positions of near-medieval ("Black-Hundred-Octobrist capitalism"¹) capitalism with pre-capitalist relations prevailing in the economic life of the bulk of the population, etc.

Still, the conclusion that in the former colonies and semi-colonies capitalism has a limited potential in solving the problems of economic emancipation from imperialism appears to be scientifically grounded. The main theoretical argument, from which one has to start, is that in the countries which had gone through colonial and semi-colonial oppression, capitalism has, because of the special conditions in which it was shaped and developed, specific features and that the emergent states now face imperialist, state-monopoly capital relying on the international division of labour and exploitation which it has built up.

Of course, the development of local capitalism runs a different course in the various colonial and semi-colonial countries. In some (Tropical Africa), it has not had any considerable role to play in economic life at all; in others (India and some Arab countries) its "presence" was relatively noticeable in the sphere of circulation, and also in the production of consumer goods for the local population. But, leaving aside for the moment some of the national specific features which, of course, could modify the overall assessment, one could say that in the enslaved countries local capitalism, commercial capital and some purely traditional spheres of production apart, was not a sector which was shaped naturally and independently. One of its peculiarities was that it did not emerge as a result of normal development and a succession of socio-economic forms whose roots lay in the country's economic life, in the local economic order. It was largely implanted from "above", being an effect and a reflection of relations which the metropolitan country introduced into the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, p. 438.

development of the oppressed country. The capital of the metropolitan countries, on the one hand, artificially stepped up the development of local capitalism (first and foremost as an appendage to its own activity), and on the other, distorted it and led to socio-economic deformations, which in the aggregate provided the basis for the conception of "colonial capitalism".

All these peculiarities in the development of local capitalism did not disappear with the elimination of colonial oppression, but were even deepened in some aspects. Even in the liberated countries it did not obtain the time and the room for normal, consistently phased development on its own stable basis. What is more, national capitalism carries the heavy chains of its colonial origins, and the legacy of colonialism in the socio-economic structure and the national economy which is yet to be overcome. The emergent countries take the path of independent development while remaining within the framework of the world capitalist economy, which develops in accordance with its internal laws, as more or less a single entity, and which is now in the process of substantial transformation because of the scientific and technical revolution.

Quite naturally, the emergent countries are not in any sense screened from the influence of the world capitalist economy. They are the objects of neo-colonialist policy, which is, in principle, not aimed merely at stimulating the capitalist development of the liberated countries. It is a development which is invested with definite forms, is hemmed in by a narrow framework, is under the overall control of imperialism and, on the whole, predetermines the subordinate role of local capitalism in the former colonies and semi-colonies with respect to the finance capital of the imperialist countries, and the unequal position of the newly independent countries in the world capitalist economy.

The newly independent countries taking the capitalist way feel the effects of the scientific and technical revolution both through the general forms in which this revolution is expressed, and through the policy of neo-colonialism, as a result of the penetration of imperialist monopolies. The final effect of this influence still has to be weighed. But it has already "invaded" the economic life of these countries in many ways,

blocking the "normal" development of capitalism, introducing its present-day methods and forms, but never accelerating the usually very slow transformation of the profoundly backward basis and the prevailing way of life of the native population. Even the elements of industrialisation connected with the activity of imperialist monopolies and the conversion of foreign enterprises, once separate and alien enclaves, into some kind of industrial centres more organically linked with the local economy, none of this does away with dependence, but merely invests it with new forms, and now and again even intensifies it. For that reason as well capitalist development in the emergent countries to this very day is largely, and now and again mostly, determined by the stimuli and impulses, by the tendencies which originate in the former metropolitan countries, and in the world capitalist economy as a whole.¹

All these factors determine the special and largely *dependent* (and "backward") character of capitalism developing in the newly independent countries, the weakness of its socio-economic potential, its limited possibilities and even inability to ensure economic independence and overcome the social deformations which originated in the colonial period, and "to digest" in the foreseeable future the traditional, pre-capitalist structure under which the bulk of the population continues to live.

Of course, the tendencies in the development of local capitalism in the newly independent countries are contradictory, and the balance between them tends constantly to change, especially as regards some countries with an exceptional combination of circumstances (geographical location, natural resources, domestic balance of class forces, the imperialists' urge for various reasons to convert the given country into a "show-window" of capitalist development, etc.), and this puts them in a special position. It is, in fact, possible that in the course of the further development of local capitalism phenomena may arise which will require some modification of

¹ Of course, the problem of this influence of the world capitalist economy under the scientific and technical revolution relates not only to the newly independent countries taking the capitalist way, but for them it is of special and primary importance.

this assessment. However, in the present situation it appears to be on the whole justified.

Capitalism in the newly independent countries, like any emergent capitalism, comes up against the problem of primitive accumulation, a problem which is unprecedentedly complicated and difficult. How the problem was solved in the West is well known: there were the wars, the indemnities, the pauperisation of broad masses of people, and colonial plunder. Some assessments say that only in the 60 years from 1750 to 1810, which were of tremendous importance in the rise of British capitalism, Britain carried away from India valuables worth from £500 million to £1 thousand million, apart from the earnings from non-equivalent trade. Meanwhile, per capita daily income in the provinces of British India dropped to less than one-third from 1850 to 1900.¹ At the turn of the century, one-fifth of Britain's expenditures was covered with funds coming from India.

However, these "idyllic" methods of primitive accumulation, to use Marx's expression, are as a rule inaccessible to capitalism in the newly independent countries. Even the further pauperisation of the masses in the former colonies and semi-colonies is a source that is limited because of the extreme poverty of the working people, to say nothing of the much greater ability of the peoples to put up active resistance to such practices. Meanwhile, the monopolies continue to siphon off thousands of millions of dollars from the former colonies and semi-colonies.

Of course, a part of the financial burden incidental to the support of developing capitalist relations in these countries is being shouldered by imperialism as a whole, for that is, among other things, one of the chief class functions of "aid". But experience shows that it is more than doubtful that the amounts going to these countries in the form of "aid" will be adequate to the solution of this difficult problem. Besides, over the past few years against the background of the crisis which has hit the capitalist monetary system and the budget, and financial difficulties facing the leading imperialist power, the

¹ *Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan*. Ed. by S. Kuznets Durham, 1965, p. 105.

tendency to stabilise the amount of "aid" or even to reduce it has been ever more pronounced.

**Net Export of Capital to the Newly Independent Countries
from Government Sources of Developed Capitalist Countries
on a Bilateral Basis***

	1960	1967	1968	1969	1970
Government funds (thousand million dollars)	3.89	6.11	6.02	5.85	6.18
Share of government funds in total export of capital (per cent)	55.2	55.3	50.6	46.6	49.2

* Rounded-off estimates on the basis of: UNCTAD, *Review of International Trade and Development*, 1969/70, Part I, TD/B/309, Add. I, August 7, 1970, p. 46; UNCTAD, *Review of International Trade and Development*, 1971, Part I, TD/B/369, Add. I, August 9, 1971.

The most important thing is that this "aid" is based on the same more or less explicit neo-colonialist schemes, and that it is aimed above all to encourage "dependent" capitalism in the newly independent countries.

The problem of accumulation is also compounded because of the scientific and technological revolution. The opportunity arises to use its achievements so as to cover the gap separating these countries from the advanced countries in a shorter period. But this requires tremendous concentration of investments and skilled personnel.

Accordingly, the problem of capitalist accumulation can, in practice, be solved to this or that extent only through cooperation with international finance capital, and this leads to an entrenchment of the unequal ties between the newly independent countries and the economic and political system of imperialism, helping to consolidate the social forces which are prepared to do a deal with the imperialists, so as to obtain their help in preventing a switch to the path of social progress and to keep the masses in check.

Such are only a few of the objective factors which make for the vast and, one could say, unprecedented difficulties in the way of capitalist development in the formerly oppressed countries, which tend to narrow down its social potential, especially as a factor in the creation of a national economy and

achievement of economic independence. But these difficulties are further increased by the extremely complicated position of the chief subjective factor of capitalist development—the national bourgeoisie or, where it has yet fully to take shape, the forces of bourgeois and pro-bourgeois orientation.

Of course, the bourgeoisie of the former colonies and semi-colonies seeks to fulfil roughly the same tasks and with the same results as the bourgeoisie did in the West a century or two ago. But its tragedy is that it has arrived a whole epoch “too late”. The national bourgeoisie is under pressure of imperialism, which seeks to keep the emergent countries in a dependent and exploited condition, feudal and pre-feudal reaction, which seeks to hold on to its privileges, and the people, who demand a resolute change in their living conditions and genuine liberation (and frequently also of the petty-bourgeois forces who lay claim to leadership of the young states, and want to use power to fortify their own economic and political positions, some of them at the expense of the bourgeoisie).

Hence, the hesitancy and vacillations of the national bourgeoisie, and its dual attitude to the national liberation revolution and its general democratic programme. The experience of several emergent countries, especially those taking the socialist orientation, has clearly shown that the national bourgeoisie dare not risk starting on—and sometimes resisting—changes which, one would think, meet its own interests, being fearful of the fact that these changes could become revolutionary and go beyond an acceptable framework.

The national bourgeoisie has a vital stake in exploiting the natural and manpower resources in its country on its own, on an equal footing in the capitalist world, and for that reason also in the take-over of the commanding heights of the economy held by foreign monopolies. But it does not want to break with these monopolies because it seeks to derive economic and political advantages from its partnership with them, because it meets their support to fight the democratic forces. Besides, as practice shows, any struggle against the monopolies and expropriation of their property frequently tend to develop into a struggle against the big bourgeoisie of the emergent

countries, which is closely allied with them, entail nationalisation of its own property and stimulate “encroachments” on the principle of private ownership in general.

In the 1950s, the Syrian bourgeoisie agreed to the nationalisation of foreign capital only under pressure and with a heavy heart; it was fearful that nationalisation would turn against itself (as it, in fact, subsequently did) and tried hard to prevent these measures from infringing on “the sacred right of capitalist ownership”.¹ Bourgeois deputies in parliament spoke out against any proposals aimed to confiscate foreign capital without compensation.

It is also worthwhile to recall in this context another psychological fact which is genealogically linked with the colonial past. It is the “inferiority complex” which the bourgeoisie still has to live down and which is still echoed in its adulation of the former rulers and the cherished urge to “rise” to their level. This feeling, which has infected at least a section of the élite in traditional society, is also to be found among certain circles of the national bourgeoisie. That is apparently what a writer in an Indian bourgeois newspaper had in mind when he wrote about the “charisma that goes with anything foreign for our people”, which is “also true in respect of foreign exchange banks who attract our Indian clientele on this ground”.² The Ghanaian press noted that local businessmen were under the dominating influence of “the political philosophy of the colonial system”.³ A consequence of this, as a rule, is the inability or unwillingness—or both—on the part of the national bourgeoisie to take resolute steps against the imperialist trusts, the only thing that could do away with their positions and help to establish control over their activity in accordance with the national interest.

In most formerly oppressed countries, where the bourgeoisie or pro-bourgeois groups are in power, the imperialist monopolies as a rule variously maintain and frequently build up their positions, resorting ever more

¹ See, *World Marxist Review* No. 3, 1965, p. 5.

² *The Economic Times*, Bombay, November 5, 1969, p. 7.

³ *Business Weekly*, Accra, February 2, 1970, p. 5.

broadly to cooperation with the national bourgeoisie by setting up mixed companies or in various other ways.

In abstract terms, the national bourgeoisie wants to see the establishment and development of a state sector in the national economy, when local enterprise is weak and frequently unable effectively to resist foreign capital. It can use the state sector to force out the foreign monopolies, to fortify the positions of local capital and establish capitalist relations.

But in any resolute drive against the positions of the foreign monopolies, with a line aimed to concentrate national resources and to extend the economic functions of the state sector, the latter has a tendency to transcend the framework of state capitalism. It can no longer be reduced to the role of some "midwife" for local capitalism, but becomes a factor which is to some extent aimed even against the elemental sway of private enterprise. Meanwhile, the state gradually institutes rigid economic dirigisme. That is precisely how events developed in the 1960s, for instance, in Egypt, Burma, Syria and several other countries. But even where the state sector is not invested with such a social orientation and operates as an economic basis for the self-enrichment and domination of definite petty-bourgeois and army groups, it frequently tends to hem in and restrict the activity of the national bourgeoisie.

As a result, the national bourgeoisie usually decides on taken support for the state sector, opposing it "excessive" extension and frequently taking a downright hostile attitude to it. It seeks to subordinate the development of this sector not only to narrow class but even group interests, frequently seeking to limit its activity exclusively to unprofitable branches of production and spheres of activity.

It would appear that the national bourgeoisie stands to gain from mustering the national resources with the aid of the state for the purpose of solving the problem of primitive accumulation and economic upswing, and from the introduction for these same purposes of some elements of planning on the scale of the whole country or of individual branches of production. But this kind of state interference, even if it has only these and no broader purposes, tends to clash with the urge of the bourgeoisie to enrich itself at any price, hampers its self-

seeking and speculative operations in foreign and domestic trade, and creates obstacles for parasitic consumption by rich social groups, not only of the bourgeoisie itself, but also of the landowners and aristocrats allied with it.

Accordingly, the national bourgeoisie opposes "unlimited" government interference in the economy and any "unwarranted" extension of its economic functions, regulation of private capital operations, which tend to "fetter" its spirit of enterprise and initiative, and "petty", that is, real and concrete planning.

Such is the bourgeois attitude in many socialist-oriented countries: Algeria, Burma and Syria among others. The policies pursued by the government of Indira Gandhi aimed to secure for the state sector a dominant position in the heavy industry and extend its positions in other branches of the economy has met with active resistance from influential circles of Indian capital. Such actions by the bourgeoisie intensify the inherent capitalist tendency towards a wasteful interplay of market forces, and a scattering and separation of economic efforts, whereas there is an especially acute need to concentrate them in the once oppressed countries.

In abstract terms, the national bourgeoisie has a stake in boosting the productive forces and industrialising the newly independent countries, but in practice the bourgeoisie's traditional business ties and habits, which took shape in colonial conditions and which impel it to engage in comprador operations, together with the inevitable clashes in the industrial sphere with ruthless competition from foreign capital, which has tremendous organisational, technical, and financial superiority, hopes of higher profits and fear of political instability, impell the bourgeoisie to invest its capital above all in commercial, credit and financial business, speculative deals and the purchase of land. Besides, the establishment of large-scale manufacturing enterprises is simply beyond the means of the national bourgeoisie without outside support, that is, without foreign capital.

Thus, the Egyptian bourgeoisie virtually failed to respond to the call by the Nasser government after its advent to power, urging it to place its capital at the service of the country's industrialisation. Nor did the bourgeois attitude change even

after customs duties on imported consumer goods were raised and lowered on industrial equipment and machinery, while investments in industry were given a five-year, and new companies a seven-year, tax holiday, all for the purpose of encouraging investments.

In Mali, the Military Committee of National Liberation, which took over after the ouster of Modibo Keita, introduced the principle of "the free movement of property and persons" and "liberalised trade" for the purpose, according to its own statement, of effectively involving the local bourgeoisie in the national economic and social development. But the Mali bourgeoisie did not respond and preferred to use its capital for speculative purposes as before. The head of state, Moussa Traoré, said in September 1969: "Mali businessmen, whom we completely trusted, speculated on the country's difficulties and the people's malnutrition to the detriment of the working people's supreme interests, making vast profits on the smuggling of goods to neighbouring countries."

Quarshie, Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism under the Busia government in Ghana, which was totally oriented upon capitalist development, said with unconcealed regret: "A peculiar feature of Ghanaian businessmen is that they lack 'the spirit of enterprise and bold initiative'."

Thus, the national bourgeoisie frequently fails to operate as an active factor in developing the productive forces and building up the national economy, and, in effect, diverts capital from the sphere of national construction.

It would be in accord with the interests of the national bourgeoisie to put through an agrarian reform and do away with feudal and semi-feudal relations which fetter the development of the productive forces not only in the countryside, but also in the towns and are an important pillar of local reaction, used by imperialism to fight against the independent development of these countries.

However, the national bourgeoisie is frequently linked with the landed estates and tends to invest capital in the purchase of land. This is true both of Asian and African countries. Now and again this also applies to the more "modern" sections of the bourgeoisie, including monopoly groups. Thus, according to *New Age*, of January, 1970 the Birla family, a leading Indian

monopolist, has about 10,000 acres of land, in addition to orchards.¹ Alfredo Montelibano, José Yuolo and José de Leon, who belong to the élite of the Philippine bourgeoisie, own vast tracts of the most fertile land.²

In addition, the bourgeoisie seeks support from the feudal and tribal élite in the fight against the peasant and democratic movement, and frequently in virtue of various circumstances shares power with them. Furthermore, in present-day conditions, a radical solution of the agrarian question does not, as a rule, boil down to a clearing of the way for capitalism in agriculture. The experience of Algeria, Burma, and Mali, among other countries, shows that the urge to solve the agrarian problem, to get the peasantry out of their state of poverty, to raise the technical level of farming, to provide the country with food and raw materials frequently results in the establishment of state farms and cooperatives in the countryside, which can be ranged against the private-property element. That is why the national bourgeoisie is fearful of radical agrarian reforms and revolutionary measures against obsolete socio-economic relations in the countryside.

Thus, in Egypt, the bourgeoisie and the big capitalists bristled against the agrarian reform law adopted soon after the July 1925 revolution, which was on the whole anti-feudal. The point is that many of them, notably Abboud, Serag Ed Din, Khashaba, Abdel-Maksoud Ahmed and Al-Shamsi were simultaneously also owners of large landed estates.

In the national states, where capitalism has been developing, the agrarian question has been far from solved, while the bourgeoisie itself is ever more extensively engaged in direct exploitation of the peasantry, making use both of capitalist and pre-capitalist methods. Thus, in India, the progressive changes in land relations are undoubtedly also in the interests of the peasantry. At the same time, in 1970 almost 20 per cent of peasant farms had no land at all, and 60 per cent had less than 2.5 acres each. On the other hand, seven per cent of the farms with over 15 acres of land accounted for 60 per cent of all the

¹ See, *New Age*, New Delhi, January 11, 1970, p. 12.

² See, N. A. Savelyev, *The National Bourgeoisie in the Asian Countries*, p. 176 (in Russian).

farmland in the country.¹ Indeed, some landowners held as much as 30,000 acres of land.² Explaining the reasons, one newspaper wrote: "It is easy to understand the State leaders' opposition to a ceiling on holdings. At least two-thirds of the members of the Vidhan Sabha earn most of their income from land."³

The situation is similar in Senegal, an African country in which bourgeois groups and capitalist relations are relatively developed, when judged by the standards of the continent. According to the Dakar Institute of Applied Economics, most large landed estates in the Senegalese countryside are owned by "marabouts or chiefs who have capitalised upon their traditional authority to amass large sums which are invested in agricultural equipment, commerce, real estate, and a few small industries. According to *Africa Report*, 1970, the largest single Senegalese producer of peanuts, for example, is the Khalife-General of the influential Mouride sect, who markets about \$250,000 worth of peanuts a year".⁴

The national bourgeoisie would, one should think, require the reorganisation of the administrative agencies inherited from the colonialists, the establishment of efficient government machinery adapted to the needs of capitalist development and purged of imperialist agents and corrupt elements, who tend to create bureaucratic snags in the way of local enterprises. But it is fearful of upsetting the existing government machine, especially its organs of suppression. Besides, it itself frequently regards the government machine as a system of "sinecures" and as an instrument of its enrichment, and takes an active part in its corruption.

What is more, that is the soil from which a species of local bourgeoisie—the bureaucratic bourgeoisie—tends to spring. The French economist Marcel-Paul Rudloff says that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie has a negative effect on economic development, blocking every initiative that could undermine its privileged positions and withdrawing vast funds from the

¹ See, *The Times of India*, New Delhi, October 1, 1970, p. 10.

² See, *New Age*, January 11, 1970, p. 12.

³ *The Times of India*, October 1, 1970, p. 10.

⁴ *Africa Report*, Vol. 15, No. 6, Washington, 1970, p. 26.

budgets for its own maintenance.¹ Thus, even with respect to the government machinery and its modernisation, the national bourgeoisie frequently tends to adopt an attitude which runs counter to the interests of extensive capitalist development.

It would appear that the national bourgeoisie stands to gain from mustering the efforts of the masses for tackling the tasks of construction and revival. In a sense, it could also benefit from a rise in the present beggarly standard of life among the people, for this would expand the domestic market for national industry.

However, the bourgeoisie is fearful of actively involving the masses in national construction, as this tends to enhance their political influence, and consolidate the positions and authority of the forces expressing the interests of the people and urging social progress. That is precisely what happened, for instance, in Algeria where, with massive political activity, institutions of the emergent republic were established and purged of personnel who had collaborated with the French colonialists, with the result that the bourgeoisie was ousted from government leadership.

That is why states headed by the bourgeoisie or pro-bourgeois circles seek in every way to prevent the masses from intensifying their political activity and progressive parties and organisations from operating, while police reprisals are directed against consistently patriotic and democratic forces. For a long period, many of these states have an officially imposed or actual state of emergency (Pakistan from 1965 to 1969 and in 1971, Malaysia from 1969 to 1971, Indonesia from 1965 on, and Nigeria, Ghana, the Malagasy Republic, Senegal and several other African countries—from time to time).

Meanwhile, the drive for profits and the unabashed urge for instant enrichment by any means induce the bourgeoisie to infringe on the people's living standards.

The bourgeoisie has an interest in consolidating national states which, with rare exceptions, emerged before the shaping of their nations. It would stand to benefit from accelerated formation of the nation, a strengthening of general national bonds, cohesion of the nationalities inhabiting these countries,

¹ Marcel Rudloff, *Économie politique du tiers Monde*, Paris, 1968, p. 339.

and pre-emption of separatist or centrifugal tendencies. But by its reactionary nationalistic and even chauvinistic policies, aimed to secure privileges for one nation or national group to the detriment of the others, the bourgeoisie itself stimulates tendencies towards national divisions and separatist movements. This will be seen from the events, frequently involving bloodshed, in dozens of new states, both in Asia and in Africa, from Pakistan and Malaysia to Nigeria and Kenya.

The national bourgeoisie should have an interest in ensuring favourable international conditions to consolidate the political and achieve the economic independence of its states, in fortifying their positions in face of imperialist pressures and, with that end in view, in pursuing an appropriate foreign policy.

However, it is also fearful of the revolutionising effect of such a foreign policy on the social life of the young states, which is why it seeks to limit the framework of cooperation with the socialist countries and to emasculate its active social-progressive and anti-imperialist content, vacillating and engaging in various deals in relations with the imperialist powers.

Finally, a factor which tends to weaken the potential of the national bourgeoisie and, consequently, of capitalist development is the contradictions and even conflicts between various influential sections of the bourgeoisie, which stem from their narrow group interests and unbridled money-making urges, and the governments which pursue pro-bourgeois policies and in effect operate as "collective capitalists".

This general characteristic of the national bourgeoisie cannot, of course, be automatically applied to its every section in every country. Experience shows that its commercial circles do not behave as entrepreneurs, the top section of the bourgeoisie definitely takes a different attitude than its "middle" sections, and especially its "lower" sections, which are frequently moved by resolute anti-imperialist attitudes. Besides, the specific situation in each country has a tremendous role to play.

Still, this characteristic is on the whole a more or less accurate reflection of the peculiar condition and socio-political orientation of the national bourgeoisie — or pro-bourgeois forces — as

a class at a new phase of the national liberation revolutions, and of its attitude to the basic tasks of the general democratic programme.¹

In summing up, let us emphasise that the most important source of the weakness of capitalism's socio-historical potentials in the formerly oppressed countries, as a factor of independent development and the winning of economic independence, especially in view of the fact that its growth runs through the overcoming of obstacles created by the machinery of the international capitalist economy and the imperialist monopolies, is its character, and also the character of its social vehicle. It is undoubtedly a capitalism which originates, not in accordance with the "American" but the "colonial-Octobrist" type, and is deprived of courage and historical "élan". It is not a revolutionary but a reformist and even a largely conciliatory bourgeoisie, whose political behaviour and peculiar economic

¹ In this context, I have found some interest in the characteristic given to the national bourgeoisie by one writer, although his conclusions are much too peremptory and perhaps even exaggerated. He says: "The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie's business agent, and it will play its part without any complexes in a most dignified manner. But this same lucrative role, this cheap-Jack's function, this meanness of outlook and this absence of all ambition symbolise the incapability of the national middle class to fulfil its historic role of bourgeoisie. Here, the dynamic, pioneer aspect, the characteristics of the inventor and of the discoverer of new worlds which are found in all national bourgeoisies are lamentably absent. In the colonial countries, the spirit of indulgence is dominant at the core of the bourgeoisie; and this is because the national bourgeoisie identifies itself with the Western bourgeoisie, from whom it has learnt its lessons. It follows the Western bourgeoisie along its path of negation and decadence without ever having emulated it in its first stages of exploration and invention, stages which are an acquisition of that Western bourgeoisie whatever the circumstances. In its beginnings, the national bourgeoisie of the colonial countries identifies itself with the decadence of the bourgeoisie of the West. We need not think that it is jumping ahead; it is in fact beginning at the end. It is already senile before it has come to know the petulance, the fearlessness, or the will to succeed of youth." (F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York, 1968, pp. 152-53.) Two French analysts, J. Atlan and H. Magnard, arguing, on the strength of Madagascar's example, the "impossibility" of capitalism with the exception of "neo-colonial" capitalism, regard as one of the main reasons for this the weak dynamism of the local bourgeoisie, which is inherently unproductive (see, *Les Temps Modernes* No. 281, december 1969, p. 835).

activity tend to compound the contradictions and weaknesses of local capitalism in the former colonies and semi-colonies, narrowing down the already limited possibilities in face of the giant economic and social problems which have matured in these countries.

This attitude of the bourgeois and pro-bourgeois forces in the formerly oppressed countries is, in effect, socially quite justified, regardless of whether they themselves realise it or not. Indeed, at first sight none of the general democratic tasks of the present phase of the national liberation revolutions, taken separately and in abstract theoretical terms, tends to go beyond the framework of capitalism, and should even promote its establishment. However, the dialectics of historical development in the present world situation and the conditions of the formerly oppressed countries themselves, notably, the dialectics of the general democratic programme of the new phase of the struggle, makes things quite different in practice. The transformations envisaged in such a programme, when implemented *fully and consistently*, when implemented *in a revolutionary manner*, and especially when taken in the aggregate, begin to "work" in the opposite direction and acquire an anti-capitalist tenor. As a result, the programme *initially* stemming from the need to achieve economic emancipation from imperialism has a tendency to carry socio-economic development beyond the limits of capitalism, as will be seen from an analysis of the substance of its basic tasks and the experience in a number of former colonies and semi-colonies. That is the historical difficulty, which is both objective and subjective, facing capitalist development in the newly independent countries. There are many countries, like Egypt, Burma, Iraq, Syria and Algeria, where it has proved impossible to realise the general democratic programme to any complete extent and to the end along the capitalist way, with the national bourgeoisie at the head, although the attempt was started under its leadership.

Thus, there is every indication that the entry of the national liberation revolution upon a new phase is not simply an enlargement of the framework of the revolution, but a profound and qualitative change. The specific feature of this stage is the coalescence of the tasks of national liberation with

the tasks of social change, with the latter steadily becoming more important.

While the question of whether capitalism is capable of providing a basis for realising the new aims of the revolution in some newly independent countries at least may be important in historical and theoretical terms, it is not, strictly speaking, crucial to the course and immediate prospects of the struggle at the *present* phase, which is, however, decisive in terms of formulating the orientation of these countries' socio-economic development. The fact that the attempts to tackle the tasks of national revival along the capitalist way have come up against vast difficulties and have not resulted in any rapid change, and that the development of capitalism runs a painful course for the masses, building up additional negative phenomena in the life of the former colonies and semi-colonies should in itself suffice. In sum, this leads to an accumulation of explosive social material, feeding the tendency towards a growth of anti-capitalist attitudes among the public circles in these countries, attitudes which had emerged earlier on the basis of the association between capitalism and colonialism. Accordingly, favourable conditions are created for political work by the progressive forces. *That is a key premise for successful struggle by these forces against the attempts to lead the emergent countries along the capitalist way.*

CONFIGURATION AND BALANCE OF CLASS FORCES

At its new phase, the national liberation movement has clearly acquired a more pronounced class character. The configuration and balance of class forces have changed substantially, and an important shift has taken place towards an *aggravation of social contradictions*. That is the most characteristic feature of the development of class relations at the second phase of the revolution. The Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 25th Party Congress emphasised:

"A complicated process of class differentiation is under way in many liberated countries, with the class struggle gaining in intensity."¹ This process is based on a deepening social differentiation, changes in the social structure as a result of economic development, and formation of national state institutions and a system of education.

Social contradictions are especially sharpened by the stand taken by the social groups and sections on the new tasks in the national liberation revolution. The very nature of the second phase, when different social forces come face to face with the question of the country's social orientation, tends to stimulate awareness and expression of their class interests and, consequently, of social differences as well.

1. The Role of the Working Class and the Peasantry

Historically the most important and progressive tendency in the development of the social structure of the once oppressed countries after independence is the *growth of the working class* on

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy*, p. 15.

the basis of the incipient or spreading development of industry, and the growing use of wage-labour in agriculture.

The facts presented in the foregoing section concerning the proletariat in the national liberation zone apply in many respects to the present phase of the national revolutions. In the short intervening period, no *fundamental* changes could, as a rule, have taken place either in its structure or in its important social specifics. Indeed, the figures given in the foregoing section in part cover the period even after independence. That is why I shall confine myself to considerations which bear on some of the specific elements of the present phase, which have arisen anew or which have acquired special significance.

The first thing to note is that the growth of the working class does not proceed at the same rate in the emergent countries, which intensifies its earlier uneven development. This depends on the level of development of the countries concerned, the policies pursued by their ruling class forces, the date of independence and several other factors. But virtually in all the former colonies and semi-colonies there is evidence of a tendency towards a marked growth in the size of the proletariat.

At the present phase, changes in the number and share of wage-workers, and the distribution of the economically active population by branches can serve as indicators of the growth of the working class and changes in its social structure as a whole, naturally with the reservations set out in the foregoing section.

Changes in the Structure of the Labour Force
of the Developing Countries

	1950		1960		1970		Growth from 1960 to 1970	
	mln	per cent	mln	per cent	mln	per cent	mln	per cent
Total labour force	406.4	100	504.6	100	661.6	100	255.2	63
Industry (including building)	39.0	9.6	55.3	10.9	77.5	11.7	38.5	99

	1950		1960		1970		<i>Continued</i> Growth from 1960 to 1970	
	mln	per cent	mln	per cent	mln	per cent	mln	per cent
Agriculture	298.0	73.3	356.7	70.7	445.0	67.3	147.0	49
Infrastructure (transport, com- munications, trade)	69.4	17.1	92.6	18.4	139.1	21.0	69.7	100

Source: Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Moscow.

**Changes in the Structure of the Working Population
in Some Asian and African Countries (per cent)**

Countries	Years	Agriculture	Industry	Infrastructure
Algeria*	1954	82.0	5.0	13.0
	1966	60.0	12.4	27.6
Ceylon	1953	53.0	13.0	34.0
	1963	49.9	12.9	37.2
Syria	1960	46.6	16.5	36.9
	1969	66.5	11.9	21.6
Pakistan	1961	75.7	9.5	14.8
	1968	69.1	11.8	19.1
Philippines	1960	64.4	13.3	22.3
	1965	58.7	15.6	25.7
India	1951	70.6	11.1	18.3
	1961	72.9	11.4	15.7
Malaya	1957	58.5	13.4	28.1
	1962	55.4	12.5	32.1
Thailand	1954	88.0	2.8	9.2
	1960	82.0	4.7	13.3

* With the exception of some categories of military personnel, Algerians living abroad, and about 120,000 women engaged in agriculture.

Source: *Yearbook of Labour Statistics* 1971, Geneva, 1971.

We find that the tendency towards an absolute and relative growth in the number of persons employed in industry together with the limited nature of this tendency is borne out by the general data, and by the data for individual developing countries. The most noticeable changes have taken place in some countries of Asia, and in North and partly in West Africa.

Development in a number of countries of Tropical Africa has been moving in the same direction.

In assessing these data, one should, however, bear in mind that the present-day proletariat in the countries of Asia and Africa even now comes to no more than 20-25 per cent of the wage-workers (5-7 per cent of the working population). It is also apparently right to assess the scale of the relative growth in the numerical strength of the proletariat. According to existing estimates, in the near future the share of the proletariat in the countries of Asia and North Africa, to say nothing of Tropical Africa, will not exceed 5-10 per cent of all the working people. In countries like India, despite the considerable increase in the number of industrial workers, their share of the working population had not grown all that much.

**Share of Industrial Workers in India
(per cent)**

Years	Of the working population	Of the total population
1951	2.00	0.7
1961	2.07	0.8
1966	2.1	0.9
1968	2.5	0.92

Sources: *Yearbook of Labour Statistics* 1969; *Indian Labour Statistics* 1970.

In some countries of Tropical Africa, the number of employed in industry over the past few years has even decreased.

As a rule, the most rapid growth of the proletariat, with a pronounced growth of its industrial core, is evident in the relatively developed former colonies and dependent countries, like India and Egypt.

Growth of the Indian Proletariat

Years	Factory workers (mln)	Miners (1,000)	Railwaymen (1,000)
1947	2.2	407	825
1961	3.76*	671	1,163
1968	4.74*	644	1,368

* 1960.

** Estimate.

Sources: *The Indian Labour Yearbook 1947-48*, Delhi, 1949; *Indian Labour Statistics 1970*.

From 1960 to 1966, the number of workers employed at big factories went up from 2,903,000 to 3,934,000, making up 83.6 per cent of all those employed in the industry included in the census (as compared with 77.1 per cent in 1960).

Growth of the Working Class in Egypt

Years	At enterprises with 10 workers and over (1,000)	At enterprises with 50 workers and over (1,000)
1952	273	220
1961	360	297

Source: *Federation of Industries in the United Arab Republic*, Year Book, Cairo-Alexandria, 1962, p. 100.

In 1968, industrial workers in Egypt numbered 885,000.

The number of workers in manufacturing has also been growing in most other countries of the Afro-Asian world, although there, with the exception of some states, this applies to small-scale food, textile and similar other enterprises.

Employment in Manufacturing in Some Asian and African Countries (1963=100)

Countries	1958	1966	1969	Countries	1958	1966	1969
Cameroun	195	153	213	Tanzania	105	133	181
Ghana	66	111	163	Uganda	101	120	132*
Kenya	136	107	—	Malaysia	73	118	126*
Nigeria	65	137	—	Pakistan	75	112	122**
Sierra Leone	59	—	152	Philippines	88	103	109

* 1967.

** 1968.

Sources: *Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1969*; *Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1971*, pp. 336-337.

Of course, one could bear in mind the unstable increase in manufacturing employment in some developing countries, for now and again the figure tends to drop. In order to make a correct assessment of the ongoing processes it is also necessary to take account of the fact that the starting level on which statistical calculations are based is extremely low in most countries.

Some positive changes have also taken place in the structure of the industrial proletariat itself (above all an increase of its contingents in the heavy industry), as will be seen from the following table, which includes the Latin American countries as well.

Industrial Employment in the Developing Countries (1963=100)

Years	Manufacturing							
	All heavy Industry	Metall- urgy	Chem- istry, petro- chemist- ry	Engi- neer- ing, metal work- ing	All light indu- stry	Food	Text- iles	Mining
1948	47	46	48	45	64	66	74	61
1953	55	53	62	49	63	74	76	73

Continued

Years	Manufacturing							Mining
	All heavy Industry	Metall- urgy	Chem- istry, petro- chemist- ry	Engi- neer- ing, metal work- ing	All light indu- stry	Food	Text- iles	
1960	87	79	88	88	90	94	93	100
1965	113	111	109	118	108	108	103	101
1969	134	123	132	142	117	120	107	101
1970	136	128	138	148	119	122	104	104

Sources: *Statistical Yearbook 1968*, New York, 1969, pp. 50-51; *Statistical Yearbook 1972*, New York, 1973, pp. 24-25.

Even after the winning of independence, the working class in many countries has some advantages over the national entrepreneurial bourgeoisie in terms of intensive formation, which is now also ensured by the existence and enlargement of the state sector.

Whereas with the advance of the revolution and the fulfilment of its tasks, other classes and social groups, including to some extent the national bourgeoisie, go through a process of stratification, the proletariat has a tendency—which is slow and meets with serious difficulties—not only to grow numerically but also to consolidate in social and political terms.

On the whole, at the new phase of the development of the former colonial and dependent countries, the tendency towards a growing importance of the proletariat in social life is ever more pronounced. The Main Document of the 1969 Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties said: "In a number of young states the social role and political activity of the working class have increased."¹ For one thing, the very emergence of millions of new proletarians (even where this does not work a fundamental change in the social structure and proceeds against the background of a vast peasant population), and their varying entry into the arena of social clashes would not have passed without trace, especially because with the growth of the proletariat and the strengthening of its industrial contingents,

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 28.

the social potential of the working class tends more and more to outweigh its share of the population.

The social activity and role of the working class is enhanced by the specific features of the new phase of the national liberation revolution, the coming to the fore of problems stemming from socio-economic progress, the development of class contradictions, the proletariat's growing experience in political struggle against imperialism and domestic reaction, etc. All of this helps to some extent to accelerate the growing class consciousness of the proletariat, so that in many countries it comes to have a clearer understanding of its interests and its positions in the overall configuration of socio-political forces.

At the new phase, the working class is, quite naturally, in the thick of the national liberation struggle, and its class purposes and interests are objectively and closely interwoven with the tasks of national liberation. But now, while continuing its vigorous efforts in the common struggle for complete national liberation, the proletariat gradually takes the path of class independence.

In India, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Sudan and Sri Lanka, among others, where the proletariat has become an influential factor of national importance and has played a great part in overthrowing the colonial and semi-colonial regimes, after the winning of independence in the course of major political action and initiatives it has decisively shown in practice that it has the potential to secure leadership in the liberation struggle.

The working class has also taken powerful action in a number of other countries, exerting a great influence on their development. The general strikes by Nigerian workers, which shook the whole country, and which in June 1964 involved almost 800,000 people in the course of two weeks, showed their capability of taking independent action on a national scale.¹ The working people also staged massive action in Pakistan (1964-1966, 1972),² Morocco (1965), Upper Volta (1966), Togo, Sierra Leone, Mauritania and Ghana (1969), and Senegal (1968 and 1969).

¹ The French bourgeois press said that this was "fifteen days which shook Africa" (see, *France Observateur*, July 9, 1964, p. 8).

² Altogether from 1966 to 1969 there were 12,000 officially registered strikes alone in the countries of Asia.

Indeed, many progressive changes in the developing countries, and frequently revolutionary changes as well, are directly connected with the leading role of the working class, which was either the initiator or leading force, or resolutely supported such action. The proletarian action in the Congo (Brazzaville) in August 1963 put an end to the pro-colonialist government of Fulbert Youlou. The general strikes in Dahomey in 1963 generated events which led to the change of political regime in the country.

The strikes by the Algerian proletariat in March 1963 blocked the way for action by counter-revolutionary forces.

Egyptian workers were among the main forces coming out in support of President Nasser after the defeat in the Six-day War and ensured the maintenance of the progressive regime. The National Confederation of the Working People of Guinea did much to beat back the imperialist aggression against the Republic in 1970. The struggle of the Sudanese working class, under the leadership of the Communist Party, was of great significance in eliminating General Abboud's reactionary dictatorship in the autumn of 1964. In effect, it was the proletariat of Sudan which should get most of the credit for the fact that the government, with the participation of the Communists, installed just after the May 1969 coup, was not at once overthrown by the reactionaries.

In the autumn of 1972, vigorous action by the Indian proletariat, led by the Communist Party, in a massive campaign under the slogan of implementing the government's progressive changes assumed extensive proportions and had a great influence on the country's political life. Action by the workers of Madagascar had an outstanding role to play in the events which in 1972 led to the overthrow of the reactionary and pro-colonialist Tsiranana regime.

These and similar other examples show very well the social potential of the working class in Asia and Africa and its capability of coping with the tasks which arise at the present phase of the liberation struggle.

The strength and orientation, together with the growing organisation of political action by the African and Asian proletariat, provide ever more cogent evidence refuting the futile attempts to minimise its importance and to substantiate

the vanguard role of other class forces in the historical development of this zone. As time goes on, there are ever greater premises for the working class itself and the progressive forces in other social groups coming to realise the historical mission of the proletariat.

Under independence, some advances have already been made in the occupational and political organisation of the proletariat in the African and Asian countries. At the beginning of 1970s, there were over 40 million organised workers in these countries, including 4.2 million in the Arab countries and 3 million in Tropical Africa. Although these are not very large figures compared with the total number of wage-workers in the zone, they show very well the major changes that have taken place. Altogether, nearly 50 new trade union centres have been established in the formerly oppressed countries.

Of vast importance for the earliest clarification of the social potential of the working class and enhancement of its social role and militancy is invigoration of Communist Party activity in the formerly oppressed countries of Asia and Africa. The Main Document of the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties said: "Communists fight for the freedom, national independence and socialist future of their peoples. They are bearers of the ideas of scientific socialism and fight in the vanguard of the national liberation movement."¹

Today, when attitude to the national liberation revolution, and the struggle against imperialism and for non-capitalist development is the touchstone of progressiveness and the revolutionary character of political parties and individual leaders, no one is capable of standing the test as well as the Communists.

At the new phase of the liberation struggle, the importance of Communist Party activity tends sharply to increase.

In the developing countries of Asia and Africa, the Communist parties are simultaneously a contingent of the national liberation movement and of the movement for

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 29.

socialism, blending, in a manner of speaking, both streams of the revolutionary struggle. It is the Communist parties which, because of their class nature and ideological weapons, are capable of formulating and implementing a political line, a line of action, which ensures the solution of pressing tasks at the present phase of the national liberation movement, while paving the way for transition of the social process to a higher stage.

In the developing countries, as everywhere else, the Communist Party is the only party which has always acted in the light of the interests and ideology of the proletariat, the class whose role tends to grow at the new phase of the revolution. The Communists have tirelessly explained the historical mission of the proletariat, and believe it to be their most important task to foster its political education, and consistently stand up for its rights.

In virtue of their specific outlook and of the historical role of the proletariat, the Communists never take narrow class positions. They are also capable of expressing—and this is their vital task—the aspirations of the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and all the working and exploited people, pursuing a political line which does not contrast all the motive forces but brings them closer together in joint struggle.

The Communist parties are the only political force in the national liberation movement practising the principles of proletarian internationalism and consistently opposing nationalistic prejudices and chauvinism. There is no need to argue the importance of this when there is frequently a growing reactionary tendency in the ideology of nationalism in the formerly oppressed countries, when the problem of relations between the various nationalities tends to be aggravated, and when there is a simultaneous growth of the importance of close ties with the Soviet Union and the socialist community for successful fulfilment of the general democratic tasks of the revolution.

Contrary to the inventions of imperialist propaganda, which are frequently echoed, consciously or otherwise, by some nationalists in the emergent countries, the Communists' internationalism is inseparable from patriotism and loyalty to the people's interests.

The Communists have made no secret of their urge to rally the peoples of the world on the basis of relations of friendship and brotherhood, equality and mutual assistance. The way to this lies through the elimination of the inequitable relations between countries, which were imposed by imperialism, through the winning of national independence by the oppressed peoples and elimination of the privileges of oppressor nations, and through the international cohesion of the masses in anti-imperialist struggle.

It is the Communists' internationalism and their ideals of the international unity of nations that induce them to carry on a relentless struggle against national oppression, and for the national liberation and strengthening of the independence of the countries formerly under the imperialist yoke.

The Programme of the Iraqi Communist Party says: "Proletarian internationalism is one of the basic principles of our Party. It is an expression of the Communists' genuine patriotism, which is totally antithetical to reactionary nationalism. The Communists' efforts to fulfil national tasks and their dedication in this struggle are one of the most important criteria of the Communists' internationalism, just as the purposes and tasks of the Communist Party at home are a necessary component part of the purposes and tasks of the world communist movement. Defence of the Soviet Union is one of the most important lines of the Communists' internationalism, and hostility towards it is sheer anti-communism."¹

Finally, the Communist parties have a primary role to play in the fight against leftist adventurist tendencies in the emergent countries. The Communists also have a special responsibility in resisting the neo-colonialists' schemes which are designed to split the progressive forces in the former colonies and semi-colonies and to set them in confrontation with each other.

There are now 29 Communist parties in non-socialist Asia and Africa. In the postwar period, Marxist-Leninist parties

¹ *Documents of the Second National Congress of the Iraqi Communist Party, September 1970, p. 127 (in Arabic).*

were set up in Sudan, Senegal, Bangladesh, Nepal, Cambodia, Laos, Reunion, Lesotho and Nigeria. The Communist parties have concentrated their efforts on becoming massive and securing a broader and closer union of Marxism-Leninism and the working-class movement in their countries, to help the proletariat realise its class position and its interests and become the leading force of the nation and the liberation struggle. But the specific feature of the Communist parties' position and activity in the once oppressed countries at the present phase is that, alongside this main purpose, a growing task before them is to spread scientific socialism in the national liberation movement as a whole, which is, in a sense, the task of getting other revolutionary forces to accept these ideas as well.

Simultaneously, in order to enhance the influence of the Communist parties, vast importance attaches to a concrete statement of their attitude to the most burning domestic issues, and the formulation of practical programmes as a socio-political alternative to the policies being pursued in these countries, or as a means of correcting them. The Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of India stressed that one of the factors by means of which the Party's class position should be demonstrated to the masses, to distinguish its policy from those of other parties, is the capacity "*to project concrete solutions, in terms of anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly and anti-feudal revolutionary democratic positions, as alternatives to bourgeois policies on national problems*".¹

The task of strengthening their bonds with the masses requires constant efforts to prevent any underestimation of their work in the midst of the masses, to prevent a concentration on general problems to the detriment of everyday issues which bear directly on the working people.

The Communist parties now give heightened attention to strengthening their political and ideological unity, creatively developing Marxist-Leninist theory, especially on various

¹ *Political Resolutions on Party Organisation, on the International Situation, the World Communist Movement and the Tasks of the CPI Adopted by the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of India. Ghatenagar, Cochin, October 3-10, 1971, New Delhi, p. 15.*

questions of the national liberation movement in present-day conditions, and resolute struggle against every stripe of revisionism—both right and "left"—and especially against expressions of nationalism. This is all the more important as a premise not only for the overall success of the Communist parties' activity, but also for extending their bonds with other progressive, patriotic trends and consolidating their positions in the struggle to unite the anti-imperialist forces.

The Communists want the process of national liberation to be carried on to the end and advanced along the path of national-democratic revolution. They have been working to help public opinion in the young states to realise that social progress and consistent democratic policies can alone help to fulfil the tasks of the new phase of the national liberation struggle.

The documents of the Communist parties—the Programme of the Iraqi Communist Party, approved at its Second Congress in September 1970; the decisions of the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of India in October 1971, the Third Congress of the Lebanese Communist Party in January 1972, the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of Sri Lanka in August 1972; and the documents of the Communist Parties of Syria and Jordan, the Party of Progress and Socialism of Morocco, the African Party of Independence of Senegal, among others—show that the purposes which the Communists set themselves at the present phase, their minimum programme, is in accord with the general democratic platform of the present phase of the national liberation revolution.

At the same time, the Communists' approach may be said to have fundamental specifics, as compared with the stand taken by other progressive trends which also want to fulfil the general democratic tasks of this phase. First of all, the Communist parties have gone beyond mere support for the various sections of the general democratic programme, and have not confined themselves to accentuating its various demands which are especially advantageous to various social sections and groups. They support the democratic programme *as a whole* and urge its *comprehensive* realisation which, as I have

said, may invest the programme with an anti-capitalist orientation.

When working to implement the general democratic programme, the Communists never lose sight of the ultimate aims of the working class. The Political Theses of the Third Congress of the Lebanese Communist Party say: "The struggle for concrete, current, everyday economic, social, cultural and political interests of the working class, the peasantry and other sections of the people is always connected in the Party's view with the exposure of the capitalist system.... This general democratic struggle acquires tremendous revolutionary importance when it is connected with the strategic goal of the working class—establishment of the social system."¹

Furthermore, the Communists have worked for consistently revolutionary methods in tackling the tasks of the general democratic programme, because this best meets the interests of the masses, satisfies their legitimate material and spiritual requirements and invigorates political activity and initiative.

Finally, a special aspect of the Communists' work is the effort to enhance the social status and improve the material condition of the working people, and to ensure and extend their democratic rights, the activity of all the patriotic, progressive parties, the trade unions and other organisations. The importance attached by the Communist parties to this aspect of their activity depends both on their fundamental principles and practical considerations. The Communists are firmly convinced that that is the only way to secure active support of the masses for the programme of general democratic transformations and to muster their efforts to implement it. The point is that such a mustering of effort is a key link which could help to "pull off" the whole chain of general democratic transformations.

Efforts to set up and consolidate a united national front of all the patriotic and progressive forces, and aimed against imperialism and domestic, including bourgeois, reaction, is a key line of the Communist parties' activity. The Communists assume that the

¹ *The Lebanese Communists and the Tasks of the Phase Ahead*, Beirut, 1972, p. 187 (in Arabic).

fulfilment of this task of the new phase of the revolution increasingly depends on the problem of rallying together all the forces prepared actively to support the general democratic programme, as well as on the problem of power in the emergent countries. If state power is to be an instrument in successful struggle against neo-colonialism and for economic emancipation from imperialism and the overcoming of backwardness, it must be revolutionary and democratic, adequately reflecting the interests of broad sections of the population, and not of some single class or social group.

The national anti-imperialist front of the patriotic, progressive forces is a voluntary coalition of parties and organisations, who retain their organisational and political independence, and their adherence to the ideology of their choice, but consciously and sincerely take the path of concerting their action for joint struggle to implement the general democratic platform of the new phase of the revolution.

The objective socio-political premise for the emergence of a common anti-imperialist front is, on the one hand, the concern of all the main classes of the emergent nations in fulfilling the general democratic tasks of the national revolution, and on the other, the inability in the prevailing conditions of any of these classes and the political parties expressing their aspirations to realise these tasks and guide the social process in the required direction on their own. The Third Congress of the Lebanese Communist Party declared that "the basic condition for success in the struggle of the progressive, patriotic and democratic forces is their unity".¹

What are the advantages of a united front? Where the contacts and interaction between patriotic, progressive forces acquire the clear-cut political and organisational form of a united front aimed against imperialism and domestic reaction, the effect of their contribution to the liberation struggle and their cooperation in this struggle is tangibly enhanced. A united anti-imperialist front can well become the centre rallying the popular movement, and in influence, scale and potential considerably surpassing a mere arithmetical sum total of its components.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 170.

The establishment of such a front means an extension of the social and political support of the progressive power, where it exists, and the basis for struggle against pro-colonialist and reactionary regimes. The emergence of such a front, provided that it is not merely declarative, but genuinely established, rests on a compromise which is realistic and advantageous for the revolution, and implies that the forces joining it concentrate on joint struggle for common goals at the current phase of the liberation movement, putting their differences behind them.

The establishment of the united anti-imperialist front is the culmination of a more or less drawn-out process in which the prospective participants in the front draw closer to each other and gain a knowledge of each other's positions in the anti-imperialist struggle. Now and again, a practical start on the formation of an anti-imperialist front, and the establishment of a sound political basis for the cooperation of the anti-imperialist forces is made by their democratic discussion of the main lines and concrete tasks of the national liberation struggle in contemporary conditions. The next important step is to organise concrete joint action aimed to achieve jointly defined goals. Experience shows very well that this can help to set up a united front in the liberation struggle, merging into a single tide the various political streams and organisations and making the action of the patriotic, progressive forces purposeful to the utmost. Very often, only joint action can help set up definite organisational forms for the unity of these forces, translating the idea of an anti-imperialist front from slogan and desire into practice and political reality.

Quite naturally, united fronts of patriotic, progressive forces advocated by the Communists, differ in social make-up, political forms and underlying platform from one country to another. The social coalition taking shape within the framework of such a front can operate as a force fighting against the existing regime or opposing it on key issues, or as a force which on the whole supports the regime and takes part in progressive activity, but criticises the negative aspects of the government's policy. The united front can include various combinations of political forces representing the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and also sections of the national bourgeoisie actively opposing imperial-

ism. But its core consists of political organisations expressing the interests of the motive forces of the revolution at that stage, with the revolutionary democratic forces as a rule now being capable of acting as the chief political ally of the Communist parties.

For all the diversity of concrete conditions in which united anti-imperialist fronts are set up, the Communists are guided by some general principles in their efforts to rally the progressive and patriotic forces.

First of all, the Communists are not advocates of any kind of unity, on unspecified terms. They want anti-imperialist, patriotic and progressive unity, in the interests of the people. Consequently, the importance of any united front depends on the extent to which its character and aims accord with the tasks which brought about its appearance, the extent to which it helps to advance the struggle against all the survivals of dependence on imperialism and for social progress, the extent to which it reflects the aspirations of the masses.

The anti-imperialist front is designed to unite all those who can and want to make the contribution to the national liberation struggle at the present period. The facts show that the involvement of various forces in the front may assume the form both of long-term alliances with a broad range of tasks and short-term cooperation aimed to achieve less important and specific aims. Of course, the Communists want to consolidate anti-imperialist alliances and make them lasting.

The diversity of the forces in any anti-imperialist coalition requires a differentiated approach to the various allies in the liberation struggle. Accordingly, the Communists formulate their attitude towards the other participants in any anti-imperialist front. Of course, this does not imply any adaptation to their allies, but a strategic line taking account of the real potential of each ally and making it possible to find the appropriate forms for their participation in the national liberation struggle at the present stage.

In order to set up and consolidate anti-imperialist coalitions, it is exceptionally important that they should take shape and act on a democratic basis, so that their functioning should lead to a strengthening of ties and solidarity between those

involved. Any attempt to ignore the interests of one's allies or infringement of their legitimate rights tends to harm the development of the liberation struggle. Sectarian self-complacency and haughtiness, and an underestimation of the potential of one's allies amount to perhaps the worst that can be done to frustrate the efforts to set up an anti-imperialist front.

The Communists assume that joint activity within the framework of the front for the solution of the problems involved simultaneously serves the interests of its participants. The Communists believe it to be their duty to set an example of loyalty to the common cause in the joint efforts, refraining from any clannishness or narrowness of views, and repudiating the attempts to derive political benefits at the expense of other organisations within the front.

Unity of action can be achieved only through constant joint efforts, in which every contingent of patriotic, democratic forces has a definite role to play in the struggle, with mutual respect and priority for the interests of the movement as a whole over the specific interests of any individual participant.

A highly important fundamental feature of the Communists' approach to the anti-imperialist front is that in order to help develop cooperation among the progressive, patriotic forces and improve its prospects, they seek to set up more than a formal alliance or a skin-deep bloc of parties or their leadership, working for unity that would be shaped and extended especially at the level of the masses, making it possible to rally them round the slogans of national liberation and the anti-imperialist struggle and promoting their political education.

At the same time, they are fully aware of the importance of cooperation on the level of the leadership of the political forces involved in the front, and never contrast or separate from each other the problems of unity "below" and "above".

Finally, the Communists believe that the character of the united front and its very existence are inseparable from yet another factor, that of the existence of democratic freedoms. Any drive against democratic freedoms which is, in effect, aimed against the masses and their political activity objectively

results in divisions within the national anti-imperialist front, deprives it of its content and undermines its strength.

The struggle to set up the united front is of vast importance. It calls for much political flexibility and persistence, skill in taking account of the socially rooted positions of the various allies, skill in pursuing a well-considered and purposeful policy with respect to them, and ability to use various forms of dialogue with these forces and compromises which are admissible in principle and are dictated by revolutionary considerations. At the same time, it calls for a clear demarcation between political flexibility and concessions which affect Marxist-Leninist, internationalist principles, concessions which may bring apparent and purely temporary advantages in the anti-imperialist struggle but which, in effect, harm its long-term and essential interests.

The Communists resolutely oppose any attempts to use the idea and objective need for a national anti-imperialist front against the activity and existence of the working people's class organisations, or against the ideological, political or organisational independence of the Communist parties. The mutual respect for the organisational, political and ideological independence of parties entering the front, the struggle to develop further the steps already taken by the front, the accomplishment of democracy on a mutual basis between different detachments of the national progressive movement—this is the correct way to strengthen trust and cooperation between them and to consolidate links within the front, in the interests of the revolutionary process. Thus ran the Statement of the Meeting of Communist Parties of Arab countries held in April 1975.

The national progressive front reflects an objective need arising in the process of historical development, which, being an expression of the interests of numerous social classes and groups, is an active weapon in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and reaction, and for the advance along the road to national development and social progress.

The winning of independence markedly extends for the proletariat of Asia and Africa the opportunities for making use of the historical advantages arising from the international conditions of its development. Many of the artificial barriers

thrown up by colonial regimes to keep the proletariat and the working-class movement in the oppressed countries forcibly isolated have collapsed. It has now become possible to enter into close and regular contacts with all their brothers by class in other countries, including—and this is especially important—the socialist countries, to strengthen international solidarity with them, to develop all-round ties with the world communist movement, to learn from the experience of the international proletariat and to receive its direct assistance and support.

For many national contingents of the African and Asian proletariat, which earlier virtually had no essential ties with foreign countries, this was a change of fundamental importance, especially in view of the role of the socialist system as the leading force of the international working class and the proletarian vanguard on a world scale.

International trade union ties are being extended by the African and Asian proletariat. An expression of this process is the entry of more trade unions from the former colonies and semi-colonies into the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the emergence of a number of regional trade union centres, like the All-African Trade Union Federation and the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions.

Still, for all this, in most of the emergent countries the young working class has yet to realise its leading role in social development, national liberation in particular. Very frequently, the working class is just starting out on the way to becoming the vanguard and leading force of the liberation struggle, and is moreover at the very beginning of its formation in many countries; it is not strong numerically, with especially few experienced and factory workers. In addition, its organisation and consciousness leave much to be desired. L. I. Brezhnev said at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties that "history has shaped the situation in such a way that in most states of Asia and Africa there is still no large-scale industry, and a working class is yet to emerge".¹

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 153.

In some of the other countries where the proletariat already has contingents numbering many thousand, it has also still to become a class "for itself", and remains, for the time being, chiefly a class "in itself".

Although at the new phase of struggle, as in the period of the battles for political independence, the proletariat has already demonstrated its courage and patriotism, its conscious influence on social development and political life in many countries is for the time being still limited.

The changes in the working class at the second phase of the national revolutions leading to the formation of mature class qualities are slow and in many cases even slower than its numerical growth. In the past short period, the African and Asian proletariat has been, quite naturally, unable to overcome its objectively grounded weaknesses, especially because the rising growth of industrial development has gone hand in hand not just with an enlargement of its ranks, but also with an intensified influx of new recruits from the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie and now and again with a reduction in the share of its experienced contingents.

Sizable sections of the proletariat still largely have to overcome some peasant features which spring not only from their origins and continuing links with the countryside, but also from the tendency frequently to carry over into the towns the rural way of life ensconced as "islands" in a growing urban population which clearly tends to run ahead of urbanisation proper.¹ The peasants who move into the towns stick together in face of the difficulties they encounter. The Soviet scientist, T. Pokatayeva, says: "Whole neighbourhoods emerge with a uniform tribal, national, religious or caste population. These groups live apart, and are centred on their traditional way of life. The rural inhabitants carry over to the towns not only the traditional handicrafts and forms of trade but also transplant in a peculiar manner the rural way of life with all its usages,

¹ By 1980 the developing countries are likely to add to their urban population alone more than the total population today of all the developed countries. (See, Lester B. Pearson, *The Crisis of Development*, New York, 1970, p. 21.)

relations and conflicts.”¹ In many towns, the population continues to be directly connected with farming.

During the period of the anti-colonial movement, the proletariat did not gain enough experience in class struggle against “its own” propertied sections. After the winning of independence, these classes rely on the state and use the full force of its repressive and ideological instruments to prevent any growth of self-awareness in the midst of the proletariat.

Most Marxist-Leninist parties in the non-socialist countries of Asia and Africa have yet to become massive parties, so that the bulk of the working class remains outside the sphere of their political influence. This means that not only hostile class, bourgeois ideas are infiltrated in its midst. It also reflects the weaknesses and misconceptions of the petty-bourgeois sections and especially of some circles of the intelligentsia with nationalistic attitudes and illusions about the formerly oppressed countries being absolutely unique, with the possibility of advancing along a way which is free from the class struggle.

The proletarians frequently continue to act not on their own behalf but, remaining under the influence of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois forces, to fight under an “alien” flag. The important socio-economic and democratic gains in their struggle are now and again politically “appropriated” and used by parties and organisations expressing the interests of other, sometimes hostile social forces, to build up their own prestige.

The proletariat and its communist vanguard has been even less successful, for the time being, in tackling the task which is of cardinal importance in extending its political influence, namely, the task of isolating the reactionary bourgeois and petty-bourgeois forces from their chief social “clientele”—the peasantry—and of wresting from them the role of its political leader.

The period of independence is not only one of rapid growth and activation of the trade union movement in the African and Asian countries. It is also a period in which the burden of

¹ *World Economics and International Relations* No. 9, 1969, p. 55 (in Russian).

the trade union split and fragmentation, brought about by tribal and narrowly occupational contradictions, intrigues by corrupt leaders and politicians, and the scheming of domestic and imperialist reaction has also fallen heavily on the young working class. There are now many trade union centres in Asian and African countries, apart from a large number of autonomous trade unions. Thus, there are five trade union centres in India, six in Pakistan, six in Sri Lanka, three in Madagascar, and so on. What is more, by 1969, Nigeria, for instance, had nearly 600 trade unions, and Dahomey at least 15 autonomous trade unions.

The African Trade Union Confederation was set up on the initiative of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and under its sponsorship. The International Labour Confederation has also set up its branch on the African continent—*Union panafricaine des travailleurs croyants*. Most organised wage-workers in Asia are members of trade unions affiliated with the ICFTU.

Finally, in many liberated countries the governments have managed to establish rigid administrative control over the trade unions and to install their own men at their head, thereby turning them, in effect, into government-run outfits.

When considering the political potentialities of the working class and its position at the second phase of the liberation struggle, one must take account of the unemployed, above all in the towns. This social group in many emergent countries has grown markedly in size and has become a force to be reckoned with.

There are millions of unemployed in India, hundreds of thousands in the Philippines and Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Egypt, etc.¹ According to case studies and estimates, in most towns on the African continent the unemployed make up from 10 to 20 per cent of the active population.

Developments in a number of newly independent countries show that at the new phase of struggle the masses of unemployed can be a political reserve of the proletariat and progressive movement as a whole, and now and again even

¹ See, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics* 1970, Geneva, 1971, pp. 420, 421.

play the part of active force in revolutionary action, as they did, for instance, in Congo (Brazzaville), Upper Volta, Dahomey and Togo. Of course, in the process they display their characteristic social weaknesses which impel them to spontaneous rioting and extremism.

However, the mass of unemployed could become, perhaps to an even greater extent than they did in the developed capitalist countries, an instrument of reaction and of the forces of right-wing radicalism. This is due to the fact that the unemployed are not strongly rooted in any class, frequently because of the break between the processes of urbanisation and the influx of peasants into the towns, where this feature is especially characterised by ugly distortions. There is also the adherence—due to the maintenance of close links with the countryside and material interest—to surviving relations and usages, which are undermined by social conflicts and which objectively cut across the development of the class struggle.

All of these aspects are highly important for any concrete analysis of the situation at the present phase of the struggle. But they can do nothing to change the historically crucial factor which is ever more pronounced at the second phase of the national liberation revolution: in contrast to the prospects before the other social sections, the working class tends to grow in numbers, steadily to mature politically and socially, and to play an ever greater social role.

* * *

Even after the winning of independence, the countryside, where living and working conditions continue, in effect, to be the same as those which prevailed over decades and even centuries, continues to be the basis of the whole social pyramid in most developing countries. On the whole, the peasantry now makes up at least two-thirds of the population in the former colonies and semi-colonies (about 60 per cent in North Africa, 80-90 per cent in Tropical Africa, and 60-70 per cent in Asia). As a rule, it continues to be the largest social group with a great numerical preponderance. With a few exceptions, the bulk of the working population are peasants.

Share of Persons Employed in Agriculture in the Total Working Population
(per cent)

Asia		North Africa		Tropical Africa	
Syria	58	Tunisia	57	Zambia	84
Thailand	82	Egypt	57	Senegal	83
Cambodia	80	Morocco	56	Liberia	80
India	73	Algeria	50	Zaire	77
Burma	70	Libya	36	Nigeria	70
Pakistan	69			Ghana	58
Indonesia	68			Sudan	80
Philippines	53				
Malaysia	51				
Sri Lanka	48.6				
Iraq	48				
Lebanon	37				
Jordan	35				

Sources: *World Economics and International Relations* No. 11, 1970, pp. 151-57; No. 12, pp. 142-49 (in Russian).

The available statistical data indicate that in most emergent countries of Asia and Africa the share of the peasantry in the total population has been declining insignificantly, a tendency which will apparently be maintained in the near future. From 1950 to 1970, its total numbers are estimated to have increased by roughly 500 million. At the same time, the share of wage-workers among those employed in agriculture has been growing.

The basic characteristics which were valid at the preceding phase of the national liberation struggle are, of course, true of and applicable to the peasantry in the developing countries. At the same time, the faster economic development and the spread of capitalist relations in many cases result—variously in the different countries—in a stratification of the peasantry, the emergence of well-off and kulak groups, and a substantial development of social contradictions in the countryside.

This process has been most extensively developed in many countries of Asia and in North Africa. It has gone a fairly long way, despite the continued existence of sizable areas of community land tenure, in a number of states in West and East Africa, chiefly Ghana, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast and Kenya, where a section of well-to-do farmers making use of wage-labour, has already emerged. Nor have Uganda, Zambia, Cameroun, Liberia and other countries of the continent escaped this process.

By the early 1960s, in the areas of commercial farming in Uganda, 2 per cent of the families were big farmers who marketed from 5 to 40 tons of coffee, 19 per cent were rich farming households marketing from 0.5 to 5 tons of coffee, and 27 per cent of all households were middle farmers marketing from 0.08 to 0.4 tons. According to a study carried out in the 1960s, the "lower" 10 per cent of the farmers in Kenya had an average gross income (cash and kind) of under 500 shillings a year, and the "top" 10 per cent—over 3,000 shillings.¹

In effect, a process of *proprietary differentiation of the peasantry* has been going forward across the whole zone of national liberation, in consequence of which a *difference*—ranging from nuance to contrast—of its *political interests* has become or is becoming a fact.

One of the features of the configuration of class forces since the winning of independence is a clear growth in the importance of the position of the peasantry in the political life and social development of the young states. L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said: "The central question of the revolutionary process in Asia and Africa today is that of the attitude of the peasantry, which makes up the majority of the population."²

This is due both to the vast and growing numbers of the peasantry and also—and especially—to the fact that it is the focal point of all the acute social problems that have come to a

¹ *Education, Employment and Rural Development*. Report of the Kericho (Kenya) Conference, 1966, Nairobi, 1967, p. 328.

² *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 153.

head in these countries, and of their possible solution. In a sense, the very condition of the peasantry tends to change, and change most substantially. Under the colonial regime, the peasantry was the basis only of the "native" social organism, with whom the colonialists reckoned little if at all, but now, at the present phase, it is the basis of the social structure of the *whole of society*, and, in effect, the rock-bottom social foundation of the national state. Besides, the political momentum of the anti-colonial struggle has variously affected the peasantry here and there, inducing a sense of national awareness among some of its sections and accumulating some political experience in the course of the liberation struggle. The awakening of the peasantry from the patriarchal hibernation and the extension of its political horizons have also been promoted by the incipient movement of some groups of the rural population into the towns and the inclusion of some of them in the proletariat.

In these conditions, the position of the peasantry (and also of the urban petty bourgeoisie) and its aspirations are a most important political factor which cannot be ignored by any government regime claiming to be stable, or by any aspiring political party. This conclusion is also true even where this position and aspirations are not expressed in massive action but rather in "passive" pressure and a biding of time which, let us add, is frequently ever more impatient.

Not only the *form* but also the *character* of this influence and its socio-political sum total depend on the class features of the peasantry, and aspect of the matter to which Marx pointed out when he connected the subordination of society by the executive authority and the political influence of the small-holding peasantry.¹ Of course, I have not tried literally to extrapolate Marx's idea to present-day reality or to draw an analogy between West European small-holding peasants and the peasants in the former colonies and semi-colonies in Asia, to say nothing of Africa. But on the strength of that idea I should like to emphasise that the influence of the peasantry on political life in the developing countries, despite its vast latent

¹ See, K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, in three volumes, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, p. 479.

revolutionary potential, can be complicated, mediated and far from straightforward.

The peculiar role of the peasantry in social development and the liberation movement after the winning of political independence depends not only on its numerical preponderance in the population, not only on the revolutionary potential which is latent in the peasantry and which is greater in some respects, but also on a certain contradiction between this potential and the difficulties in involving the bulk of the peasantry in active struggle. This is, of course, also connected with factors which had operated at the preceding phase—the peasantry's backwardness and dispersion, and the strong patriarchal ties and forms of ideology. There is also the changing social importance of these ties and forms.

It is true that now and again the democratic forces have used community relations and some patriarchal traditions to build up the foundation of progressive development. But on the whole patriarchal, community relations and ideological forms (including religion and its institutions) which in the period of struggle for political independence could serve as instruments for collective solidarity aimed against the colonialists, now most frequently tend to fetter the political activity of the peasants in a thousand ways or, which is worse, are used by reactionaries to maintain their influence over the peasantry.

As the experience of some countries in Asia and North Africa has shown, this is largely due to the tenacity of the feudals' political influence in the countryside, which frequently fails to decline as their economic positions are undermined. A correspondent of *l'Humanité* who in 1966 toured the areas of Egypt where an agrarian reform had been carried out was told that the big landowners continued to exercise some power even without any land, which means that the peasants continue to live in fear and under the pressure of tradition.

The fact that the bulk of the peasantry continues to be politically backward and inactive, being frequently saddled with the inertia of passive subordination should also be considered in close connection with the role of community relations and some patriarchal traditions.

All of this in turn substantially limits the potential and scale

of active and organised political support which sizable masses of the peasantry and social sections akin to them are now capable of giving to the progressive forces. These factors also have a bearing on the present opportunities for mounting intensive political activity in the once oppressed countries, the relative strength of the tendency towards democratic forms and institutions, on the one hand, and towards authoritarian methods, on the other.

The residual forms of socio-economic relations and ideology also have a negative influence on the politically more developed sections of the peasantry. Besides, these sections also bear the marks of other weaknesses and negative elements which are above all of social origin, and which are similarly connected with inadequate political experience.

When these sections acted as a massive force of the national liberation struggle and the mainstay of progressive movements, these sections, together with the corresponding contingents of the urban petty bourgeoisie, not only imparted to these movements a strong anti-imperialist drive but also brought with them rebellious attitudes and illusions—also spread by some leaders of the national liberation struggle—about the possibility of instantly improving their lot and ending the intolerable conditions of their existence. After the long colonial oppression and racist abuse, the explosion of national feelings quite naturally tends to assume the form of bellicose nationalism and now and again also of jingoistic attitudes.

It so happened that in the course and as a result of the national liberation revolutions vast masses of peasants were, in a manner of speaking, catapulted into the political arena of the former colonial and semi-colonial zone. In some newly independent countries—with weak proletarian forces—these masses, together with other small-holders and petty proprietors, whom the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial protest had also awakened from their feudal and pre-feudal hibernation, found themselves in the thick of the revolutions engaged in social transformation. This occurred in conditions when the alliance between the peasantry and the working class, far from being finally established, was in some instances still in its early stages.

The course of events at the present phase of social development in the emergent countries appeared to have left no time for the mass of peasants and petty bourgeoisie to go through a long historical period of some political education and influence by the proletariat. This mass is being involved in the revolutionary process, which frequently leads to a socialist orientation, in what might be called its protoplasmic form. From here largely springs the peculiar nature of the present-day condition of the process in the former colonies and semi-colonies. Hence its difficulties and zigzags, its retreats and downright defeats, alongside some successes.

What is characteristic of public opinion in the newly independent countries is the lack of any clear-cut notion of socialism and the effect of a peculiar "charm" of socialism rather than a class-conscious urge for it. This is especially true of the peasant section of the politically active forces. The gist of this yearning for socialism and support of socialist slogans is, in effect, a protest against the anti-popular policies of the privileged strata and against the hard conditions of the working people.

In many countries where the peasantry took part in the fight against the colonial yoke under the leadership of bourgeois nationalistic forces and organisations, the winning of independence initially established their authority among the rural population. The bitter disappointments of the period that followed, the unrealised hopes for a fundamental improvement of life, which the peasantry had pinned on the prospects of independence, may have shaken this authority in many instances but have not finally undermined it. There is also the fact that the national bourgeoisie put through some political measures in terms of agrarian reform and ideological influence—aimed variously to retain the peasantry's support. Together with the utmost use for this purpose of religious superstitions and anti-communist falsifications in many developing, and especially African, countries, there has been a fairly wide and persistent campaign aimed to spread mistrust for the urban proletariat among the peasantry. The rural population is being induced to believe that in the developing countries the proletariat is a privileged social group, whose

struggle to improve its condition tends to harm the peasantry and also to run counter to the national interest.

On the other hand, the stand of the bourgeois forces in the countryside, to say nothing of the feudal and tribal reactionaries, cannot be regarded as being especially solid not only because they are being unhinged by these forces' anti-popular policies. In contrast to the developed capitalist countries, where decades and centuries separated the start of the bourgeois revolution and the early beginnings of proletarian revolution, the rural bourgeoisie tends, as a rule, to emerge in the developing countries fairly recently. But it is this bourgeoisie that is chiefly capable of providing a link between the peasantry and the bourgeois class as a whole, with capital as a national social force, thereby entrenching the hegemony of the bourgeoisie over the peasantry. Indeed, this general consideration is also true of broader sections of the petty bourgeoisie.

* * *

The social background against which the liberation struggle at the second phase has been developing cannot be adequately characterised without mention, however brief, of the material conditions of the broad masses of people, notably the working class and the peasantry, which continue to be hard. One very strong cause of dissatisfaction among the masses is the striking contrast between their penury and the luxury and conspicuous consumption of the bourgeois rich, who frequently engage in a real orgy of money-grabbing and speculative enrichment. In his three-volume study, entitled *Asian Drama*, Gunnar Myrdal says that in the countries of South-East Asia, with which he deals in his book, "economic inequalities have generally not decreased since independence; if anything, they have increased in all the countries of the region".¹

In Pakistan, many members of the military dictatorship made fortunes overnight while the bulk of the people continued to live in privation. Over 70 per cent of the families had an income of under 250 rupees a month, while prices went

¹ G. Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, Vol. 2, New York, 1968, p. 756.

up by 48 per cent from 1959 to 1971. In India, the condition of the masses was positively influenced by the successful development of the economy, education, public health, etc., but the problem of socio-economic contrasts, as Indian leaders have admitted, continues to be highly acute. According to case studies on the scale of the whole country, 324 million Indians spend under 20 rupees a month on consumer goods (with the subsistence minimum at 25 rupees a month). Meanwhile, only from 1963/64 to 1967/68 the families of monopoly magnates increased their assets as follows: the Mafatlals from 459.1 million to 1,358.7 million rupees, or by 195.9 per cent; the Birlas from 2,927.2 million to 5,756 million rupees, or by 96.6 per cent; the Shrirams from 546.8 million to 1,074.1 million rupees, or by 96.4 per cent.¹

In Nigeria, ministers and company managers in 1965 earned from £3,500 to £10,000 a year, and unskilled workers between £36 and £78 a year, and peasants—about £40.²

In Liberia, 75 per cent of the national income, according to Professor J. Gus Liebenow of Indiana University, was distributed to the foreign households and business firms and to the three per cent of the Liberian population that constitutes the political élite.³

Oginga Odinga, a prominent Kenyan political leader, says in a book: "KANU's present overweighted government of 46 ministers and junior ministers earn between them something in the region of a quarter of a million pounds sterling a year, enough to provide housing for 500 families.... In six months an M. P. receives more money than the average peasant earns in half a life-time."⁴

In Sudan, workers' wages in May 1969 came to about 35 piastres, or under \$1.50 a day, which in view of the high cost of living in effect meant starvation.

A French weekly said that since independence, that is since 1960, the guaranteed minimum wage for workers in former French colonies in Africa had virtually not changed at all,

¹ *New Age*, March 14, 1971, p. 6.

² J. Davies, *African Trade Unions*, Baltimore, Maryland, 1966, p. 127.

³ J. G. Liebenow, *Liberia. The Evolution of Privilege*, New York, 1969, p. 187.

⁴ Oginga Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru*, London, 1967, p. 302.

coming to 0.44 francs an hour in Chad, 0.90 francs in the Ivory Coast, and 1.25 francs in Senegal (following a 15-per cent increase after the large-scale strikes in June 1968). The weekly added: "Living standards are extremely low. Most of the African population working for wages is doomed to chronic malnutrition."¹

For the working people, the basic outstanding tasks of national revival and social progress assume a very visual form, being embodied in their hard living conditions. That is an important source of growing social protest among the masses and the development of attitudes of revolutionary support for the general programme of democratic transformations.

2. The Stand of the National and the Bourgeoisie

The establishment of national states and the elimination of their semi-colonial dependence have mostly resulted in a build-up by the local bourgeoisie of its economic and frequently also of its political positions. This applied above all to its entrepreneurial groups in industry and in agriculture, although merchants are still numerically the largest section of the local bourgeoisie, especially in the less developed countries.

By the mid-1960s, foreigners in India, for instance, held only 7.7 per cent of the net assets of large companies with a capital of 5 million rupees and over.²

No less indicative are the data characterising the positions of Indian and foreign banks and scope of their activity.

Indian Scheduled and Foreign Banks—
Business in India
(mln rupees)

Type of operation	National Banks		Foreign Banks	
	1965/66	1971/72	1965/66	1971/72
Aggregate deposits	25,791	72,426	3,490	6,261
Bank credit (total)	19,793	53,486	2,828	4,892

¹ *France nouvelle*, Paris, June 11, 1969, p. 13.

² *New Age*, May 29, 1966.

Continued

Investments in government securities	7,194	17,184	948	1,717
Bills purchased and discounted				
inland	2,346	8,255.6	166	605
foreign	579	2,223.8	125	614
Cash in hand and balances with Reserve Bank	1,624	1,814.8	159	58

Sources: Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, Bombay, July 1966, pp. 822-25; June 1972, pp. 1016-17, 1022-23.

In the postwar period, involvement of the local bourgeoisie in the Philippines in long-term gross investments went up from 25-30 per cent to 65-70 per cent. From 1949 to 1968, foreign investments came to less than 5.5 per cent of investment in new companies.

In 1971, of the 12,588 newly registered companies with a paid-up capital of 670.2 million pesos, Filipino businessmen accounted for 645.1 million pesos (or 96.3 per cent) and foreigners for 3.7 per cent.¹

From April 1959 to May 1967, gross investments in the economy of Thailand came to 3,119 million baht, of which 2,288 million baht, or 73.3 per cent, was of Thai origin, and 831 million baht, or 26.7 per cent, of foreign origin.²

This is a process that has gone forward on the African continent as well, even if it is not as pronounced, and frequently at its very initial stage, as in Tropical Africa. In 1963, Kenya had 4,717 registered private companies, the 624 biggest of which were owned by foreigners, and the rest by Kenyans. The well-known US Africanologists Th. Geiger and W. Armstrong reported that in 1964 there were roughly 200,000 native entrepreneurs in Nigeria and about 100,000 in Ghana. Although most of them were engaged in small retailing activities earning under \$420 a year, in Ghana there were also 1,200 relatively big entrepreneurs with an annual turnover ranging between \$30,000 and \$150,000.³ A progressive

¹ Central Bank of the Philippines. *Twenty-Third Annual Report*, 1971, p. 19.

² See, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 13, 1967, p. 108.

³ Th. Geiger and W. Armstrong, *The Development of African Private Enterprise*, Washington, 1964, pp. 26, 28.

Nigerian newspaper, expressing the interests of the Nigerian working people, reported that in 1966 there were "not less than 40 Nigerians who are Dollar Millionaires!"¹ Geiger and Armstrong present data testifying to the growing role of Africans in private enterprise in Liberia, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and elsewhere.

Still, one should bear in mind that in most countries of Tropical Africa, and also in some Asian countries, there is still no big entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, while its industrial sections are very weak. In most instances these are no more than small businessmen. In this respect, one should consider the statistics on the Ivory Coast which characterise the role of African capital in big and small industrial production.

Of course, the inclusion of small and tiny entrepreneurs in the bourgeoisie is in many instances highly controversial, but these data do show a definite trend towards the growth of bourgeois forces which is ever more pronounced.

The bourgeoisie has been growing not only in the towns but also in the countryside through the stratification of the peasantry, the growth of a bourgeois section among the feudal landowners and the tribal élite, and the acquisition of land by the urban bourgeoisie. The bureaucratic, administrative bourgeoisie apart, this mode of formation of the bourgeoisie in some African and Asian countries is the most important one at the present phase.

Private Enterprise in the Ivory Coast
(thousand million African francs)

Years	Big enterprises	Small industry	
		European owned	African owned
1950	3.32	0.70	0.27
1965	44.91*	2.82	1.06

* About 90 per cent of the capital of big enterprises is owned by foreign companies.

Source: S. Amin, *Le développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire*, p. 294.

¹ *Advance*, Lagos, January 1-15, 1966, p. 2.

I have already cited relevant data for some Asian countries, notably India. In the African countries, for instance, the Ivory Coast in 1964 had over 10,000 African farmers (about ten per cent of all peasant households), with nearly 30 per cent of the farmland. Each had at least five farmhands. The land records listed hundreds of land tracts owned by Africans, including tracts of forest of over 100 hectares.¹ The tribal chiefs, says S. Amin, have become a real "plantation bourgeoisie" with annual earnings from 350,000 to 600,000 African francs.²

In areas where agriculture is market-oriented rich peasants make up the following percentages: Zambia—over 20 per cent, Kenya—17 per cent, and Uganda—almost 20 per cent. It is true that the forms of exploitation they use are only partially capitalist, with feudal and patriarchal family relations frequently still having the main role to play.

The local bourgeoisie has also been building up its positions by ousting alien non-imperialist elements, frequently with the use of government administrative measures, including deportation. Such measures were taken in Indonesia in the 1960s against bourgeoisie of Chinese origin; in Burma against Chinese bourgeoisie in 1967 and 1968, and earlier against Indian bourgeoisie; in the countries of East Africa, against Indian and Pakistani bourgeoisie; in the countries of West Africa, against Syrian and Lebanese bourgeoisie, in Ghana in 1969 and 1970 against Lebanese and Nigerian bourgeoisie, and so on.

Of course, these data produce a somewhat one-sided picture. As a rule, they bear first and foremost on countries where the national bourgeoisie is most developed. They also most frequently reflect the dynamic of the bourgeoisie's development rather than its positions in *absolute* terms. Meanwhile, despite the growth of the bourgeoisie in all the emergent countries taking the non-socialist orientation, especially when compared with the old privileged and propertied social sections, its positions in many instances, above all in Tropical Africa, continue to be extremely weak.

¹ A. R. Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*, Princeton, 1964, p. 27; S. Amin, *Le développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire*, pp. 291-93.

² S. Amin, *Le développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire*, pp. 91-92.

What also needs to be borne in mind is that the national bourgeoisie is not at the helm of the ship of state in all the countries that have, in effect, been travelling along the capitalist way, which means that it cannot use the state for its own interests. Frequently the bourgeoisie in the countries has to share power with pre-capitalist or petty-bourgeois groups. In other and frequent instances, power is entirely in the hands of these groups, which, even when in practice they have worked to spread capitalist relations in their countries, thereby acting in the interests of the bourgeoisie *in historical terms*, have now and again taken an unfriendly attitude to it.

The years of independence have been marked by the emergence of a new privileged section, the so-called bureaucratic administrative bourgeoisie, which has been growing in virtually all the emergent countries, and in some of these is the chief, if not the only, social representative of the bourgeois or pro-bourgeois forces. One French newspaper said, for instance, that "in Africa the term 'bourgeois' is virtually a synonym for bureaucratic official".¹

The bureaucratic bourgeoisie in the former colonies and semi-colonies is a term usually applied to definite elements of the civil service who make use of their official position to enrich themselves, to engage in all manner of dishonest machinations and pursue a political line hostile to the national interest.

The bureaucracy has a great role to play because of the growing importance of the machinery of state, a natural development in the young states, and also because of the shortage of trained personnel for administrative service. The young governments have found themselves to be heavily dependent on their officials, the bulk of whom, and above all many of the big and middle-bracket officials, are conservative or even pro-colonialist.

Of course, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie does not spring from barren ground. In political attitudes, social and everyday mentality and, to some extent, even in make-up of personnel it largely has its roots in the local personnel of the colonial

¹ *Le Monde*, January 4, 1966.

administration, which was, as a rule, incorporated within the system of the national state power.

The shaping of the national state has gone hand in hand with a vast inflation of the administrative machinery. According to some sources, the number of civil servants in the mid-1960s came to 995,000 in Pakistan, 286,000 in Ceylon, and 94,000 in Malaya.¹ In the first five years of Indonesia's independence, the national civil service quadrupled, to nearly 600,000 officials, and has continued to grow since.²

In mid-1969, there were 58,000 government officials in Sudan, which meant an increase of over 50 per cent over the six preceding years. Their payroll increased from 17 million to 46 million Sudanese pounds.

In 1967, the Ivory Coast had nearly 20,000 people whose living standards more or less came up to "Western standards", and these were mostly members of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.³

In many developing countries, there are more officials than workers. Thus, in the mid-1960s, Morocco's government establishments, for instance, had 50 per cent more officials than there were workers in large-scale industry, transport and construction. At about the same time, the number of government officials in Dahomey was greater than the number of proletarians, not counting the unemployed.⁴

This expansion of the machinery of government is due both to actual needs and the low professional standards of most of the personnel,⁵ and to the operation of other factors. There is the urge on the part of some leaders, relying mainly on the state machine, to extend their political base and to "repay" some political leaders or whole political groups for services

¹ *Asian Bureaucratic Systems*. Ed. by Ralph Braibanti, Durham, 1966, pp. 648-49.

² *Major Governments of Asia*. Ed. by George McTurnan Kahin, New York, 1958, p. 520.

³ *Overseas Business Reports* No. 45, Washington, July 1967, p. 16.

⁴ *Economie et Politique* No. 125, 1964, pp. 102-04.

⁵ Typists in government establishments in Senegal, for instance, produce only one-quarter of the number of pages turned out by typists in the European countries (see, David Hapgood, *Africa: From Independence to Tomorrow*, New York, 1965, p. 75).

rendered; the impact of caste, home-town or tribal "solidarity" in a situation in which a government post is frequently the most, and now and again the only, available job, which in addition carries prestige and promise of advancement.

What this means will be seen, in particular, from the example of Liberia under President Tubman, when among his relatives were three ministers, several deputy-ministers and departmental heads, seven ambassadors, two senators and various other officials. Nigerian ministers admitted that up to half a minister's time was spent in getting people jobs, and creating jobs when such did not exist.¹

The core of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie consists above all of the senior and partly of the middle section of the officials, whose living standards and way of life on the whole differ so strikingly from those of the people and even of the lower groups of government officials. The material aspect of this gap in some African countries is illustrated by the following table:

Annual Salaries of Government Officials
in West African Countries
(pound sterling)

Posts	Nigeria	Ghana	Sierra Leone
Senior posts	1,728-3,900	1,470-3,050	1,600-3,250
Administrative, professional and scientific personnel	720-1,584	680-980	684-1,236
Executive, technical and senior secretarial personnel	312-1,584	265-1,450	360-1,476
Clerks, junior secretaries, junior technical assistants	174-828	175-365	168-552
Auxiliary assistants	132-371	125-185	102-237

Source: A. L. Adu, *The Civil Service in New African States*, London, 1965, p. 238.

¹ Ronald Wraith, Edgar Simpkins, *Corruption in Developing Countries*, London, 1963, p. 34.

In 1970, the annual salary of the Ghanaian Prime Minister came to 30,600 cedi, and those of his ministers to 20,000 cedi, which was roughly 100 and 70 times the annual wages of a rural teacher and a skilled worker, and 55-80 times the average salary of government officials.

Apart from the large salaries, the administrative élite enjoys a number of very substantial additional privileges in the form of private residences, paid services, free medical treatment, etc. Many officials and persons in office in the developing countries receive more than persons in similar posts in the former metropolitan countries, and even more than the colonial officials whose jobs they took over.

But the unjustifiably high salaries and various privileges are only a part of the story. A feature of the administrative bourgeoisie is that it is steeped in corruption and nepotism, making use for that purpose of the political and economic instruments of government and frequently operating in the state sector as well. One of the channels of illegal enrichment is the diverse shady deals with private companies, local and foreign, at the expense of the state. The money so gained is frequently deposited in foreign banks abroad.

Striking facts are cited in this context by two Indian authors, S. Dwivedy and C. Bhargava, in a book entitled *Political Corruption in India*. According to the Central Tax Administration, government officials used various machinations to dodge taxes on earnings, which amounted to 2.3 thousand million rupees a year. It is estimated that during the second five-year plan period, roughly 5 per cent of all appropriations for construction, or nearly 1.4 thousand million rupees, was misappropriated.¹ A prominent Indian economist, B. Shenoy, believes that the money value of import licences and of the illicit earnings from government contracts alone may be of an annual order of 6.5 thousand million rupees.²

A British bourgeois paper carried an article entitled "Life at the Top in Black Africa", containing various facts concerning a number of countries and reporting, in particular, that

¹ S. Dwivedy and C. Bhargava, *Political Corruption in India*, New Delhi, 1967, pp. 29, 30.

² B. R. Shenoy, *Indian Economic Policy*, Bombay, 1968, p. 52.

President Dr. Hastings Banda of Malawi was the owner of three big and a number of small tobacco plantations, a commercial company, and a local newspaper, which he had bought for £150,000. The cost of the presidential palace going up in Malawi, the paper added, came to about £3 million (with the country's national income at less than £20 million).¹

Facts about the corruption of many political leaders of the old regime in Sudan came to light after May 1969. It turned out that in order to win the support of members of Parliament the government allowed them licences for the import of various goods. In 1968, for instance, illicit licences were used to import £12 million worth of fabrics from Japan. The papers carried a document about an illegal deal between a former head of state, Ismail Al Azhari, with a merchant from Port Sudan. As a result of these and other deals, £170,000 was deposited to the account of Al Azhari's 11-year son. Azhari himself had an account of £250,000, while his official salary came to only £500 a month. One-time minister of finance, Sherif Hussein el Hindi, even engaged in international deals. Having signed on the government's behalf agreements on loans from Kuwait and Libya, he remitted the money to his own accounts in various European banks. Meanwhile, reporting to the government, he said that the delay in the receipt of the remittances was due to various formalities and bureaucratic snags. As a result, Sudan received the money six or 12 months later, while the minister pocketed the interest rate, which came to a fairly round sum.

In Somali, a special commission set up after the change of regime in October 1969 reached the conclusion that of the 3,475 million shillings received by the government treasury from July 1, 1960, to October 30, 1969, in the form of grants and loans from other states and also taxes and other revenues, the bulk was appropriated by a handful of former leaders for their own base ends to the detriment of the Somali people.

One cannot, of course, regard all these facts as being accidental, just as they cannot be explained as stemming chiefly from various traditions in the developing countries. This

¹ *The Sunday Telegraph*, London, August 1, 1971, p. 6.

phenomenon cannot be assessed only on the strength of moral criteria. Indeed, this is a concrete expression, within the framework of the behaviour of a whole social section and its individual members—an ugly expression, it goes without saying—of a definite social phenomenon. It is characteristic of the formerly oppressed countries as a whole, where the emergence of the state and other national political institutions frequently tends to run ahead of the formation of an adequate economic basis and structure.

As a result, these institutions tend to acquire for some time a relative independence that is greater than ever before in history, taking an especially active part in building up the basis, and using political power to assure themselves of economic support and economic power. "Thus, political power helps to create economic power, and not the other way round, as was the case under the classical form of development of capitalism in the West European countries."¹

Indeed, a broader look at the problem (without the whole process being reduced to instances of *personal enrichment*) will show that what has been said about the special role of the superstructure in creating the basis could apply not only to countries with bourgeois and pro-bourgeois regimes but also to socialist-oriented states.

The behaviour of the administrative-bureaucratic bourgeoisie can be seen as implying the use of political instruments not only for the attainment of material goods, but also for providing the section as a whole with a definite and solid economic basis. Furthermore, in broad terms the growth of this social group can justly be seen as *a way in the formation of the local bourgeoisie*, and the "vital activity" of this group as a peculiar form and channel of primitive accumulation, despite the fact that it frequently prefers to engage in parasitic consumption of the resources so gained.

The privileged bureaucratic section most frequently has a peculiar parasitic philosophy, looks to the joys of the present and by its plunderous activity in a sense even hampers capitalist development. But that is representative of the bourgeois way

of life. The main thing is that in terms of nonresistance and even of support of the spontaneous development of capitalism (to say nothing of the direct benefits going to private local and foreign capital), the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the regimes which it, in effect, controls or which are under its strong influence, constitute a force which historically operates in the interests of the bourgeoisie as a class, in the interests of capitalist development.

The characteristic features of the administrative bourgeoisie in the developing countries, considering its special position within the system of state power and the social tendency it embodies, remind us of Marx's idea that in certain conditions the bureaucracy is itself capable of acting as an instrument paving the way for the class domination of the bourgeoisie.¹

Because of its specific position and methods of enrichment, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is especially venal in political terms and is capable of taking up the most anti-national and anti-popular stand. Indeed, judging by some of its political tendencies, inclinations and mentality, it may well be considered something of an heir of the comprador bourgeoisie.

The tendency of a section of the upper and even of the middle element of the government machine to take an anti-national and pro-colonial stand, notably in some African countries, is now and again also determined by direct financial considerations: one of the sources of their salary is imperialist financial aid coming in as subvention for the budgets of young states.

When saying that the state and party apparatus in the developing countries has a special status and frequently offers a soil for the formation of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie, one should, of course, bear in mind that this applies mostly to the upper sections of the administration. The civil servants and party functionaries should not be seen as a solid mass, because differentiation has gone forward in their midst as it has in other social groups.

¹ *Rinásçita*, January 2, 1970, p. 9.

¹ See, K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, in three volumes, Vol. 1, pp. 477-78.

3. The Role of the Petty-Bourgeois Forces and Middle Sections

At the present phase of the national liberation revolutions the *petty-bourgeois* and *semi-proletarian*, the *intermediate urban sections*, have a growing political role to play. After the winning of independence, these social groups are inflated with the influx of a section of the rural population in the towns and the rapid growth in the number of employees, students and intellectuals. But the growing political weight of these sections is due above all to their social specifics and interests, their position in the national liberation struggle at the preceding phase, and also the specific class structure of the developing countries.

Like the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the urban lower sections have played an important part in the anti-colonial movement in many countries, and this naturally had an influence on their political mood and weight. They are very much more mobile politically than the peasantry, while being equally sensitive to nationalistic slogans even at the second phase of the struggle, when these slogans are still meaningful and now and again become even more popular.

The political activity and relative independence of the intermediate social sections are also promoted by the fact that after the winning of independence both the working class and the national bourgeoisie are still weak in many countries. Finally, in most instances power in the young national states has gone to the representatives of the intermediate sections or groups based on these sections.

Most of the petty-bourgeois groups continue to be a force capable of taking a radical stand even after the elimination of the colonial regimes.

Developments in many newly independent countries show that at the new phase of struggle among a sizable part of intermediate sections, including the intelligentsia, under the impact of domestic conditions and, especially, of the international situation, there is a growing tendency to move to the left and to support socialist slogans and the socialist orientation in social development. This phenomenon, with various nuances

reflecting local conditions, has been noted by spokesmen of the Communist parties in Asian, African and Latin American countries. Thus, addressing the international theoretical conference of Communist parties in Prague in November 1969, Georges Batal, representing the Lebanese Communist Party, said that "the fact that large sections of the petty bourgeoisie in the Arab countries turn to socialist ideas and that some of its progressive elements show an interest in Marxist-Leninist ideas is a positive political phenomenon". He also stressed that "the indecision of these strata due to their class origin and the lack of perspective in the programmes of their political parties have shown that their ability to win social emancipation and radically solve the national problem is limited".¹

Luis Corvalan, in an article entitled "Alliance of the Anti-Imperialist Forces in Latin America", wrote: "We should not lose sight of another objective factor, namely, that not only the politically conscious workers but also a considerable section of the petty bourgeoisie are adopting a revolutionary attitude and fighting for the liberation of our continent with the aim of building socialism."² He also elaborated on this idea in his speech at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969.³

Chairman of the Italian Communist Party, Luigi Longo, delivering a report at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee in 1969, drew the conclusion that "the Third World countries have entered a qualitatively new phase of their political and social development", and added that in this context there was need to emphasise two phenomena that were of much interest: "1) involvement of new social forces, students and petty bourgeoisie, especially in towns, in the anti-imperialist and revolutionary struggle; 2) political and ideological evolution of the forces which do not as a rule join the revolutionary communist bloc and which henceforth no longer

¹ *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1970, p. 8.

² *World Marxist Review* No. 7, 1967, p. 26.

³ See, *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 269.

separate the anti-imperialist struggle from a definite class content".¹

The ability and, now and again, the readiness on the part of petty-bourgeois groups and intermediate sections to take up positions of political radicalism at the new phase of the national liberation struggle depend first and foremost on the fact that with the winning of independence no changes have taken place in their living conditions, as they had expected, with the consequent contrast between their conditions and the way of life of the privileged top section. What is also very important is the growing requirements in urban conditions and especially the impact of the mass media advertising the opportunities offered by modern civilisation in the production of material and spiritual values.

The political position of these social forces is also greatly determined by their nationalistic tendencies and their concern for economic independence with the prospect of ousting the foreign monopolies from the national market. Finally, it is determined by the attractiveness of socialist slogans as information reaches the urban dwellers about the achievements of the socialist states and as the international situation exerts its influence. Of equal importance is the fact that for the petty-bourgeois sections capitalism is associated not only with colonialism but also with big business, which subjugates and ruins the small businessman.

At the same time, the petty-bourgeois masses of the towns are, in effect, not free from any of the negative features inherent in the bulk of the peasantry. That is so not only because they are of peasant origin and still have close ties with the peasantry. Like the peasantry, this social group continues to be politically backward, suffering from poverty and ignorance, worried about the future, and highly susceptible to various class illusions and utopias. Like the peasantry, it also fails to show any tendency towards political stability and discipline, while its political mobility frequently takes the form of impulsive fits and starts, with swings over a wide latitude in the course of which it frequently serves as an instrument manipulated by the reactionary forces. The petty-bourgeois

¹ *L'Unità*, Rome, May 28, 1969, p. 6.

masses, the lower sections of the towns are even more inclined than the peasantry to strike up rebellious attitudes, which in present-day conditions are intensified by "revolutionary" and "social" impatience.

The instability of the petty bourgeoisie's social and economic conditions, especially in the developing societies, gives rise to the instability of its political tendencies and its casting about, the urge to add stability and security to its status overnight, its inclination to support "extreme" and "instant" measures, which it may seek to find in the prospects of the left or the right.

As a result, it offers a base for anti-imperialist revolutionary-patriotic aspirations, which are an objective premise for an alliance between the petty-bourgeois sections and the working class and the poor peasantry, and now and again also for reactionary-extremist trends of a nationalistic and clerical character, which are frequently used by imperialism to promote its own interests. As in the social development of the capitalist countries in the West, the experience of the former colonies and semi-colonies, like Indonesia, Ghana, Mali, Algeria, Syria and Iraq, has already shown very well that the petty-bourgeois sections could provide the soil not only for revolutionary-oriented attitudes but also for vacillations and even sharp swings towards counter-revolution.

Quite naturally, even the marked radicalisation of political attitudes among the petty bourgeoisie of the towns and the urban lower sections could not eliminate the negative features inherent in these social forces, or do away with the ugly social and psychological effects of the long colonialist domination. In this situation, the positive role of the tendency towards a progressive orientation among a sizable section of the petty-bourgeois forces and the intermediate sections as a whole, and the extent of their contribution to the revolutionary process of national liberation at the new phase depend on whether they can overcome their weaknesses and notably on persistent ideological struggle by proletarian organisations, aiming to achieve this.

Even after the winning of independence, the *intelligentsia* undoubtedly continues to be politically the most influential and active part of the intermediate sections. Of course, much of

what has been said about the intermediate sections also applies to the intelligentsia. Nevertheless it should be dealt with separately in view of some special considerations relative to it. Alongside the working class—and in the capitalist-oriented countries, also alongside the national industrial bourgeoisie—the intelligentsia, a special stratum, is a historically new social group. Its growth is an expression of a new and promising line of development for which the way is paved by independence.

The ranks of the intelligentsia are swelled—in some emergent countries fairly rapidly, in others more slowly, and in still others hardly at all—by the influx of employees from the civil and military services and also the intellectuals proper. The influx of the latter takes place above all through an increase in the number of persons in the humanities as the system of education is developed and national culture revived. At the same time, this is also largely due to the growth in the number of technical specialists as new processes are generated in the economy.¹ The separation of employees from the intelligentsia is a process that begins or is further developed above all with the growing numbers and separation of the intelligentsia proper.

The intelligentsia continues to be the chief political representative of the intermediate and petty-bourgeois sections. In many newly independent countries, it is at the helm of the ship of state. Groups of the intelligentsia have frequently used the emergence of national states to establish closer ties with the government apparatus.

As at the previous phase, politically active groups of the intelligentsia continue to be relatively independent in their political choice and social orientation. But this independence has gradually, if slowly, been declining with the growth of class differentiation, the need to make a choice on the country's line of development (especially when such groups are in power) and finally, as a result of the social and political differentiation

¹ According to a 1970 UNESCO estimate, there were over 2.2 million specialists in the scientific and technical fields in Asia, Africa and Latin America, including 1.41 million in Asia, 156,000 in the Arab countries and 58,200 in Africa.

within the intelligentsia itself. That is why, all other things being equal, the more developed the newly independent country, the greater the changes in the economic terms and the more advanced the process of class formation, the lesser is its "independence".

On the basis of old and new economic ties, and also of political preferences and sympathies, sometimes of an anti-communist character, some groups of the intelligentsia continue to be tied with the national bourgeois forces or switch to their positions. Other groups tend to be transformed into bureaucratised sections. Indeed, I already had them in mind when referring to the administrative bourgeoisie. These corrupt groups mostly move closer to, with the near prospect of merging with, the circles of the intelligentsia which support domestic reaction, or the traditionally privileged sections of the colonial period, or were even on the other side of the barricades in the struggle for independence.

Finally, another and frequently large section of the intelligentsia takes a progressive patriotic stand, evolving towards left-wing radicalism or more or less consistent revolutionary democracy. Apart from international factors, this process is also promoted by important domestic factors. There is the tenuous character of the economic ties between its main sections and the bourgeois forces proper on the one hand and some economic dependence on the state on the other; the vast numerical preponderance over those in the liberal professions within the intelligentsia of specialists and salaried employees, who are mostly organised and frequently have fairly militant traditions, are members of the same organisations with other wage-worker trade unions, including the proletariat, or act together with them. There is the frequently hard material condition of a sizable section of the intelligentsia after the winning of independence. There are the strong nationalistic feelings, the conviction that their country must rise again to "greatness", that this cannot be done on the basis of capitalism, and the lack of faith in the capability of the local bourgeoisie resolutely to advance the cause of national progress. There is the sympathy for the condition of the people, especially of the peasants, for various reasons, including tribal and caste bonds, and the urge to improve their conditions. There is, finally, the

anti-imperialist position, arising from all these feelings, and a hostile attitude to the capitalist West which inflicted on the countries the torments of colonial oppression and humiliation.

It is fairly safe to say that the tendency towards a left-wing orientation is more pronounced among the younger generation of intellectuals. In this sense, some have spoken of a generation gap in the developing countries, failing to take account of the fact that the older generation has also produced many active participants and leaders in the revolutionary struggle for liberation. But it is also true that the young people are not at all or to a lesser extent connected with the relicts of the colonial past, having grown up outside the atmosphere of adulation of the West, are less susceptible to the influence of the patriarchal ideology and more receptive of modern ideological trends. Many of them receive their education in the socialist countries and are profoundly influenced by the advanced world outlook.

Some groups of the intelligentsia, while taking a progressive position, also display an inclination to left-wing extremism and the doctrinaire approach which is frequently combined with petty-bourgeois illusions in practical politics.

A sharp increase in the political importance of the military "intelligentsia" is characteristic of the second phase of the national liberation revolutions.¹ This is due to its increasing numbers and especially to the growth of its political activities and, to some extent, to the general growing importance of the army. The army, once an auxiliary force of the colonial authorities, totally subordinate to it and officered by foreigners, is becoming one of the main pillars of the national state, and in the specific conditions of the former colonies and semi-colonies, where for various reasons it turns out to be much more important and more powerful in political terms than it is in the leading capitalist countries.²

¹ The fairly widespread tendency to regard army officers in the developing countries as a part of the intelligentsia, without any substantial reservations, or any reservations at all, is hardly justified.

² On January 1, 1975, nearly 20 states in Africa and in the non-socialist part of Asia were under the control of the military.

A factor tending to enhance the role of the armed forces in social affairs is the rise of groups and elements in their midst consisting mainly of revolutionary and patriotic-minded young officers. As a rule, they are guided by the same nationalistic feelings and ideas of their countries' "greatness", reinforced by the urge to build up a powerful army, an urge which is fed both by similar ideological and military-caste considerations. These groups of army officers are just as strongly moved, as some circles of the civilian intelligentsia, by a desire to secure for themselves a definite social status, the opportunity to apply their capabilities, concern for their future and simply advancement in their career.

There is no denying that the military "intelligentsia" also has some specific political features—the only ones with which we are here concerned—that need to be specially analysed.¹ However, these features are not crucial to any determination of its political stand with respect to the principal tasks of the new phase of struggle and the emergent countries' way of social development. That is why one could apparently confine oneself here to a general characteristic of the intelligentsia and the intermediate sections as a whole. Its main features are fully applicable to military "intellectuals". I should like to make only one remark, which has been suggested by statements in foreign and some Soviet publications, implying that the armies of the newly independent countries are essentially a totally specific entity and almost a single whole, with its own political platform and ideology.²

The army is known to be everywhere one of the key elements of the state apparatus and its chief instrument of force. The armed forces in the emergent countries have special opportunities to exert an influence on developments and to impose their own will. With the embryonic political structure in the African and many Asian newly independent countries, the

¹ See, G. Mirsky, *The Army and Politics in the Countries of Asia and Africa*, Moscow, 1970 (in Russian).

² This view is fairly widely accepted, if not dominant, among bourgeois sociologists. A typical instance of this is to be found in Perlmuter's "The Arab Military Elite". (See, *World Politics*, Vol. XXII, No. 2, Princeton, 1970, pp. 269-300).

fairly low level of consciousness among the masses, the caste, tribal and language divisions, the amorphous and unorganised state of the political parties, and the weakness of other elements of the government apparatus, the army with its varying state of discipline, is less susceptible to various particular influences (although it is far from being free of these) and is an authoritative and, in a sense, national organism.

But the armies of many young states have their own specific features. Some of them have no firmly established drill-room traditions and blind obedience, with less pronounced clannishness among the officers, many of whom rose from the ranks. Because of the tenacity of tribal and patriarchal family relations, they have closer ties with the civilian population. Service under a foreign officer in the past, and frequently even in the present, is an additional reason for more acute anti-imperialist feeling. Finally, insofar as this relates to Africa and some Asian countries, the embryonic class differentiation, the social patchwork or, in a sense, even the transitional nature of the state power make for a situation in which the class function of the army is less pronounced.

At the same time, the armies of the young states have other features as well. In many countries, the armed forces were set up under the colonial domination, and a special effort was made, frequently not without success, to induce the military personnel to adopt the ideology of the colonialists, to despise the people and to crawl to their colonial masters. Many officers were trained in military establishments in the imperialist countries. At the time of the military coup in Ghana in 1966, for instance, 20 per cent of the officers in the armed forces were graduates of Britain's Sandhurst, while all the leaders of the putsch, with one exception, had served in the colonial army.¹ Because the soldiers are illiterate and politically immature, they frequently become pliant tools of a handful of officers.

The tendency to exaggerate the political potential and independence of the army circles has apparently been

¹ See, *Marxism Today*, February 1967, p. 42.

suggested by the revolutionary events in a number of emergent Asian and African countries, where the political importance of the armed forces was strikingly revealed. There is, above all, the experience of the Egyptian revolution, where the officers and men under Nasser's leadership had the decisive role to play. Algeria's National Liberation Army took an active part in frustrating the Algerian bourgeoisie's attempts to complete the war of liberation by setting up a pro-Western regime. Army circles have also had an unquestionably outstanding part in the revolutionary events in Iraq, Syria, Burma and Somali, and in the overthrow of the anti-national governments in Nigeria and Libya.

However, one should bear in mind that for the army, say, in Egypt, to act in the role of revolutionary force, Nasser and his associates had to break the fetters of discipline and the oath of allegiance that the officers and men had sworn to the regime of King Farouk. In other words, they had, in effect, to break up the old army. That is why Nasser and his friends set up a revolutionary organisation called the Society of Free Officers. In a paper given at a Cairo seminar, Ismail Sabry Abdallah, representing the Egyptian periodical *Al-Talia*, said that "the word 'free' was used to distinguish the revolutionary elements within the army from the others". The fact that the Society of Free Officers operated within the army makes no difference to the basic character of their organisation as a political one, which rose up against the existing system in the interests of the people.

This conclusion suggests itself: it was not the army of the Egyptian monarchy that carried out the revolution; on the contrary, the revolutionary forces, having established their control in the army and having, in effect, modified its character, led the army against the reactionary, anti-popular power. The revolution started in the army and there scored its first victory.

That this is the right approach is confirmed by developments in other newly independent countries. The army has exerted a far from similar influence in their political life. For all the specific features arising from the vague class structure of society in many of these countries, the army, until it remains within the framework of the established discipline and also of

loyalty, has everywhere served as an instrument of the existing system.

The armed forces set up by the colonialists from local inhabitants have not won any laurels in the fight for liberation: indeed they have more often than not served the colonial regimes. The British analyst, William Gutteridge, who has written a number of works on the armed forces in the young states, has good ground to say, for instance, that on the whole the armies of Africa had a role in the achievement of independence that was "nil or minimum", and negative rather than positive.¹

In the course of several military coups in the developing countries, the army, in effect, backed the establishment, making sure that the whole movement was confined to a change of scenery. Characteristically, no internal upheavals occurred in the armed forces, which acted as an entity, under the old command. By contrast, wherever the revolutions led to a change in the social character of the regime, they were preceded by a break-up of the existing order in the army and frequently also by a split in the armed forces. It is, for instance, a fact that in Ghana the rebels first took control of the army and only then staged their coup. Developments in Nigeria took a similar turn in the course of the coup in January 1966, even if they did run politically in the opposite direction.

However that may be, nothing serves to confirm the idea that the armies in the developing countries have fundamentally specific social and political features, which makes them a special social institution in that sense. When emphasising this thesis, which I think is fundamental for the whole problem of the role of the "military intelligentsia" and the armed forces in the developing countries, I do not in any sense underestimate the peculiarity of many aspects of the problem in these countries. What I have in mind, in particular, is the reflection in the army of the embryonic social differentiation, the impact of religious and tribalist factors, which together with the military-caste interests can serve as important—and in excep-

¹ See, W. Gutteridge, *The Military in African Politics*, London, 1969, pp. 21-22.

tional cases as primary—motive forces for open intervention in political affairs, etc.

Everything that has been said about the intelligentsia shows that it is a social group whose political importance tends especially to grow at the new phase of the national liberation revolutions. At the same time, it is also a social section most strongly influenced by socialist slogans and the ideas of scientific socialism.

4. The Motive Forces of the Revolution at the New Phase

At the present phase of the national liberation process, as compared with the phase of struggle for political independence, important changes have been taking place in the configuration of class forces and their role in this process in the emergent countries.

The advance of the liberation struggle has confronted the various social forces involved with a choice of way for the young states. The social contradictions in these countries are also being sharpened by the deepening class divisions on the basis of economic changes, and the growing awareness by all the social sections and groups of their specific interests, and the experience they have acquired about the political behaviour of the other social forces—allies and adversaries in the national liberation struggle. Besides, there is the effect of changes in the balance of class forces resulting from the first phase of the national revolutions, the elimination of direct foreign rule and, in this connection, the relaxation of the unifying "over-and-above class" factor in the fight against that rule, and the self-seeking policy pursued by the propertied and privileged groups.

The aggregate effect of these processes has led to important changes not only in the relations between the various class forces and has affected not only their social platform, but has also caused changes in their attitude to imperialism and the problem of national liberation. It has entailed an important differentiation in the national liberation movement, which has had an effect on all its elements: social groups, political parties, national states, raising some to a revolutionary, socialist

orientation, and pushing others into reformist and frequently conciliatory positions.

The contradiction with imperialism continues to be the main one in the social life of the countries in the national liberation zone even at the second phase of the revolution, although some aspects of this contradiction, the relationship of national and class, political and economic factors in it have changed.

Even after the elimination of the colonial regimes, the contradiction with imperialism provides a sort of pivot for the concentration and unfolding of social clashes in the newly independent countries. These clashes occur and develop in the general course of the struggle against imperialism, with the class forces involved taking their positions either directly or ultimately on this or that side of the anti-imperialist barricades. Before the winning of independence, imperialism is confronted—the feudal forces and the traditional comprador groups apart—by the whole oppressed nation, but at the second phase of the struggle the situation tends to change. The anti-imperialist “barricades” are abandoned by some sections of the national bourgeoisie, chiefly the top sections, which make deals with imperialism. The latter is also backed by the emergent neo-comprador groups.

At the new phase, the peculiarity of this anti-imperialist contradiction, which is simultaneously *external* and *internal*, is maintained and, in a sense, even intensified. However, the external aspect of the contradiction between the oppressor and oppressed nations now increasingly appears as a contradiction between imperialism and neo-colonialism, on the one hand, and on the other, young states which are politically independent, however formal their independence may be here and there. The internal aspect of the contradiction (as a result of the social regrouping) is that between the foreign monopolies operating in the newly independent countries, between all the forces and factors of neo-colonialist penetration and their local allies (the feudal landowners and tribal reactionaries, the neo-comprador sections, the conciliatory circles of the bureaucratic, national and petty bourgeoisie, etc.) on the one hand, and on the other, the patriotic forces, represented mainly by the working people and the nonpropertied sections.

A conference of Communist Parties of the Arab countries in May 1967 characterised the “basic contradiction” in the Arab world as follows: “Imperialism, Zionism and reaction”—at the one pole, and “the peoples of the Arab countries, their patriotic, progressive and revolutionary forces”—at the other.¹ The General Political Statement issued by the Third Congress of the Lebanese Communist Party qualified as the “basic” contradiction for the Arab countries that “between the Arab national liberation movement, on the one hand, and imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction, on the other”.² Finally, the Programme of the Iraqi Communist Party says: “Imperialism remains the chief enemy of the national-democratic revolution, which has its own allies in the counter-revolutionary elements within the country: the feudal lords, the big landowners, the big bourgeoisie—merchants, usurers, real-estate owners, and officials (military and civilian).”³

The purely social antagonisms within the newly independent nations operate within the framework of this basic configuration of class forces, under which national and social contradictions combine, intertwine and partially coincide with each other. The attitude to imperialism has an important influence on the division of the social forces, frequently helping to narrow down the class basis of the reactionaries, limiting the influence of the bourgeoisie on the petty bourgeoisie, and helping to draw the intermediate class sections towards more radical positions.

At the preceding phase, class contradictions were almost entirely—directly and everywhere—mediated through the anti-imperialist conflict, appearing to be subordinate and obliterated and being, actually or apparently, contradictions of a secondary order. Today, there is an ever more pronounced “backlash” effect, mediating the anti-imperialist contradiction through social antagonisms, which acquire a growing im-

¹ See, *Party Life* No. 11, Moscow, 1967, p. 76 (in Russian).

² *The Lebanese Communists and the Tasks of the Phase Ahead*, p. 406 (in Arabic).

³ *Documents of the Second National Congress of the Iraqi Communist Party*, September 1970, p. 83 (in Arabic).

portance of their own. The contradiction with imperialism itself, while, naturally, retaining its primary national liberation substance, increasingly appears as a social antagonism.

While taking note of this, one must simultaneously bear in mind the cardinal fact that this whole intricate system of social conflicts and antagonisms operates within the general framework of the national liberation struggle, and that the problem of national liberation continues to be something of a local point for these conflicts and antagonisms.

Indeed, even at the new phase the revolution may, in a sense, still be regarded as a national one in terms of programme and the interests with which this programme accords. At first sight, this formula appears to be patently erroneous. But one should not forget that even when dealing with the national revolution at the preceding phase we had in mind a nation that was not merely an ethnic category, but a socio-political group permeated with the national interest, beyond whose limits there remained not only a large section of the feudal forces but also the comprador groups. Of course, at the second phase the social framework of the "nation", to which the programme of the revolution looks, tends, in a sense, to be narrowed down, although in many instances the "mass" of the nation involved in the political process is enlarged.

However, the fact that the general democratic programme of the second phase of the struggle accords with the national interest and aspirations of the various social forces does not yet imply their readiness to work for or even to desire its realisation in the *revolutionary way*. This is most obviously expressed in the arrangement of class forces. The motive forces of the revolution at the new phase are still the working class, the peasantry (but now chiefly its working and exploited masses) and the intermediate sections.

The programme for giving greater depth to the national liberation revolution fully accords both with the national and the social aspirations of these forces, while their contradiction with imperialism has a class-antagonistic character, even if the acerbity and, especially, the awareness of this contradiction is not the same for all these forces. It is quite safe to say that there is a steady deepening of the conflict between the working

people and the exploited sections of the newly independent countries, and imperialism. This is due not only to the living and working conditions of the once oppressed peoples, but also to the growing influence of the vanguard in the national liberation struggle—the Communists and the revolutionary democrats. The Communists' anti-imperialist position is naturally consistent in class terms, but even the contradiction between the revolutionary democratic forces and imperialism already contains some elements of social antagonisms which are connected with the anti-capitalist tendencies developing among these forces.

At the same time, the role of these social groups in the national liberation revolution at the new phase, the given composition of its motive forces, their *joint* participation in the struggle (frequently with demands which are not quite differentiated), the actual shaping or existence of a coalition of these forces in the revolutionary process, especially where it has been developing successfully (a coalition which is frequently not realised in clear-cut political terms and is not formally organised)—all of this is a reflection of the structure of society in the developing countries.

After the winning of independence, in the course of political and economic development, the importance of local specifics in the question of the motive forces of the national liberation revolutions tends to grow, but even at that phase tendencies which are of general importance are clearly revealed.

Over a large extent of the second phase of the revolutions, especially at its beginning, the intermediate sections emerge as the most active and influential force, insofar as this refers above all to their political representation. However, the new phase of the national liberation revolution taken *as a whole* can hardly be assessed as a phase in which the political role of these sections, including the intelligentsia, tends to grow. Ultimately, at a definite point in the development of the new phase of the revolution, once it has acquired sufficient scope and depth and has, in a sense, reached a turning point connected with the crystallisation and final establishment of its social orientation, there is a tendency for the political importance of the intermediate sections to decline, relative to the chief classes of emergent society. That is a natural result of the growing

position of these classes, in an atmosphere of advancing class formation and struggle to determine the social orientation of the newly independent countries. That is also the result of the growing "erosion", on the basis of the same processes, of the relative independence and "unity" of the intermediate sections and their division into groups which join the chief social forces.

When saying this, one must, of course, simultaneously assume that the intermediate, middle sections continue to be an important motive force of the national liberation revolution *throughout the whole* of its second phase, with the patriotic intelligentsia, in its capacity as their political representative, retaining its frequently key position for a long time. In the specific conditions of the emergent countries the numerically smallest but politically most active and dynamic minority is now and again capable of leaving a profound imprint on political life.

This is most obvious in the countries of Tropical Africa and in the less developed Asian countries, where, despite the growing role of the proletariat, the masses of peasants and petty bourgeoisie continue to be the mainstay of the forces acting for social progress, while the revolutionary intelligentsia is an influential group in the movement.

For the working class, the second phase of the revolution as a whole serves as a phase of its growing social importance and advance towards *leadership* in the liberation struggle. Nor does this run counter to the fact that throughout a definite period, especially at the beginning of the second phase, the working class does not yet have a sufficiently prominent role to play in the liberation movement in many instances and in many countries.

The importance and role of the peasantry, or, to be more precise, of its toiling and exploited masses, as the motive force of the national liberation revolution at its second phase likewise undergoes a definite evolution. The growing stratification of the peasantry, alongside the partial agrarian reforms which meet chiefly the interests of the kulak elements, in some countries engenders a tendency to reduce the role of the peasantry as an active motive force of the revolution in the first period after the winning of independence. As social contradic-

tions in the countryside sharpen, the living conditions of sizable sections of the peasantry, especially of the village poor, in some instances worsen, and illusions about the national bourgeoisie's desire or ability to pursue a policy in the interests of the rural working people are blasted, the vast revolutionary potential of the peasantry is brought out and activated in this or that form.

At the same time, available experience shows that this process—in virtue of the above-mentioned causes and the weak positions of the advanced, progressive forces in the countryside—is as a rule very slow. Political inertness continues to be characteristic of sizable sections of the peasantry.

I think that it is wrong not to take account of the fact that some factors, which did not exist or did not operate to the same extent as in the now developed countries, may—at any rate in some emergent countries, exert an influence on the realisation of the revolutionary and on the whole political potential of the peasantry. In these countries, the peasantry had at its disposal a long period for political take-off. Over many decades it continued to be, alongside the chief classes of bourgeois society, the most important social and frequently also political force, acting as a reserve of the bourgeoisie and then (its toiling masses) as an ally of the proletariat, wherever the socialist revolution had gone forward.

However, in the newly independent countries events may take or have already taken a somewhat different course. I said above that with the preservation of deep social backwardness and against its background some processes characteristic of the present-day type of development appear to be transferred to these countries mostly in a distorted form. One consequence of this is the accelerated formation of the middle sections, and the intermediate groups as a whole. These circles can, for however brief a period, act as a political "rival" of the peasantry, and slow down the realisation of its political potential.

Apart from the completing phase of the successful development of the new phase of the revolution and its growth into a socialist phase, one should apparently start from the assumption that at this phase, in contrast to the preceding one, there is in most cases virtually no leadership by *one* class, unless, of

course, it has already been won in the course of the struggle for political independence. As a rule, the liberation struggle is headed by a coalition, involving—variously and in diverse combinations—the political representatives of several social groups constituting the motive forces of the revolution.

The existence of such a coalition, of which the united national front is in effect the supreme organisational expression, is typically the necessary condition for the successful development of the liberation struggle at the present phase.

Even at the first phase of the national liberation revolution, the national bourgeoisie appeared as the most contradictory social element of the liberation struggle, a feature which now becomes more pronounced and, one might say, in a new qualitative form. As I have already shown, the national bourgeoisie's dual attitude to the revolution and its general democratic programme tends to grow and deepen.

The first thing to note is that neither the make-up of the national bourgeoisie nor its social framework remain the same. Let us recall that the conception of "national bourgeoisie" is now and again not only vague but also fluid. This is quite natural because it is based mainly on a criterion like the attitude taken by the given social group, whether of the middle or the big bourgeoisie, to the national liberation programme. At the various phases of the anti-imperialist struggle the framework of the social forces making up the national bourgeoisie tends to change.

The realisation of some goals of the national liberation movement and the advance of other, more radical goals must necessarily bring about changes in the political position of various sections of the bourgeoisie, which had operated as a national force at the stage of struggle against the colonial regimes. Accordingly, at the new phase the criterion for identifying the national bourgeoisie continues to be chiefly political, although its connection with the economic aspect of the matter becomes closer. This is above all the attitude to imperialism and the general democratic programme.

In principle, virtually the whole of the local bourgeoisie *as a class*, with the exception of its neo-comprador, primarily bureaucratic faction, wants to see the fulfilment of the general

democratic tasks of this programme, especially the winning of economic independence. But *in practice*, some of its sections (like the monopoly bourgeoisie, a part of the big bourgeoisie and now and again even of the middle bourgeoisie) have more pronounced conciliatory tendencies, despite the fact that they have not quite abandoned the struggle for national independence, with an eye chiefly to securing equal partnership with foreign capital. Gripped with fear of the people and succumbing to imperialist blandishments or intimidation, they abandon the ideals of their short-lived political youth, and take the way of compromise with imperialism.

There is apparently not enough reason for the time being to question the fitness of "national bourgeoisie" as a term for the present phase. But when dealing with the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie and private entrepreneurs in general, and without having the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in mind, it would be right to say that in some countries the boundaries of the "national bourgeoisie" have been gradually losing their contours. At any rate, there is evidence of a tendency in that direction leading to an approximation of the "national bourgeoisie" with the "local" one, that is, with the bourgeoisie as a whole, with the eventual prospect, that may not be very immediate, of the former being dissolved in the latter.¹ This is, in effect, a natural result of national capitalist development.

Simultaneously, there is a growing differentiation of the national bourgeoisie into strata and groups, whose economic and political interests do not coincide on many points, and this leads to the emergence of essential and frequently sharp contradictions between these groups. Apart from other issues, the dividing line here may run between the advocates of different *forms* of capitalist development. As a class, the national bourgeoisie is of one mind on the fundamental socio-economic choice for the newly independent countries, and in this sense it has ever more actively ranged itself as an

¹ Of course, this is even truer of the relatively developed newly independent countries than of the more backward former colonies, like the states of Tropical Africa, where the neo-comprador bourgeoisie is more in evidence and has more influence, as compared with groups of the national bourgeoisie.

entity against the mass of the people. But that does not rule out the existence of differences about the *variant* of capitalism to be adopted, about the choice, shall we say, between the "Octobrist" and the "democratic" ways.

Even at the new phase, the national bourgeoisie as a class retains its anti-imperialist tendency. Now, this is due primarily to the aspect of development of national capitalism in the former colonies and semi-colonies which lead to a clash with neo-colonialism and are objectively anti-imperialist in tenor.

Of course, this tendency, as I have already said, is cut across and frequently overcome by the reverse tendency to compromise with imperialism. This is actively stimulated by the ruling forces of present-day imperialism, whose policy, however contradictory, is dominated by the line of cooperation with the local bourgeoisie in the formerly oppressed countries. These forces are aware that the situation that has taken shape in the emergent countries, on the margin of the capitalist world, is one of the most important factors of the instability of the capitalist system as a whole, and they would like to defuse, even if partially, the social dynamite that has accumulated there. What is equally important is that imperialism looks on national capitalism in the developing countries largely in the light of its contest with world socialism. Upon this mutual urge for compromise are oriented the diverse reformist and conciliatory programmes and plans of development for the emergent countries and, accordingly, of weakening and eliminating the revolutionary movement in these countries.

However, the logic of the social process frequently turns out to be stronger than such intentions. It erects barriers in the way of their implementation, and now and again even scraps the schemes of the imperialist strategists, causing the conflict between the national capital of the former colonies and semi-colonies and the imperialist monopolies to flare up from time to time. The imperialist monopolies, seeking to establish capitalism in the emergent countries, have tried to hamper in every way the development of the local bourgeoisie, imposing limitations on it for the purpose of maintaining their control and keeping it in the status of junior partner, operating as powerful rivals in the formerly oppressed countries and on the world market. Some monopolies—frequently cutting across

the general line of the imperialist powers' policy—continue actively to support their feudal and oligarchic allies, who resist bourgeois reforms.

Another factor tending to sharpen the conflict between imperialism and the national bourgeoisie is that by pursuing the policy of moderate reformism, to say nothing of conciliation, it tends to multiply the contradictions and difficulties of development facing local capitalism in the former colonies and semi-colonies.

While remaining an anti-imperialist factor in the main, the national bourgeoisie *ceases to be a revolutionary force as a class. At the second phase, it also ceases to play the role of motive force of the national liberation revolution*, which is why it cannot be its leader. As a rule, the leading circles of the national bourgeoisie regard the revolution as being complete and seek to solve the problem of economic independence *only through reformist development*, with more or less cooperation with world capitalism (which, of course, does not eliminate any of the contradictions with it). Indeed, it is in consequence of this stand of the national bourgeoisie and other social forces under its political leadership, that the national liberation movement at the present phase tends to split up more clearly and more deeply than ever before into a revolutionary and a reformist-conciliatory trend. For the same reason, the role of the national bourgeoisie in this movement in many countries has steadily declined.

This conclusion is confirmed by experience, for instance, in Egypt, Burma, and Syria, among other countries, where virtually the whole of the big and a large section of the middle (industrial and commercial) bourgeoisie refused to cooperate with the revolutionary democrats in power even on terms which assured it of important economic advantages and also of some political opportunities. It subsequently acted as one of the chief forces engendering the tendencies for a degeneration of progressive regimes.

At the same time, this experience also induces one to make a reservation. This stand of the national bourgeoisie as a class does not rule out the possibility that over a period individual groups of it in this or that country could—in virtue of the concrete conditions in these countries and the specific condition of these groups—support revolutionary measures at

the present phase aimed against the positions of the imperialist or feudal forces.

Attitude to the national bourgeoisie and correct assessment of its anti-imperialist potential and the *nature* of this potential are one of the important questions of the Communist parties' strategy and tactics at the new phase of the national liberation revolutions.

The question of the national bourgeoisie was reflected in the documents of all the postwar international meetings of Communist and Workers' parties. The Declaration of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries held in Moscow in 1957 said that in the zone of national liberation there is need for a "united anti-imperialist and anti-feudal front of the workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie and other patriotic democratic forces".¹ In other words, the national bourgeoisie was regarded, in effect, as being on the whole "a patriotic democratic force".

The Statement of the 1960 Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties contains an all-round and circumstantial characteristic of the positions and political specifics of the national bourgeoisie. It said: "In present conditions, the national bourgeoisie of the colonial and dependent countries unconnected with imperialist circles, is objectively interested in the accomplishment of the principal tasks of anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution, and therefore retains the capacity of participating in the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism. In that sense it is progressive. But it is unstable; though progressive, it is inclined to compromise with imperialism and feudalism. Owing to its dual nature, the extent to which the national bourgeoisie participates in revolution differs from country to country. This depends on concrete conditions, on changes in the relationship of class forces, on the sharpness of the contradictions between imperialism, feudalism and the people, and on the depth of the contradictions between imperialism, feudalism and the national bourgeoisie."²

¹ *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, p. 18.

² *Ibid.*, p. 64.

Here, it is not the national bourgeoisie in general that is dealt with, but a national bourgeoisie which is not connected with the imperialist circles, and is a force that is *objectively* concerned with fulfilling the tasks of the revolution. There is also emphasis on its dual nature and the possibility that it will modify its positions depending on the concrete conditions in the various countries. At the same time, the document allows for the capability of the national bourgeoisie to take part in the *revolutionary* struggle against imperialism and feudalism.

In terms of the national liberation movement, the 1960 Statement was drawn up—and accordingly reflected the state of affairs—as the movement was passing from its first to its second phase. To some extent, it summed up the situation (including the question of the arrangement of class forces) of the transition period, which bore the marks of *both* these phases. No wonder it still lacked the thesis about the new phase of the national liberation revolutions, which was, however, formulated in the documents of the Communist parties very soon after the 1960 International Meeting, which also shows the extent to which it had matured. Furthermore, on the basis of the dialectical approach, the Statement established, alongside the general tendency, the fact that in practice the political behaviour of various circles of the national bourgeoisie depended on the concrete conditions, an approach which gives each Communist party the necessary leeway for correctly assessing the situation in its country and formulating a corresponding line.

At the same time, some interpretations of the 1960 Statement, which appeared in the press, tended to overestimate the progressive potential of the national bourgeoisie, especially in the context of the issue of the national-democratic state. The national bourgeoisie was declared to be one of the necessary and even equal elements of the social basis of that state.

I think that the chief methodological source for the imprecise interpretations of the question of the national bourgeoisie at the present phase of the national liberation struggle in some publications was the confusion and identification of its *anti-imperialist* and *revolutionary* potentials, which

ignored the fact that these were two different things. Indeed, that is the basis on which there was in practice some exaggeration of the revolutionary (but not of the anti-imperialist) potential of the national bourgeoisie.

The key to the correct approach to the problem is a clear-cut distinction between the two tendencies within the national bourgeoisie. There is also need to bear in mind, as I have already said, that the *objective* concern of this or that social group in fulfilling definite social tasks is not at all tantamount to its concern for tackling them in the *revolutionary* way, let alone a readiness to fight to fulfil these tasks along that way.

Does this approach imply an underestimation of the anti-imperialist potential of the national bourgeoisie? On the contrary, I think, it is this approach that is at the present phase directed against sectarianism: when no dividing line is drawn between the revolutionary and the anti-imperialist potential of the national bourgeoisie, it is easy to slide—under the influence of its obvious refusal to take part in the revolutionary struggle and even of its resistance to that struggle—into a denial of the latter as well.

The Main Document of the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties stressed, in the context of the issue of successfully fulfilling the tasks of national development, social progress, and effective rebuffs to the schemes of neo-colonialism, the need to invigorate the masses of people, enhance the role of the proletariat and of the peasantry, to rally the working young, the students, the intelligentsia, the urban middle sections, the democratic army circles, and all the patriotic progressive forces.¹ This enumeration of the progressive and *revolutionary* socio-political forces at the new phase makes no direct mention of the national bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the Main Document speaks of the sharpening conflict between the "working class, the peasantry and other democratic forces, including patriotic-minded sections of the petty-bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and, on the other, imperialism and the forces of domestic reaction, the elements

¹ See, *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 28.

of the national bourgeoisie which are increasingly accepting a deal with imperialism."¹

Here we find a confirmation of the view that, *as a class*, the national bourgeoisie, as a rule, no longer has any solid revolutionary potential. At the same time, the Main Document does not question either the anti-imperialist potential of the national bourgeoisie, or the possibility and necessity of using it in the revolutionary struggle for national liberation and against imperialism, or yet the possibility that various groups of the national bourgeoisie in the individual countries may behave in a peculiar way.

However that may be, further development of the national liberation struggle, the formation of the young states and the definition of their social orientation have now been taking place everywhere not just in clashes with imperialist and anti-imperialist forces, but also in the contest between the *three tendencies*, representing imperialism, the bourgeois and pro-bourgeois circles, and the working and exploited sections.

The specific feature of the class struggle at the new phase of the national liberation revolutions is that they develop in the presence of the national state. Wherever the state is in the hands of the national bourgeoisie or other exploitative groups, it has a dual role to play, like the bourgeoisie itself. This state, utilised by bourgeois and pro-bourgeois groups for their narrow class interests, frequently strikes out at the consistently patriotic forces and, *in this context*, in effect, operates as an anti-national factor.

In the socialist-oriented countries, the national state serves as an instrument of resolute anti-imperialist struggle and deep-going social transformations in the interests of the masses. But even there, and frequently even to a greater extent, it is a field where various social forces clash, in the event, primarily the revolutionary and the reformist, the democratic and the anti-democratic forces, although even there the division into national and anti-national elements also makes itself felt, naturally, in varying extent.

¹ *Ibid.*

SOME IDEOLOGICAL PROCESSES AFTER THE
WINNING OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

Even at the first phase, the development of the national liberation revolutions went forward in an atmosphere of acute ideological clashes, which acquire especial bitterness at the present phase, as the issues of national liberation and social emancipation are woven into a single ganglion, as national unity taking shape at earlier phases of the struggle comes up against the reality of social contradictions, and as imperialism intensifies its ideological pressure in its attempts to prevent socialist ideas from reaching the former colonies and semi-colonies.

The winning of independence was the turning point in the spiritual life of the once oppressed countries of Asia and Africa. Important changes in the ideological atmosphere in the young states were naturally promoted by the collapse of the wall of isolation from the rest of the world, the release from the forcibly imposed one-sided ideological orientation upon the preferences of the metropolitan country, the relaxation and even elimination of the system of terrorism against progressives, the explosion of national feelings, the growing confidence of the local forces in their strength, the greater attention to their own culture and the wider acquaintance with the world of socialism.

Among the most characteristic features of these changes are the further spread and rise of nationalism, with an intensification of its dual character and negative aspects, the growing popularity of socialist slogans, the ever wider penetration of the ideas of scientific socialism and the formulation of diverse conceptions of "national" socialism.

The multisectoral economy of the Asian and African countries, the social diversity of the forces involved in the national liberation struggle, the growth of national and class awareness among the once enslaved peoples, and the urge of each politically active group, whether progressive or reactionary, to raise its own ideological banner at the historically crucial phase for the newly independent countries led to the emergence of various ideological trends, whose conceptions and even forms, like the whole course and tendency of the ideological struggle, cannot be understood outside the context of the worldwide ideological contest between socialism and imperialism.

Whatever the outward appearance of the ideological clashes in the newly independent countries, whatever the actual or apparent specifics of the conceptions spread in these countries, their true content and importance are ultimately determined and expressed within the framework of the worldwide struggle.

The peculiar ideological atmosphere in the former colonies and semi-colonies is determined above all by the fact that the problem of national liberation continues to be central to their social life. Besides, in virtue of these countries' backwardness diverse forms of pre-capitalist and patriarchal ideology are still current among their people.

At the second phase of the liberation struggle, nationalism continues to be the most widespread and influential force in the ideological and political life in the countries of the zone of national liberation.¹ It continues to be a form of national and

¹ K. R. Narayanan, the Indian bourgeois publicist, wrote: "Nationalism is the background against which the drama of democratic development has been unfolding itself in India since Independence. Every aspect of development—social, economic, political and cultural—is informed by the spirit of nationalism, and moved by its emotional impetus. For a renaissance nation like India, awakening from centuries of political subjection and economic degradation, it is only natural that the nationalist spirit should be the presiding force in society." (*Indian and Foreign Review*, New Delhi, June 15, 1965, p. 9.)

I have found it necessary to quote this view at length because, despite the exaggerations and the one-sidedness and the specific phraseology of this bourgeois author, it does give some idea on the situation in India and elsewhere.

anti-imperialist self-awareness for sizable sections of the population.

However, with social problems central to the struggle, nationalism has increasingly shown itself to be incapable of putting forward any constructive programme, because of its limitations and very relative progressiveness, and its inability to provide an anti-imperialist ideology to tackle the new tasks of the liberation movement.

In this context, interest attaches to the opinion expressed by a well-known US specialist on the developing countries, Professor R. Emerson, which is based entirely on the tenets of bourgeois sociology. He says: "Nationalism by itself gives the answer to virtually none of the particular problems arising from the ubiquitous demand for development and, indeed, to very few of the multitude of questions which confront peoples coming to independence. Its most vital contribution is in the realms of the intangibles of the spirit: the restoration of self-respect, the building up of morale, and the stimulation of social solidarity. It does not, however, determine the choice between alternative and often conflicting values...; it does not provide all the good things associated with independence; and it does not establish the institutions necessary for further advance. One must look elsewhere than to nationalism to decide even such overall questions as whether a free enterprise system or Communism, liberal democracy or centralised authoritarianism, is most fitting and the vast majority of lesser decisions must also be taken primarily on other than nationalist grounds.... Even in the realm of foreign affairs where nationalism most evidently comes into play, it is likely to give no conclusive answer to questions concerning entry into this alliance or that, neutralism or commitment."¹

No wonder then that outstanding leaders of the national liberation struggle who were in touch with the interests of the masses, like Nasser, who had once campaigned exclusively under the banner of nationalism, at the new phase brought to the fore slogans of social progress. By contrast, many bourgeois leaders, and right-wing petty-bourgeois leaders as

¹ Rupert Emerson in: *Political Development and Social Change*. Ed. by J. Finkle and R. Gable, New York, 1968, p. 172.

well, still prefer to rely on the slogan of nationalism. What is characteristic is that the shift to the right among various groups and elements of revolutionary democracy and their reactionary degeneration has been frequently accompanied by active efforts to revive that slogan.

Even "moderate" nationalist leaders frequently feel the inadequacy of nationalistic ideas alone in the new conditions, and the need also to rely on some kind of other ideological pillars. The US publicist Robert Shaplen quotes various political leaders in the Asian countries to the effect that "the old nationalist ideologies can no longer provide the ideas and policies which the second phase of the Asian revolution so badly needs".¹

What is also noteworthy is that spokesmen for the revolutionary democratic wing of the national liberation forces find it necessary to emphasise, as the head of the ASU delegation of Egypt at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, that they were acting in the light of "nationalism in its *revolutionary expression*, which calls for freedom and socialism" (emphasis added—*Auth.*).² There is good ground to regard this as a reflection of the political and ideological differentiation of Afro-Asian nationalism of progressive changes within one of its trends, and an urge to dissociate themselves from the frequently growing reactionary tendencies.

Indeed, at the present phase there is growing evidence of anti-democratic and reactionary aspects of nationalism among some social and political forces in the emergent countries. This is largely due to the objective factors, the changing conditions and tasks of social development. Indeed, with the struggle ultimately centering on the issue of orientation in social development, the idea of an "over-and-above class" national unity is invested with a different meaning, increasingly running into irreconcilable contradiction with the urge for social progress and the working people's class interests. It is being used by the bourgeoisie to drop the issue and cover up

¹ R. Shaplen, *Time Out of Hand. Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia*, New York, Evanston, and London, 1963, p. 3.

² 23rd Congress of the CPSU. *Verbatim Report*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1966, p. 107 (in Russian).

the social anti-capitalist aspect of the on-going struggle. The idea of an "over-and-above class" national unity is being ever more widely used by the reactionaries to resist the rise in the political consciousness of the masses, to spread the idea of class collaboration and to build up the positions of the propertied classes, which turns it into a weapon in the hands of the forces advocating the capitalist way of development.

Tendencies of national egocentrism and national exclusiveness now and again become more pronounced (both in the domestic and the international field). These are expressed in the emergence and growth of conflicts between nations, in the attempts to put down national minorities and ethnic groups in some former colonies and semi-colonies, and also in the sharpening relations between some young states. Of course, this has not occurred without incitement on the part of the imperialists, who would like to see the countries of Asia and Africa at each other's throats in order to distract them from the struggle against neo-colonialism.

The tendencies of national exclusiveness and egocentrism are expressed not only as the nationalist platitude of claiming superiority of one nation over the rest, but also in other peculiar forms. Thus, now and again there are claims of a special "historical" mission for whole continents, like Africa or Asia, or even for the whole of the so-called Third World. This idea was launched by F. Fanon¹ and his followers and has now won a considerable number of advocates, receiving support, especially indirect support, even from imperialist propaganda.

In some instances, this idea of the "exclusiveness" of the African and Asian countries is being based on the revolutionary role of the national liberation movement, which is presented as the chief force of modern history, with the role of the international working class and the world socialist system being simultaneously minimised, whether deliberately or otherwise.²

¹ See, Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*; F. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, New York, 1968; F. Fanon, *Toward the African Revolution*, London, 1967.

² A characteristic example is provided by the statements of D. Diallo, a political leader who has held responsible posts in Guinea and Mali, who has expressed left-wing views and has even claimed to be an "African Marxist". He has not only declared that "the political orientation of the states of Africa, Asia

Others have put forward the idea that because of their colonial and semi-colonial past, all the economically lagging (poor) nations constitute a special community which is as a whole ranged against all the "developed" (rich) nations, regardless of social system or any other social class distinctions.

Finally, there is what is in effect an inverted imperialist theory claiming that the "West" and the "East" have their own specific historical ways, that the national character of the peoples of the former colonies and semi-colonies is absolutely "unique", which is why they can allegedly develop along totally unique ways, rising above the general regularities of history and escaping the "ills" of the highly developed countries.

Some advocates of such theories carry them to a logical conclusion, and find themselves advocating an anti-white, coloured racism. In Africa, for instance, we find apologists of the idea of "Negritude"¹ and some groups using the flag of Pan-Africanism, and in Asia, those who advocate "Asia-centrism" and the idea of "Asia for the Asians".

A characteristic feature of all these conceptions is that they tend to treat as absolutes and to distort some actual facts and peculiarities in the life of the African and Asian peoples,² and to speculate on anti-colonialist emotions, and on the feelings of

and Latin America will be the definitive factor in the liberation of the working people of Western Europe", but has even asserted that Africa's entry upon the socialist path will have the "decisive role to play" in the worldwide revolution (see, Demba Diallo, *L'Afrique en question*, Paris, 1968, pp. 17-18, 212).

¹ Criticising the theory of "Negritude" Sékou Touré said: "The colour of man's skin is not definitive of man. Colour has nothing to do with his character or qualities. Black and white inhabiting this continent live in the same conditions. Consequently, they have the same rights and the same duties to join efforts to make good the inadequacies on this continent, to advance towards the flourishing of man and society. The conception of Negritude, we think, is not a historical thesis" (*Jeune Afrique*, Paris, April 14, 1970).

² One need merely point to the fact that the colonial and semi-colonial past does, indeed, determine a set of common tasks for the peoples of Asia and Africa in struggle against imperialism; that the liberation struggle of the peoples of the former colonies and semi-colonies does, indeed, make a big contribution to world revolutionary development; that in some newly independent, notably African, countries, class differentiation is embryonic and community relations still exist, which could to some extent facilitate the transition to socialism, and so on and so forth.

mistrust for people of the white race which the imperialist brutalities and oppression have spread among a section of the population in Asia and Africa. Such theories, in effect, also use the growth of the national awareness of the once subjugated peoples and their legitimate pride in the results of their victories over the colonialists and the establishment of their independent states.

Considering that these theories are a kind of backlash to the racist abuse of the dignity of the oppressed peoples, there are many anti-imperialist-minded but sincerely confused men among their advocates. Still, such views are reactionary. Irrespective of the aims pursued by the propagandists of such views, the main meaning of this ranging of "undeveloped" nations against the "developed" nations or claiming the existence of a closed community and apartness of the former colonies and semi-colonies, to say nothing of the induction of hatred for the "whites", amounts in practical terms chiefly to a fanning of mistrust and even hostility for the time-tested allies of the national liberation movement.

The tendencies of nationalistic narrowness and limitation also hamper the strengthening of anti-imperialist solidarity among the peoples of Asia and Africa themselves. As a result, in this respect there is also a growing discrepancy between nationalism and the tasks of the liberation struggle, because at the new phase the approximation and cohesion of these peoples acquire especial importance.

Now and again, anti-communist tendencies are intensified in the nationalism not only of the bourgeois but also of the petty-bourgeois forces in the African and Asian countries; this plays into the hands of the imperialists, with their efforts to divide the ranks of the national liberation movement, to isolate and to oust the Communists.

None of this means, of course, that nationalism in the former colonial and semi-colonial world at the present phase has lost its progressive aspects and has worked out its anti-imperialist content, although a tendency in that direction is clearly in evidence. It is still the nationalism of nations which, in many respects, continue to be effectively oppressed and exploited, and which still have a long way to go in achieving equality in their relations with the imperialist powers and in completing

spiritual "decolonisation". It is the nationalism of nations which are, as a rule, still taking shape, nations going through the phase of general democratic transformations, national revival and consolidation of national states.

The establishment of national ties takes place in the struggle against feudalism and imperialism, so that the nation principle here is progressive and frequently also revolutionary. The shaping of nations in these countries involves the awakening of the masses, and their struggle against imperialism and for progressive social transformations.

The growing complexity of the problem of Afro-Asian nationalism at the new phase of the national liberation struggle, in effect, consists in the fact that it continues to combine within itself, frequently in highly whimsical forms, progressive and reactionary aspects, although the latter frequently tend to grow. Indeed, this applies to the nationalism of *each* formerly oppressed nation, and it would be an oversimplification to try to bring out "progressive" and "reactionary" nationalisms on a country-by-country basis, applying them to this or that country as a whole.

In this context the principled stand taken by the Communists with regard to nationalism at the preceding phase continues to be meaningful. Lenin taught the Communists of the East as follows: "You will have to base yourselves on the bourgeois nationalism which is awakening, and must awaken, among those peoples, and which has its historical justification."¹ Lenin also emphasised that the Communists must establish contacts with the working and exploited masses of the colonies and semi-colonies to show them that the international proletariat is their only ally, and that only in alliance with it can they achieve liberation.

Mindful of Lenin's precepts, the Communists have continued to support the progressive aspects of the nationalism of the exploited nations of Asia and Africa. At the same time, the Marxists-Leninists seek to show its limitations and inconsistencies, explaining that national egocentrism and apartness lead to isolation from the forces of world progress.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 162.

While resolutely criticising the reactionary expressions of nationalism, the Communists have emphasised the great progressive importance of the rising national self-awareness in the newly independent countries. While the process is highly complex and many-faceted, and involves the possibility of various exaggerations, it is historically fully justified at the present phase and has a tremendous role in these countries' social life. The Communists have not stood apart from the process but have been at its centre. While considering that nationalism continues to be a form of national self-confidence for a large section of the masses, they do not believe it to be the most adequate, let alone, the only, form. That is why the Communists object to this self-consciousness being locked within the shell of nationalism and have been active in spreading the patriotic and internationalist world outlook as the ideology which best meets the urgent tasks of the national liberation revolutions.

Everything that has been said about the nationalism of formerly oppressed nations at the present phase of the national liberation movement applies not only to its bourgeois but also to its petty-bourgeois species, even if to a different extent. Among a section of the petty-bourgeois forces of national liberation, at least, the spread of reactionary and the fold-up of progressive tendencies in nationalism are blocked by its revolutionary democratic stand, the sharpening conflict with imperialism and the national bourgeoisie, the extension of ties with the socialist states and the choice of an anti-capitalist orientation. Here, it is frequently right even to say that the anti-imperialist and revolutionary content of nationalism tends to grow in some respects.

At the new phase of the liberation struggle, nationalism is broadly allied and interlaced with various conceptions of socialism. In a sense, this is also an expression of the discrepancy between nationalism as such and the tasks of the new phase, and insofar as some petty-bourgeois trends are concerned, also of the aggravation of the conflict with imperialism and the national bourgeoisie. K. R. Narayanan writes: "In an underdeveloped country purely political nationalism is a hollow thing, and is replete with irrational potentialities. The moment a nationalist movement gets

divorced from necessary social and economic reform it loses its vitality as well as hold on the people, and gives place, almost inexorably, to a more revolutionary kind of movement."¹

The well-known US scientist, Professor L. Snyder of New York University has also drawn attention to the "association of nationalism with socialism" among some underdeveloped nations. He says this is "one of the most significant trends of the twentieth century".²

Associated with conceptions of socialism, nationalism gives them a nationalistic hue, and this provides an additional illustration of its continuing role in the former colonies and semi-colonies. Some bourgeois analysts, like the US sociologist Professor P. E. Sigmund, even believe that these conceptions are a peculiar modernised version of nationalism.³ At any rate, they regard nationalism as still being a much more potent force, as compared with socialist conceptions.

Although some theories of "national socialism" were put forward at the first phase of the national liberation revolutions, they did not then as yet play any significant role. On the contrary, a growing and frequently dominant role in various trends advocating socialist slogans is the most characteristic phenomenon in the development of the ideological aspect of the national liberation struggle at a present phase.

The banner of socialism is being adopted by a large number of political parties and prominent public leaders in the developing countries, including those who are actually opposed to any fundamental social changes. Socialism has been declared the official goal and state doctrine in half the Arab countries: the Arab Republic of Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Sudan and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen; in various states of Tropical Africa: Guinea, Mali, Chad, Mauretania, Somali, Tanganyika, Kenya, Congo, Malagasy Republic, Senegal, Cameroun and others; in many countries of Asia, Burma, India, and Singapore among others.

¹ *Indian and Foreign Review*, June 15, 1965, p. 10.

² Louis L. Snyder, *The New Nationalism*, Ithaca, New York, 1968, p. 33.

³ See, *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*. Ed. by P. E. Sigmund, Jr., New York, London, 1963, p. 4.

The main reasons for this lie, first, in the growing prestige and revolutionising influence of socialism. With the winning of independence, public opinion in the former colonies and semi-colonies has variously gained access to the experience of the Soviet Union and some other socialist states, where many peoples who had lived before the establishment of the new social system at roughly the same level of development as in the newly liberated countries overcame their backwardness within the shortest period.

Second, the reasons lie in the specifics of the present phase of the national revolutions, when there is an acute awareness of the scale and complexity of the social and economic tasks arising after the winning of political independence, the need for concentrating and making purposeful use of all the available resources, and the discovery that local enterprise is incapable—and frequently also unwilling—to do the right thing about reconstruction.

Finally, third, there is the vast importance of the spontaneous urge for socialism among the masses and a large section of public opinion in the developing countries, which is fed by the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial attitudes and feelings.¹

There are a number of factors which go to explain the spread in the formerly oppressed countries mainly of conceptions designated as “national socialism”. Among these factors are the level of social development in these countries, the character of the social basis of the national liberation movement, the power of nationalistic attitudes, which, together with a conscious urge among some political groups to be rid of “foreign”, that is above all progressive views, have engendered

¹ The developing countries’ public opinion, intellectuals in the first place, says the US analyst Edward Shils, from their contacts with the rest of the world “have learned how gradually the advancement of the Western countries has moved, and they have heard of the speedy progress of the Soviet Union from a backward country to the status of one of the most powerful industrial nations in the world. What could be more harmonious with their present perceptions, their aspirations, and their background than to espouse a socialist solution to their unhappy problem? And if to this is added the fact that their countries have been held in subjection by capitalistic countries and the socialist countries proclaim their hostility to imperialism, the disposition toward socialism receives another impulsion”. (*Political Development and Social Change*. Ed. by J. L. Finkle and R. W. Gable, New York, 1966, p. 351.)

an emphatic desire to advance their own conceptions of socialism.

Still, the fact that “national-type” socialism theories are put forward shows that capitalism has been discredited in the eyes of broad masses of people in Asia and Africa, and therein lies the chief social significance of these theories at the present phase.

Of course, one should bear in mind that this is a trend which frequently has very vague outlines indeed, not only because of the ideological forgeries and deliberate donning of pseudo-socialist raiment, but also because of the lack of any thought-out, scientific conception of the socialist system. With the unprecedented growth of the prestige of socialism, on the one hand, and the vast urge in the newly liberated countries for rapid economic upswing and deep-going social changes, on the other, any urge for progress presents itself—sincerely, in most instances—as socialist, and nearly every political group which is dynamic and claims to exert a serious influence tends to act “on behalf of socialism”. Gunnar Myrdal was not too far off the mark when he said that while socialism is exceptionally popular in South-East Asia, notions of it are highly vague and involve compromise, so that the term “socialism” there is frequently used as a synonym for “nationalism”, “the modernisation ideology”, and so on.¹

The conceptions of “national socialism” are far from homogeneous in form and particularly in substance. They express various and even contradictory social-class positions. Alongside the sincere advocates of socialism, alongside those who put forward utopian ideas and fail to see that in practice they correspond to a political line leading to the establishment of capitalist relations, there are also those who swear oaths of loyalty to socialism in order to camouflage their anti-popular policies. That being so, clarification of the true meaning of these conceptions and their differentiation become a central task of any objective analysis.

This is all the more important because many bourgeois analysts of the problem have a tendency to present all the

¹ See, Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama. An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, Vol. II, New York, 1968, pp. 806-08.

conceptions of "national socialism" as a single whole. That is a very natural approach for them to take because it helps them to round off the "sharp corners" and obscure the social-class aspect of the problem. It is hardly right, for instance, to ascribe to the methodological defects of bourgeois sociology the fact that some reactionary ideologists have tried to fit all the trends in the African countries advocating socialism in the Procrustean bed of "African socialism". By doing so, bourgeois propaganda has extensively exploited the potentialities latent in these conceptions of "national socialism" and the existence of some — and fairly important — common features.

At first sight, the existence of such features may appear to be somewhat unexpected. After all, the conceptions of "national socialism" are current in a large number of countries with vastly diverse political conditions, social order, national traditions and configuration of class forces. However, the similarity of some key features of the historical situation, social structure and spiritual life and the same ideological tendencies connected with the worldwide clash of ideas all go to explain the existence of common methodological and some theoretical and political aspects.

To start with the point that these theories put forward socialism chiefly as a necessary means for fulfilling tasks of *national liberation*, and bringing about rapid independent development and national revival.

Meanwhile, capitalism, with its economic system, political institutions and ideology, is being criticised not only as an "unjust" social system, but above all as the "source" of imperialism and colonialism. This approach is an expression of the historical specific character of the conceptions of "national socialism" arising in the formerly oppressed countries, where social development still has to solve the problem of national liberation. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania said: "I believe that no underdeveloped country can afford to be

¹ What is more, bourgeois sociologists have criticised and declared "unrealistic" the opposite approach by Marxist scientists, their urge to produce a differentiated analysis of these trends to bring out their social orientation. See, for instance, Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, "The Soviet View of African Socialism" in: *African Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 268, London, 1968, pp. 197-209.

anything but socialist." ¹ The same idea was emphasised by the weekly *Etumba*, organ of the Central Committee of the Congolese Workers' Party: "Socialism alone is capable of guaranteeing independence." ²

The theories of "national socialism" are largely eclectic, and some bourgeois authors have even designated them as "eclectic socialism". Alongside the elements of traditional ideology they contain large borrowings from various ideological sources, even incompatible ones. This will be easily understood, considering that behind the conceptions of "national socialism" are groups and elements which are socially mixed and frequently even antagonistic, that some leaders in the newly liberated countries have announced their intention to have an ideology of their own, and also that these theories take shape under the ideological influence from the socialist and the capitalist world.

However, there is need to stress the special influence exerted on these theories in varying form and extent by Marxism, especially in the criticism of imperialism and the establishment of some principles and methods of economic development.

Even Western bourgeois ideologists have recognised this. The preface to one book on the subject says: "Some Marxist ideas on history and social classes and Leninist views on imperialism have entered into the stream of Middle Eastern socialism, chiefly since World War II." ³ Professor Crawford Brough MacPherson says in a book analysing ideological problems in these countries that Marxism has had a marked influence on ideological life in the developing countries. ⁴ The Senegalese scientist Mamadu Lô, a non-Marxist, says that in the field of economic development, it is incontestable that the transformations in the socialist countries "have exerted a profound influence on the African leaders' political think-

¹ *East Africa Journal*, Vol. IV, No. 8, Nairobi, December 1967, p. 34.

² *Etumba* No. 213, October 24-30, 1971, p. 8.

³ *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*. Ed. by Kemal H. Karpat, New York, Washington, London, 1968, p. 16.

⁴ See, *Ideology, Politics and Political Theory*. Ed. by Richard H. Cox, New York, Belmont, 1969, p. 304.

ing".¹ Indeed, Marxism appears before the economically underdeveloped countries in a twofold aspect: "First as an explanatory model of the processes of colonisation and decolonisation and then as a technical model for economic growth."²

One must, of course, bear in mind that the borrowing of Marxist propositions for the conceptions of "national socialism" frequently involves their transformation and some distortion, depending on the political stand taken by the advocates of such conceptions. This occurs as these propositions are adapted to the needs of the conceptions concerned (and this also involves their deliberate distortion) or results from their combination with other, alien ideas.

The conceptions of "national socialism" are characteristically bound up with nationalistic ideas. There can hardly be any doubt, for instance, that there is not only an anti-Marxist, but also an "anti-foreign" nationalistic barb to the following statement of principle by the architects of the programme document of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which says: "African socialism is a term describing an African political and economic system that is positively African not being imported from any country or being a blueprint of any foreign ideology but capable of incorporating useful and compatible techniques from whatever source."³

The nationalistic hue is a reflection of the general ideological atmosphere in which these conceptions take shape and of the fact that nationalism is one of their ideological predecessors and sources. In addition, it is an expression, one might say, of some "departure" from nationalism which now no longer acts altogether independently here and there but which resides under the umbrella of "socialist theories". The ideas borrowed from the nationalist arsenal are variously subordinated—now and again in highly peculiar form—to the needs of these theories, although they remain, in a sense, a fairly independent

¹ B. Traoré, M. Lô, J.-L. Alibert, *Forces politiques en Afrique Noire*, Paris, 1966, p. 166.

² *Ibid.*, p. 167.

³ *African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya*, Nairobi, 1965, pp. 2-3.

element. At the same time, there is the opposite process of these ideas exerting a deep influence on the other component elements of these conceptions.

The advocates of "national socialism" as a rule claim that the peoples of Asia and Africa have a "special" historical "individuality", that their way of life has innate "socialist" tendencies, or even that these peoples had a "socialist system" in the pre-colonial period. Tom Mboya, KANU's Secretary-General declared: "When I say 'African socialism' I have in mind the rules of conduct in African societies which have over the centuries given our peoples their dignity and have guaranteed them a certain security, regardless of their social status."¹

Moral and ethical elements have a special, if not chief, role to play in the "national socialism" conceptions of socialist society. Mboya defines socialism in general as "a viewpoint or a frame of mind which has been adopted to establish rational relations and harmony in society."² This approach is frequently connected with the idea that the way to socialism runs through the elimination of unfair distribution, while the class structure of society is based on the size of cash incomes.

The ideologists of "national socialism" mostly connect their conceptions with religious notions, and frequently even derive them from such notions. Léopold Senghor declares the religious frame of mind to be one of the principles of Senegalese socialism, claiming that it is above all an innate quality of the Africans' "nature".³ Norodom Sihanouk, in his capacity as head of Cambodia's Popular Socialist Community (SANGKUM), stressed that its socialism was "inspired by Buddhism".⁴ There are any number of such facts in the life of other developing countries. The conceptions of "national socialism" usually emphasise the "special" and leading role of the small producer in the social development of the young states and in the struggle for socialism, opposing the complete

¹ *L'Etudiant*, Vol. VII, No. 5, Leyden, May 1963, pp. 23-24.

² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³ See, L. Senghor, *Théorie et pratique du socialisme sénégalais*, Dakar, s. d., p. 35.

⁴ Norodom Sihanouk, *Notre socialisme bouddhique*, s. l., December 1966, p. 6.

elimination of private property and, especially, insisting on the maintenance of small-scale landed property.

Finally, the last point in this concise characteristic is that the theories of "national socialism" are not in any sense complete or finally shaped. They are *transitional*, in accordance with the transitional character of the present-day socio-economic relations in the newly independent countries, the present phase of the national liberation struggle and the political levels among the masses and their leaders.

However, it would be quite wrong to draw the conclusion—on the strength of the general theoretical and philosophical features of "national socialism" conceptions—that these are fundamentally similar, to say nothing of equating them.

It would be a mistake not only because "national socialism" conceptions have considerable theoretical distinctions alone. The main thing is that behind the outward similarities of some of their features and propositions, lie totally different and frequently antithetical class, ideological and political attitudes. That is why in order to bring out the true face and substance of these conceptions and to differentiate between them in any way, there is an obvious need for an analysis not so much of their theoretical content, as of the policies they pursue. Indeed, a closer look at the political practices reveals the fact that theoretically similar and even identical propositions are used to pursue totally different policies.

On the strength of these criteria, that is, the policies and social character of the forces putting forward "national socialism" theories, the ideological and political tenor of these theories, one would be justified to establish two main trends among them: the reformist (or conservative-reformist) and the revolutionary democratic. Here, the social orientation and social basis of the former trend is *predominantly* bourgeois or petty-bourgeois (predominantly because these social forces are usually combined with each other, even if in different proportions), while the latter is, also predominantly, peasant, petty-bourgeois and semi-proletarian.

Besides, conceptions proclaimed by feudal groups and comprador elements, which are unabashed servitors of the colonialists, have a place apart and are purely demagogic. They

are the false banner of feudal and bourgeois reactionaries which is being used in an effort to divert the masses from the way of national independence, anti-imperialism and social progress.

With some reservations, one could classify under the former head the official ideological credo of parties like the Indian National Congress (before its split in 1969, after which its policies became more radical), the Destour Socialist Party, the Kenya African National Union, the Progressive Party of Senegal, etc. Under the latter, those of the Algeria's National Liberation Front, the Syrian and the Iraqi Baath, the Burma Socialist Programme Party, the Democratic Party of Guinea, the Congolese Workers' Party, the united political organisation of the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Tanganyika African National Union, the now defunct Convention People's Party of Ghana and the Sudanese Union of Mali, etc.

Of course, this kind of classification is inevitably schematic, for the conceptions and the political parties adopting them—both in the revolutionary and the reformist group—frequently have their own features which do not fit into the general scheme. Besides, in actual life, the dividing line between the reformist and the revolutionary wing does not run only *between* the various parties, but equally *within* them, in consequence of the different social and ideological character of their component forces. That is why in each of these instances the emphasis is only on the leading tendency. Finally, there is also need to take account of the fact that in various countries there are important differences within the conservative-reformist (as within the revolutionary democratic) trend, because of the dissimilar conditions in the various countries, the different condition of the local bourgeoisie and the acuteness of its contradictions with imperialism, and the concrete balance of strength between the bourgeois and the petty-bourgeois advocates of these theories.

The conservative "national socialism" theories do not, in effect, go beyond the framework of bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic reformism, being mainly subordinate to the interests of the local bourgeoisie and the pro-bourgeois forces. They also variously reflect the attitudes of the petty-bourgeois

groups, which are now under the political and ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie, whether local or foreign. These theories provide an ideological envelope for the policy which is designed to overcome economic and socio-economic backwardness and to reduce or eventually to eliminate the dependence on imperialism (frequently through compromise) through the establishment of capitalist relations, sometimes within the framework of state capitalism, even if only for the immediate historical period ahead.

It is true that for many of their non-bourgeois advocates, including some leaders, this kind of "projection" of these theories into practice is not so much a matter of deliberate choice, as of a spontaneous result of policies whose true meaning is frequently obscured from their view by a thick screen of "over-and-above class" illusions.

These theories are noteworthy above all because they are a symptom of capitalism's inability to act in the open. They are also an indication that some circles of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intelligentsia in the emergent countries are aware not only of the unpopularity of the capitalist system among the masses, but also of the limited transformative potential of local capitalism, and want to use socialist experience in their own interests.

Having reached the conclusion that the "classical" way of capitalism along which the West advanced is impracticable in the former colonies and semi-colonies, and seeking to accelerate economic development and cope with some of the more acute social problems, bourgeois and pro-bourgeois circles in some African and Asian countries make efforts to use methods which have proved effective in the socialist countries. Of course, when doing this they tend to kill their true, socialist content. The leaders and ideologists of ruling groupings in these countries favour the establishment and consolidation of a state sector, the use of planning principles, the development of cooperatives in the countryside, and so on, but when advocating these measures and variously implementing them, the bourgeois circles also succumb to pressures from the petty-bourgeois sections, in an effort to allay the anxieties of the petty proprietor about his future. These circles clearly tend to be swayed by these circles' illusions, and their own as well, in

the hope of using such measures to ease the most crying defects of capitalism, to damp down the contradictions of bourgeois society in order to strengthen it, and to depress and weaken the elements which go to revolutionise and erode that society.

Among the specific features of the conservative-reformist conceptions in theoretical terms there is, above all, the fact that, as a rule, they reject dialectical and historical materialism, flatly denying the class struggle not only in the context of their own countries, but in the general framework of history, declaring class collaboration to be the motive force of social development.

They reject any revolutionary solutions for the urgent problems of the emergent countries, drumming in the idea that socialism is "non-class" and applies to the "whole of humanity", being of equal concern to all the social sections of the nation, and strenuously denying that socialism is based on class premises.

The idea of a mixed economy is regarded by the reformists mainly as providing broad opportunities for the development of private capital, chiefly local, but foreign as well. The state sector is not allowed either to play the dominant role in the economy or to exercise control over the operations of private capital.

Reformist conceptions are characteristically anti-communist and anti-Marxist, such attitudes being mostly avowed and now and again bellicose. Indeed, the advocates of such conceptions seek to draw a line between scientific socialism as a *conception* and as a *method* of development, in order to reduce socialism to a package of methods, a peculiar set of techniques which make it possible to modernise the country and overcome backwardness, without being intrinsically connected with the socio-economic content of development.

They oppose scientific communism, declaring it to be a "false" or "obsolete" doctrine.

The conceptions of bourgeois orientation openly range themselves against scientific socialism in theoretical and political terms. Their anti-communism is also expressed in the attempts to separate and contrast—both in theory and practice—communism and socialism, declaring communism

to be a socialism that is "not real", "not genuine". Besides, the characteristic emphasis on and absolutisation of the national "uniqueness" of their countries is not merely a nationalistic and petty-bourgeois exaggeration but also, in a sense, a peculiar way of segregation from Marxism and struggle against it. Such is, in effect, the spirit of the following statement which is contained in KANU's official programme document: "The sharp class divisions that once existed in Europe have no place in African Socialism and no parallel in African society. No class problem arose in the traditional African society and none exists today among Africans."¹

Indeed, the use of the term "national socialism" is frequently dictated by the same tendency, as will be seen from the official documents of some parties, like the Action Programme of the youth branch of Cambodia's Popular Socialist Community.²

Of course, the reformist conceptions of "national socialism" have an anti-imperialist and bourgeois-democratic aspect to them. Their criticism of capitalism helps to discredit it. But by claiming to act on behalf of socialism, these conceptions assume a reactionary and mainly demagogic role, hampering the growth of political awareness among the people. Besides, the policy pursued under their banner can frequently—even if only temporarily—reduce the popularity of socialist ideas among some sections of the population.

One cannot, it seems, rule out in principle all possibility of evolution of some of these conceptions in a more or less progressive direction chiefly through a radicalisation of the petty-bourgeois forces now supporting them as they escape from the influence of bourgeois and pro-bourgeois circles, and the section of the petty-bourgeois elements which has finally thrown in its lot with these circles. But this kind of evolution is, at least, as likely as the opposite one.

The conceptions advocated by the revolutionary democratic wing are quite different. They reflect the interests and

¹ "Kenya's White Paper on African Socialism", *Socialist International Information*, London, Vol. XV, No. 11-12, June 5, 1965, p. 131.

² See, *Agence Khmere de Presse, Bulletin quotidien d'information*, January 25, 1958.

attitudes of broad sections of pre-capitalist society, chiefly the peasantry, the semi-proletarian and petty-bourgeois masses in town and country, the lower urban strata, the radical intelligentsia and, now and again, also the emergent proletariat, that is, the motive forces of the national liberation revolution at its second phase.

Strenuous efforts are being made by the revisionists to influence the ideological processes in the young states. The revisionists' influence is reflected in the leftist and adventurist ideological stand taken by some political groups in the formerly oppressed countries and tends to fan bellicose nationalistic and chauvinistic feelings. However, it would be a mistake to ascribe to the influence of revisionists alone all the leftist attitudes, to say nothing of reactionary nationalistic feelings, because there are also substantial internal premises for them.

At the present phase of the national liberation movement scientific socialism becomes an ever more attractive force in the emergent countries. This is due to the growing acquaintance of public opinion in these countries with Marxism-Leninism as a theory and especially as a mighty instrument of social transformation, exemplified by the accomplishments of the socialist countries. One factor in popularising the ideas of scientific socialism is the Communist and Workers' parties in the former colonies and semi-colonies, the socialist countries now connected with the developing countries not only along social but also state lines, and the international communist movement as a whole.

The Communists of the newly independent countries have exposed the hypocrisy of the feudal and comprador reactionaries, who seek to cover up their anti-patriotic plans with a smokescreen of socialist catch-phrases. They reveal the true substance of the bourgeois-reformist forgeries of socialism and expose imperialist propaganda attempts to advertise various reactionary forms of unscientific and utopian socialism in contrast to Marxism-Leninism.

There is growing awareness of the fact in the young states that Marxism has stood the test of practice in countries with different socio-economic conditions, having demonstrated its

creative power in transforming virtually every type of social relations existing in the world.

Of course, the spread of scientific socialism in the former colonies and semi-colonies is a complicated and, apparently, long-term process. Among the serious difficulties on the way are the deep-seated backwardness of social relations and the weakness of the proletariat, the limited experience, if any, of anti-capitalist struggle, the specific features of the position of the countries which have joined in the worldwide struggle against imperialism, after "missing" many successive phases of ordinary political and socio-economic development, the primary role in social life of vast peasant and petty-bourgeois masses, with their ideological preconceptions and illusions, and the pressures of imperialist propaganda and anti-Marxism, which have been assuming ever more refined forms.

Nevertheless, social development in the newly liberated countries, above all the growth of a modern industry and proletariat, the growing experience of the anti-imperialist and class struggle, and the consolidation of world socialism steadily lead to a consolidation of the positions of scientific socialism. When considering the factors underlying the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia, Lenin stressed that Marxism had been adopted by the country as a result of its own painful experience. It appears that this process is in one form or another inevitable for the emergent states as well.

CHAPTER FOUR

INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE

Far from declining, the dependence of the character and course of the national liberation revolutions on international factors at the new phase of struggle tends in many respects to increase, for instance, ideologically. Some of the aspects of such dependence, notably, the economic aspect, in effect, appear anew, and acquire primary importance. One of the distinctive features of the political behaviour of the class motive forces of the revolution and also of its pro-imperialist and reformist adversaries at the present phase is that they are especially subject to the influence of international factors.

At the second phase of the national liberation revolutions, there is an important twofold change in the international conditions of their development. First of all, there are the important changes in the international arena itself, in the balance between and potentialities of the reactionary and the progressive forces. Besides, the international situation now has an effect on developments in the former colonies and semi-colonies largely through the medium of emergent national statehood.

There is also need to emphasise that the policies of the international forces with respect to the developing countries—and this concerns not only world socialism and the communist movement, but also the imperialist camp—are based on the assumption that the national liberation movement has entered a new and strategic phase. Accordingly, this is taken into account in framing policy, which continues to have the same basic content, but is considerably modified in form.

Another point to note is that the international conditions in which the national revolutions developed in the second phase have, undoubtedly, largely changed for the better, as compared with the period of struggle for political independence. At the same time, it would be wrong to ignore the fact that in some respects there are also some complicated factors, stemming from the peculiarities of the world situation and with the specific features of the new phase itself, from the character of their interconnection and interaction with international conditions.

Assuming that the point of transition from the first to the second phase—naturally, within the framework of the national liberation movement as a whole and not in some concrete country—came roughly at the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, a kind of crystallisation of important qualitative changes in the balance of class forces in the international arena achieved on the basis of the results of the Second World War had occurred by that time.

Having beaten back the imperialist attempts at counter-revolutionary restoration in the countries where popular democratic revolutions had won out, the socialist system did not merely consolidate itself but also succeeded in vastly strengthening its political and economic foundation and military might. The socialist community has become a factor which exerts a *direct* influence on a global scale, making itself substantially, and frequently even crucially felt in virtually every key area of the world and in all the major international issues.

The fundamental changes in the world political climate and in the structure of international relations, which are favourable for the liberation movement, are also expressed in the establishment of new type of relations between the socialist countries and also between them and the developing countries.

Meanwhile, the conversion of the once oppressed nations into subjects of world politics, the founding of over 80 new states, the winning of independence by semi-colonies, and the formation in Asia and Africa of a system of national states which emerged from the flames of the anti-imperialist struggle and which make up two-thirds of the globe's population likewise necessarily had a profound effect on international

relations. The very emergence of the young states and their involvement in international affairs promote further progressive changes in these relations, so curbing imperialist influence. These states, pooling their efforts with those of the socialist countries, are capable of shouldering a great and growing responsibility for the development of international relations and the strengthening of world peace and the security of nations.

Over one half of the UN members (82 out of 144) are African and Asian countries, and this has markedly helped to strengthen the tendency in that body towards the creation of a more or less stable anti-imperialist majority on a number of issues.

The young states which have risen to political independence occupy a special place¹ in the structure of present-day world social relations. First of all, in contrast to all the other countries within the world capitalist economy, they are, as a rule, not part of the political system of imperialism and are not, at the present phase, its political reserve. Hence, the deep-seated contradiction between their economic and political positions.

Second, these countries remain in a profoundly unequal and exploited condition within the world capitalist economic system.

At the same time, the socialist countries' support and the development of cooperation among the young national states enabled them to some extent to withstand the tendencies stemming from their inequality and more or less successfully to resist the dictates of the monopolies.

Third, the question of the highroad of their socio-economic development is still being decided in many of the emergent countries, despite the fact that they are within the capitalist world economic system (while some young states have already opted for the anti-capitalist orientation).

Indeed, these countries provide an arena for the clash of antagonistic social orientations of our day, and the chief zone where world capitalism, as a socio-economic formation, seeks to carry on its "territorial" expansion.

Fourth, because the independent political, economic and ideological development of the young states is aimed against

¹ See, *The Road to Communism*, p. 491.

the inequitable relations imposed by imperialism, it has intrinsic and essential anti-imperialist tendencies, which are, quite naturally, expressed in different forms, and this applies not only to the anti-capitalist but also to the capitalist-oriented countries, in virtue of the objective character of development of national capitalism in these countries. As a result, they, too, are variously involved in the worldwide struggle against imperialism.

Fifth, these countries' spiritual life is dominated by nationalist ideology, many of whose aspects are ranged against imperialism, and various conceptions of socialism, while pre-capitalist forms of ideology are also prominent. There are now enough facts to insist that the countries taking the non-capitalist way are in an even more specific position, owing to the socialist orientation of their social development, the resolute anti-imperialist stand reflecting the sharpness of their conflict with imperialism, and the character of their relations with the socialist world, which consist not only of objective connections but also of an alliance aimed against imperialism.

A corollary of the growing might of the socialist system and of the disintegration of the colonial empires was the weakening of imperialist positions both on a worldwide scale and also with respect to the national liberation zone. Its opportunities for resorting to sheer violence and armed suppression against the national liberation movement have been sharply curtailed. Moreover, with the emergence of national states in the former colonies, with their inherent tendency to develop towards stronger independence, the imperialists' opportunities for exerting an *immediate* influence on the young states' political and economic life are as a rule also reduced.

At the same time, the grounds for conflict between the newly liberated peoples and imperialism are not only largely maintained but because of the operation of new factors working to develop the conflict, there is a further tendency for it to become deeper and more acute.

In *objective terms* this comes to a steadily growing polarisation of wealth and poverty on the inter-state level in the non-socialist world; aggravation of the conflict between the sovereign national political superstructure of the young states and their economic basis, which is largely dependent on the

foreign monopolies; the imperialist drive to implant neo-colonialist forms of oppression; and the real opportunities opened up for the young states to carry on a successful fight for complete national liberation with the support of the socialist system.

In *subjective terms* this comes to a deepening of the process of social division in the developing countries and a growth of the class content of the national liberation struggle, spreading public awareness in the former colonies and semi-colonies of the fact that they remain unequal and exploited and that there is a gap between the economic levels of these countries and the imperialist states which had plundered them for decades and centuries¹; the sharp backlash generated by neo-colonialist encroachments, etc.

Besides, the contradiction between imperialism and the developing countries is now expressed in a much wider sphere. Thus, it is most pronounced in the political, economic, diplomatic and other *inter-state* relations between these countries and the imperialist powers and in international affairs as a whole.

At the new phase, there is a deepening of inter-imperialist contradictions over the relations with the former colonial and semi-colonial world and mounting competition between the monopolies, for which the growing markets of the newly independent countries are of considerable interest. Besides, in the light of the tendencies in the past few years it is safe to say that the coordination of action by the imperialist powers in the national liberation zone has, perhaps, tended to decline, owing to the general aggravation of the inter-imperialist contradictions. But this has also been caused to some extent by the fact that against the background of the now obvious prospect of a *protracted* struggle to determine the orientation of the young states' development and the difficulties facing the progressive forces in some of these countries, each imperialist power has tended increasingly to look to its own interests. Meanwhile, the forces of national liberation have greater opportunities than ever before of making use of these contradictions, for they are

¹ Although now and again this is oversimplified into the notion of "rich" and "poor" nations, which is actually a bourgeois and petty-bourgeois interpretation of the gap.

able to enter into relations with other countries without asking permission from the former metropolitan country.

Finally, the positions of imperialism vis-à-vis the former colonies and semi-colonies have also been weakened because the capitalist world has faced mounting internal difficulties and growing pressure from the anti-monopoly and anti-capitalist forces.

With the winding up of the colonial system, a new chapter has been started in the relations between world socialism and the forces of national liberation. Of course, the policy of the socialist countries and the international communist movement in supporting the national liberation struggle has not changed. That is part and parcel of proletarian internationalism and a necessary element of the worldwide revolutionary strategy of the international working class in present-day conditions.

However, the *forms* of support and solidarity offered by socialism to the national liberation movement and the chief problems which such solidarity aims to solve are a different matter, for they tend to change with the development of the national liberation struggle, the succession of its phases and deepening of its social content, and the growing strength of the socialist countries. What is more, the social content of the alliance and interaction of world socialism and the forces of national liberation with some of its contingents, at any rate, is also capable of enrichment (on the same fundamental anti-imperialist basis).

Lenin said that when pursuing a policy of achieving the closest alliance between Soviet Russia and all the national and colonial liberation movements, there was need to determine the forms of this alliance in accordance with the level of development and maturity of these movements in the various oppressed countries.¹ Addressing the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East, Lenin also stressed that the Communists "must find specific forms for this alliance of the foremost proletarians of the world with the labouring and exploited masses of the East whose conditions are in many cases medieval".²

¹ See, V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 146.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 161.

These ideas of Lenin's are even more meaningful today, at the second phase of the national liberation movement, considering the great unevenness of its development in the various regions in this period, its social intricacies and, finally, the peculiar social forms emerging in the Third World.

At one time, political alliance and interaction between world socialism and the national liberation movement were effected almost exclusively through ties between social organisations, political parties and trends in the oppressed countries. Since the collapse of the colonial regimes, these ties have rapidly developed and expanded. But the most important change in this alliance and its fundamental specific feature at the new phase is that it is now being realised above all and on a growing scale through inter-state relations between the socialist and the newly liberated countries. Today, the Soviet Union, for instance, has diplomatic relations with most former colonial and semi-colonial countries in Africa and Asia.

The Soviet Union has pursued its policy of supporting the struggle of the peoples in the national liberation zone and of developing its ties with the young states in every possible way, taking account of the patchwork conditions in the zone and the diversity of the forces involved in the liberation struggle. But in any case, the objective anti-imperialist tendency in the development of the young states continues to be an important basis of these ties, their relations with the socialist countries serving as a factor of support for this tendency.

L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, said at the 25th Party Congress: "We are doing and will continue to do everything to develop and strengthen friendship with those who really want it. We and the vast majority of the states that arose on the ruins of the colonial system are united by a deep common allegiance to peace and freedom, and aversion to all forms of aggression and domination, and to exploitation of one country by another. This community of basic aspirations is rich and fertile soil on which our friendship will continue to grow and flourish!"¹

In the relations between the socialist and the newly independent countries the principles of independence and

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy*, p. 20.

equality, mutual respect and mutually advantageous cooperation are closely blended and interwoven with anti-imperialist solidarity, which is based on their common interests, and the socialist world's support of these countries' national liberation in the economic, political and ideological spheres.

In principle, these are *relations of a special type*, and can in a sense be designated as transitional. In social content, they are, as a rule, higher than the relations between the capitalist and the socialist countries.

The extent to which this special content and its anti-imperialist and progressive social aspects are expressed in the relations between the socialist and the developing countries is determined by the independence of these countries and the socio-political face of the forces in power. There is good reason why the socialist countries have the closest ties with the advanced national states, for their chosen line of development creates important prerequisites for such ties.

This aspect of the matter is reflected in the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Art. 2 of which says: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iraqi Republic declare that they will cooperate closely and in all fields to ensure the conditions for preserving and further developing the social and economic gains of their peoples and respect for the sovereignty of each over all of its natural resources."¹

The socialist countries have also extended their cooperation with states in which national bourgeois forces are in power. The starting point there is that the independent development of these states is objectively aimed against the positions of imperialism and can be ensured only with the support of socialism, which fully meets the interests of the people in these countries and promotes their struggle to realise the aims of the national liberation revolution and achieve social progress.

The policy of developing ties is also pursued with respect to national states whose sovereignty is still largely nominal, for there, too, there is a growing urge for genuine independence, which calls for support.

¹ *Pravda*, April 10, 1972.

The present phase is marked by the emergence and broad development of what is, in effect, a new form of militant solidarity and alliance between the international working class and the national liberation movement. These are contacts and ties in the national, and especially international, field between the Communist parties and revolutionary democratic parties. Simultaneously, relations with all parties and organisations in the national liberation zone taking or being capable of taking an anti-imperialist stand on various concrete issues are also being maintained and further developed.

At the preceding phase, the edge of the interaction and solidarity between socialism and the forces of national liberation was aimed against traditional colonialism. This line of support has been continued even after the collapse of the colonial system, and primarily with respect to peoples still in colonial fetters. At the same time, alliance and cooperation between socialism and the forces of national liberation are now aimed above all against neo-colonialism and fulfilment of the basic tasks of the new phase of the revolution. Accordingly, this alliance and cooperation variously bear on all the main aspects of the general democratic programme of this phase.

The main lines along which this alliance and cooperation are being realised are as follows:

— *In the political sphere*, it is consolidation of the young states' independence, their rights and practical potentialities in deciding for themselves which social orientation to take; efforts to eliminate all expressions of inequality and imperialist dictates from international relations and to strengthen world peace and security of nations.

— *In the military sphere*, it is strengthening the defence capacity of the young states and helping them to defend themselves against aggressive acts and military pressure from the neo-colonialists; resistance to imperialist attempts to use areas of the former colonial and semi-colonial world as strategic and military bridgeheads against the forces of national liberation and the socialist countries.

— *In the economic sphere*, it is struggle for the economic emancipation of the developing countries from imperialism and construction of their national economy; extension of

mutually advantageous economic cooperation between states, and against inequality, exploitation and discrimination in international economic relations. Lenin said that the once oppressed peoples are "becoming more and more aware of the economic necessity of an alliance with Soviet Russia against international imperialism".¹

— *In the ideological and spiritual sphere*, it is exposure of the imperialist policy and ideology; struggle against the ideas of national and racial oppression, and against the spiritual expansion of neo-colonialism; and for a cultural revolution in the newly independent countries.

The Soviet Union's assistance has been a great contribution to the heroic struggle of the peoples of Indochina against imperialist aggression. The anti-colonial, anti-racist movement of the peoples of Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia and other countries has always enjoyed the Soviet Union's support.

This resolute support has helped the advanced Arab states and the Arab peoples' liberation movement as a whole to rebuff imperialist blackmail. It was the most important reason why the architects and sponsors of Israel's aggression in the Middle East have failed to achieve their political aims.

The Soviet Union's role in the victorious outcome of the national liberation struggle of the people of Bangladesh is generally recognised.

The USSR's stand has been an effective factor of defence against imperialist encroachments for many former colonies and semi-colonies, among them Guinea, Somali, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, and Libya. It is largely because of the Soviet stand that the neo-colonialist plans to dismember Nigeria have failed. Relying on Soviet support, many newly liberated countries have been able to consolidate their sovereignty, rupture the fetters of unequal agreements imposed by the colonialists before independence and reduce their dependence on aggressive blocs.

The socialist countries' economic and technical assistance to the young states is an important source of support for their struggle for economic independence. By September 1, 1975, the Soviet Union had economic and technical cooperation

agreements with 54 countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. By 1975, 472 economic, social and cultural projects had been built in developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America with the assistance of the USSR. Only in the past ten years (1965-1974), its trade turnover with the developing countries increased by over 200 per cent.

The Soviet Union's economic assistance has directly promoted the laying of an economic foundation for the independent development of the young states. At the same time, it has helped importantly to modify their position in face of imperialist capital. As a result, they are able to adopt a more independent stand in their economic ties with the capitalist world and actively to insist on a change in the inequitable relations imposed on them by the imperialist powers.¹ The young national states are enabled to work for external economic relations with the capitalist countries that would to some extent promote their economic construction, without harming their sovereignty.

In present-day conditions, the socialist countries' indirect assistance is perhaps almost as important as their direct assistance, and this applies not only to the economic aspect of the matter. The existence of the world socialist system and its ties with the young states have a great effect on the political line taken by imperialism in the Third World and the shaping of relations between the imperialist powers and these states. Today, the imperialist powers have to formulate and implement their policies in the Third World with an eye to the socialist community, carefully weighing the concrete possibilities for cooperation between the socialist and the national states, and the powerful attraction exerted by the socialist world.

The socialist world's resolute struggle against bourgeois ideology helps the forces of national liberation to overcome the spiritual influence of imperialism in their countries and to resist the neo-colonialist drive to win the minds of men. The socialist countries' assistance in training national personnel

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 477.

¹ "By providing an alternative to Western aid, the Soviet programme in effect created a climate in which anti-Western neutralism is possible." (*The Washington Post*, May 30, 1971, p. A26.)

helps to carry on a cultural revolution and deprive the imperialists of important instruments for exerting a spiritual influence on social life in the developing countries. With the wall of colonial isolation lying in ruins, world socialism has operated as a powerful factor in spreading advanced democratic ideas in the young states, despite the resistance of bourgeois or pro-colonialist regimes and the reactionaries.

L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, said at the 25th Party Congress: "The Soviet Union's attitude to the complicated processes taking place within the developing countries is clear and definite. The Soviet Union does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples. It is an immutable principle of our Leninist foreign policy to respect the sacred right of every people, every country, to choose its own way of development. But we do not conceal our views. In the developing countries, as everywhere else, we are on the side of the forces of progress, democracy and national independence, and regard them as friends and comrades in struggle.

"Our Party supports and will continue to support peoples fighting for their freedom. In so doing, the Soviet Union does not look for advantages, does not hunt for concessions, does not seek political domination, and is not after military bases. We act as we are bid by our revolutionary conscience, our communist convictions."¹

Finally, the favourable changes in the international situation at the second phase of the national liberation revolutions are also connected with the development of relations among the young states themselves. The strengthening of ties among these states on the basis of anti-imperialist solidarity can help significantly to consolidate their political independence and win economic emancipation. There is a varied tendency for such ties to grow in the political, diplomatic, economic and military spheres, although now and again the process is slow and contradictory.

When characterising the international conditions for the development of the national liberation movement since the

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy*, p. 16.

collapse of the colonial system, it is also important to reckon with the existence of negative factors in this context.

First of all, there are the possibilities and the policies of imperialism. There is no need to demonstrate the fact that while imperialism has suffered great losses as a result of the Second World War, and the whole of postwar development, it still remains a mighty force. Nor is there any need to argue that while imperialism may have lost direct domination of many dozens of African and Asian countries, it still continues to wield important instruments for political, military-political and ideological influence on these countries. Enough has also been said about the importance of economic problems at the new phase of the national liberation revolutions, but it is precisely in economic terms that imperialism continues to hold the most substantial positions in the modern world, and especially vis-à-vis the former colonies and semi-colonies.

The economic ties of the former colonies and semi-colonies are, as a rule, oriented upon the imperialist countries. From 1970 to 1972, roughly 73 per cent of the developing countries' imports and exports fell to the countries of Western Europe, North America and Japan. From these countries also came the bulk of the developing countries' state loans. The imperialist monopolies continue to hold important and frequently dominant positions in the economy of many newly independent countries. As a result of all this, imperialism has effective opportunities for exerting political pressures as well.

Hence, the prime factor which tends importantly to complicate the progressive development of the young states. It is the impossibility for the countries which have opted for the socialist orientation not only immediately to withdraw from the world capitalist economy but also to bring about a fundamental change in the relations with it, the necessity to carry on non-capitalist development while maintaining inequitable ties with this economy which are dangerous in socio-economic and political terms for a more or less protracted period, and the objectively rooted condition of a gradual and long-term reorientation of these countries' economic life from the capitalist upon the socialist world.

This is all the more important, considering that since the collapse of the colonial system the main imperialist line has

been aimed directly not so much against the political self-determination achieved by the once oppressed nations, as against any further deepening of the national liberation revolutions, and at foisting the capitalist orientation on these countries. Indeed, the fundamental specific of neo-colonialism consists above all in the fact that it is imperialism's *social-class* reaction to the fundamental changes in the Third World, not in the obvious sense that neo-colonialism bears the marks of the social system and the class originating and pursuing the policy—for that is true of *any* colonial policy—but in the sense that it is a class response by capitalism in the context of the struggle between the two systems primarily to protect itself *as a system* and, accordingly, the bourgeoisie as a class, and to do this on a worldwide scale, and not only to maximise profits or fortify the positions of this or that "national" imperialism.

I have already said that at the present phase imperialism variously seeks to provide support for local capitalism in the newly independent countries, especially in the struggle over the choice of development way. The imperialists have pursued their neo-colonialist line in an effort to influence the character of the contradictions, the class struggle and even the changes in the social structure in the emergent countries.

At the second phase of the national liberation struggle, the general line of imperialist policy tends, perhaps, almost fully to overcome the underestimation of the role of the local bourgeoisie. What is more, the social strategy of neo-colonialism is characteristically oriented upon agreement and alliance with definite sections of the national and bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Imperialist politicians have acted on the assumption that influential circles of the national bourgeoisie must find it attractive to have neo-colonialism work for the capitalist development of the young national states, to prevent them from taking the path of social progress. In a sense, the imperialists expect the national bourgeoisie to display some class solidarity.

The imperialists have used a wide range of instruments—economic, political and ideological—to put through their deal with definite bourgeois and pro-bourgeois elements, with the economic basis being provided by the economic programme of neo-colonialism, which is compatible with

some growth and enrichment of the national bourgeoisie and, moreover, implies these. What the imperialist monopolies have, in fact, proposed to the local bourgeoisie is a division of the market in the young national states in their efforts to involve the national bourgeoisie in exploiting the resources of these countries as a junior partner.

One would think that it was totally hopeless to offer the bourgeoisie inequitable cooperation now that it has its national state and is able to rely on it in most instances. However, the imperialists hope that, alongside the interest displayed by influential circles of the national bourgeoisie in economic cooperation with foreign capital, use can be made for their purposes of the social differentiation in the young national states and the dual character of the national bourgeoisie. Their assumption is that with the growing social antagonisms, mass discontent and more vigorous activity of the progressive forces, reactionary tendencies will grow and the anti-imperialist potential of a section of the national bourgeoisie will weaken.

That is why the neo-colonialists have advanced anti-communism, an important instrument of exerting an influence on the national bourgeoisie, as the ideological and political basis for an agreement with it. The imperialists regard the self-seeking, narrow class tendencies of the national bourgeoisie as an important premise for its agreement with the anti-democratic wing. Nor can one ignore some of the features of the national bourgeoisie which, as I have said, spring from the colonial conditions of its formation and which have a great influence on its attitude to imperialism.

The imperialists have been making ever wider use of various instruments to promote the growth of bourgeois elements in the young national states. Apart from diverse forms of economic stimulation and downright bribery, the neo-colonialists have also used other measures, including political and ideological ones. The "reforms" advocated by the imperialists in the developing countries are designed to stimulate capitalist relations, help the growth of bourgeois elements and establish bourgeois political structures.

In countries with national-bourgeois governments, the imperialists have sought to promote the growth of private-

property and capitalist elements in order to fortify the social basis of these governments. Wherever revolutionary democrats are in power, this is being done to shore up the forces fighting against their policy of social progress. Finally, in countries with puppet regimes such policies are pursued in order to entrench these regimes and even to push them along the way of some nationalist evolution.

This is a good point to note that the imperialists are now not always interested in having patently puppet regimes. Of course, in present-day conditions such regimes provide the maximum opportunities for neo-colonialist control and have usually been preferred by the imperialists. But the whole of postwar experience shows that with the worldwide rise of the national liberation struggle puppet regimes are highly unstable, tending to concentrate against themselves powerful forces of national protest, unwittingly promoting the political education and radicalisation of the people, and sharpening the anti-imperialist attitudes of the national bourgeoisie, in the way of whose development these regimes frequently erect major obstacles to prevent it from taking over. This is illustrated by the regimes of Nuri Said-Faisal in Iraq, Batista in Cuba, Youlou in the Congo, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Duvalier in Haiti, and finally, Ngo-dinh-Diem and the leaders of the defunct Saigon clique in South Vietnam.

In other words, puppet regimes frequently stand in the way of plans to stamp out the revolutionary national liberation struggle by means of some reforms. That is why in present-day conditions, the imperialists frequently prefer governments headed by conciliatory members of the local bourgeoisie, considering that this does not significantly jeopardise the basic aims of neo-colonialist policy and, in effect, promotes their realisation.

None of this clashes with the fact that there are puppet and dictatorial regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America which managed to stay in power because of imperialist support. Apart from the handful of African countries, where the former colonial rulers have themselves avoided making any innovations, in the belief that there is no serious threat to their domination for the time being, in all the other instances the imperialists appear to be feverishly clinging to patently puppet

regimes because they have no other choice or because they are fearful of the difficulties of a transition period.

The imperialists fear that in the process of swapping puppet regimes left-wing and consistently patriotic forces will succeed in seizing the initiative and establishing superior positions. These fears are fortified by the fact that the reformist and conciliatory parties and groupings of the bourgeoisie, and even more frequently of the petty bourgeoisie with whom they would like to deal, are not politically homogeneous and always have within their make-up more or less influential forces whose line is well to the left of the "official" one.

Accordingly, the neo-colonialists are constantly confronted with the problem, or "dilemma", as Walter Lippmann once put it, of whether to run the risk of removing overcompromised groups or to continue to support them. "It takes a lot more acumen and political courage ... to back a progressive faction," Lippmann said and added: "Nevertheless, in the task of containing the expansion of communism there is no substitute for the building up of strong and viable states which command the respect of the mass of their people."¹

But in practice, and under the pressure of various circumstances, including those just mentioned, imperialist governments tend to act otherwise. There is also the consideration that the neo-colonialists are not as fully free to manoeuvre here in yet another sense. Barring a handful of the "most" puppet regimes, other pro-imperialist and corrupted governments tend gradually to acquire various degrees of relative independence, and in order to continue in power are frequently prepared to do anything, and even to act against their imperialist patrons in extreme cases.

Indeed, the imperialists still have to cope with the main problem of their policy in the zone of the former colonial and semi-colonial countries, that of ensuring a "smooth" transitional period in a reformist capitalist transformation in these countries on the basis of a deal with the national-bourgeois forces, and that of averting developments under which the weakening of obsolete structures tends to undermine the whole foundation of the anti-popular power and to a

¹ *New York Herald Tribune*, June 17, 1965, p. 20.

breakthrough of leftist elements in the resultant vacuum. The crisis of the policies pursued by the ruling classes in some countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, on which the capitalist way has been imposed, is simultaneously and largely also a crisis of the reformist-conciliatory schemes of development.

At the same time, there is no doubt that imperialism has made fresh efforts in this direction, so that the impossibility of applying the reformist and conciliatory approach to the whole of the formerly colonial and semi-colonial world does not doom it to failure in every country. Nor does it predetermine any automatic collapse of imperialist strategy with respect to the developing countries. Indeed, the unfeasibility of this approach itself depends on the struggle of the forces ranged against neo-colonialism on a world scale, and especially in the young national states.

It is not right either to ignore the fact that in some instances imperialism has managed to achieve some desirable changes in the formerly colonial countries, especially in the sphere of their foreign policy.

At the present phase, the conditions in which the alliance of the forces of world socialism, the international working class and the national liberation movement develops and functions have not remained immutable either.

It is true that the national liberation movement is impelled by powerful factors to consolidate its ties with the international working class and world socialism, but this tendency has to make headway in struggle and to overcome considerable obstacles. It is hardly right, therefore, as some have done, completely to identify the objective interconnection between socialism and the struggle of the forces of national liberation, on the one hand, and their alliance within the framework of the world revolutionary movement, on the other.

One should bear in mind that in purpose, motive forces, social make-up and ideology the national liberation movement has a different character, as compared with the working-class movement for socialism, despite the elements of the class struggle in its anti-imperialist content.

The national liberation movement involves potential or actual class antagonists. The anti-neocolonialist aspirations of

the bourgeois or pro-bourgeois groups in its ranks force them to seek support from the socialist world, but at the same time, they are moved by a class hostility to the cardinal aims of the world revolutionary process. This contradiction is also expressed in varying degree among the petty-bourgeois elements, which are so influential in the national liberation movement, although it does assume totally different forms. Besides, these elements are inclined to political vacillation, frequently over a wide range. These are the ills which even beset many forward-looking revolutionary elements of nonproletarian origin, for some of them have simply not yet become fully aware of the role which they already have to play in world revolutionary development.

To this should be added the anti-communist preconceptions of some, including progressive, elements, the nationalistic narrow-mindedness of some leaders in the developing countries and other ideological impediments.

Consequently, it would be wrong to assume that the smooth functioning of the alliance of world socialism and the forces of national liberation will be automatic, especially after the collapse of the colonial system. Actually, the importance of the struggle by the proletariat's vanguard—the socialist states, the Communist parties and the advanced forces of the national liberation movement—to strengthen the alliance at the present phase of the national revolutions tends to grow, owing to some of the specific features of the contemporary national liberation movement.

The new factors which have arisen are now determined by the fact that the inter-state relations through which this alliance is largely realised are, in virtue of their specific character, much more complicated, with the nationalistic preconceptions and other weaknesses of influential national liberation forces now also being expressed at the state level. But the most important thing is the dual role of most young states, something that must necessarily reduce their anti-imperialist potential and influence their attitude to world socialism.

The contradictory attitude on the part of some social forces of the national liberation movement to the socialist countries' anti-imperialist support is compounded by the class

differentiation in the developing countries and growing reactionary attitudes among influential circles of the local bourgeoisie.

The political and emotional tenor of the struggle against imperialism frequently becomes less explicit on the surface. At the same time, in the hope of obtaining credits and attracting private investments, bourgeois and bourgeois-and-landowner governments frequently make foreign-policy concessions to the imperialist powers, while petty-bourgeois regimes are inconsistent in pursuing their anti-imperialist line in the international arena.

In the sphere of economic relations there can also arise some ground for definite complications (when the leadership of the young states takes a narrowly nationalistic approach). The socialist countries have been consistently fulfilling Lenin's behests about rendering selfless assistance to oppressed and backward nations. At the same time, the international working class now and again has to face petty-bourgeois and egoistic or, one might say, consumer views of the socialist countries' internationalist duty. Indeed, even a section of the influential circles in the advanced national states now and again tend to take such an approach.

The well-justified view has been generally accepted by public opinion in the Third World that all the nations of the globe have an equal right to the fruits and achievements of modern civilisation, a conviction which feeds the anti-imperialist tendencies of national liberation movements. But with the prevalence of narrowly nationalistic attitudes and egocentrism, this may provide a basis for false purposes, ranging from the attempts to equate the socialist countries with the capitalist countries on the issue of overcoming the young national states' economic backwardness to the idea of establishing a group of developing countries confronting not only the imperialist powers but also the socialist community.

All these negative aspects can exert an influence that is all the more unfavourable in view of their being actively used by the imperialists. To undermine the alliance between the forces of socialism and national liberation or, at any rate, to prevent its further consolidation is a *strategic* aim of imperialist policy in fighting the world revolutionary process.

Finally, another point needs to be noted. The conflicts which arise between the young states on nationalistic and other grounds seriously hamper the strengthening of their anti-imperialist solidarity and limit their capabilities in using the advantages of the inter-state ties. In this context, let us note some of the specific features of development in this period of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement, the conflicts and friction between Malaysia and the Philippines, Kenya and Ethiopia, Ethiopia and Somali, between the Arab states, etc.

Consequently, the international conditions for the development of the national liberation revolutions at their new phase tend importantly to change, chiefly along the line of strengthening and building up favourable premises for the successful advance of the national liberation process and the enrichment of its social content.

The Soviet Union, the socialist states and the Communist parties have continued painstakingly to take account of the specific features of the national liberation movement as a part of the international class struggle. They have done this in order to establish correct relations among all the forces of world liberation process and to consolidate the alliance between the national liberation movement and socialism and to create optimal conditions for the movement's realising its revolutionary potentialities. The Communist parties' fundamental line was authoritatively reaffirmed at the 1969 International Meeting, which said: "*It is of paramount importance for the prospects of the anti-imperialist struggle to strengthen the alliance between the socialist system, the forces of the working-class movement and national liberation.*"¹ The practical policies pursued by the CPSU and the other Communist parties have shown the once oppressed peoples that their national interests, correctly understood, are identical with the socialist interests of the world's proletariat.

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 30.

SOME FACTORS STIMULATING THE ANTI-CAPITALIST TENDENCIES IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION PROCESS

The analysis of the specific features of present-day national liberation revolutions has involved consideration of some characteristics of their present phase in the domestic and international plane. It would now be right, in summing up, to enumerate the main political, socio-economic and ideological factors which engender or stimulate anti-capitalist tendencies in the process of national liberation and favour a possible swing of the process towards a socialist orientation. Of course, there is need to reckon with the fact that many of these factors—and their operation, in particular—are closely interconnected, interwoven and even blended together, so that it is hard to separate them in practice.

I have in mind the following groups of factors:

a) The character of the epoch as transitional from capitalism to socialism, and the high stage achieved in this transition, something that is expressed in the transformation of socialism into a world system and a motive force of contemporary history, and of the Soviet Union into a world power; and in the overall balance of class forces in the international arena.

Today, in the last three decades of the 20th century, the international situation in military, political, economic and ideological terms is as a whole more favourable for non-capitalist development of the countries escaping from colonial dependence than it was in the interwar and even in the postwar period.

The Soviet Union and world socialism not only provide a pillar for the independent and progressive development of the

former colonies and dependent countries, but also a powerful factor of *class* influence exerted by the working class, organised on state lines within the framework of the socialist community, on processes going forward in the national liberation zone. This is all the more important because the working people's power, once a national force, has become an international force capable of exerting a decisive influence on international politics.

Today it is no longer right to consider the question of the proletariat's hegemony in the historical development of the former colonies and semi-colonies, the question of its political influence on other, including intermediate, strata, exclusively in national terms, only from the standpoint of the interaction between internal class forces in each individual country. Today it is no longer right to draw the conclusion that the forces of scientific socialism do not exert any influence on political and social development in countries having no full-fledged proletariat, or where it is weak or has no party of its own. This kind of approach is especially unjustified where such countries have established close relations with the socialist states. Together with the international communist movement, the socialist system now has the functions of *proletarian vanguard on a world-wide scale*, including the countries delivered from imperialist oppression, the peasant and semi-proletarian masses, and all the intermediate strata in the former colonies and semi-colonies, thus helping to compensate—*only to some extent*, of course—the weakness and inadequate organisation and influence of the working class in some countries.

Indeed, it is this class role of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries that Lenin had in mind when he made this well-known statement of his: "We shall endeavour to render these nations, more backward and oppressed than we are, 'disinterested cultural assistance', to borrow the happy expression of the Polish Social-Democrats. In other words, we will help them pass to the use of machinery, to the lightening of labour, to democracy, to socialism."¹

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 67.

The class function of world socialism with respect to the former colonial and semi-colonial countries and the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist impact of its policy are effected along every line of support for the national liberation movement. This influence is focussed on the problem of the emergent countries' choosing the way of their socio-economic development.

The socialist countries' economic cooperation is aimed to help the developing countries build up an independent economy through the strengthening of a state sector, with an anti-capitalist orientation in the progressive countries, and one competing with private enterprise in many other newly independent countries, something that promotes the growth of the working class and its more rapid development as compared with private national capital. This cooperation also helps to reduce the influence of world capitalism on the newly independent countries' economic life, and to popularise the forms of economic development and methods of economic management used in the socialist countries.

The revolutionising example of the socialist states is the most important form of their class influence on the social processes in the national liberation zone, helping to attract the people in the former colonies and semi-colonies to socialism and fostering them in a spirit of hostility for capitalism. One source of special influence on public opinion in the former colonies and semi-colonies is the actual experience of non-capitalist development of the once oppressed peoples and their ways of overcoming backwardness and dependence along that path and liberation from exploitative relations.

Indeed, the introduction of socialist ideas into the national liberation movement is now primarily connected with the achievements and prestige of the Soviet Union and the socialist community and their policies.

The class approach of the socialist countries and the world communist movement is also expressed in the fact that they regard their cooperation with the revolutionary democratic forces oriented upon socialism and support of the countries led by these forces as their internationalist task. In his speech at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, L. I. Brezhnev said: "Communists regard assistance to

and support of these young countries as one of the most important tasks of their foreign policy."¹

The states taking the non-capitalist way are an important element in the USSR's economic, scientific and technical cooperation with the developing countries, accounting for a sizable part of Soviet credits and loans to the former colonies and semi-colonies.

Finally, another form in which the class functions of the socialist system with respect to the formerly oppressed peoples is expressed in the steady development and strengthening of fraternal internationalist ties with the African and Asian proletariat and its Communist parties. This aspect of the matter is all the more important in view of the fact that the progressive, revolutionary forces in the zone are especially in need of solidarity on the part of the international communist movement in view of the complexity of the conditions of struggle, their "youth" and various other reasons.

The working-class movement in the capitalist countries has an important part in giving support to the progressive forces of the young states, in spreading socialist ideas and in discrediting capitalism. The fact that powerful socialist forces operate in the capitalist world, and that capitalism is being subjected to such extensive criticism in its own centres is an important factor of anti-capitalist influence.

Let us recall that in his advice to the Communists of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan and the Mountaineer Republic "to practise more moderation and caution, and show more readiness to make concessions to the petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, and particularly the peasantry", Lenin pointed to the changing international situation, when the Communists "have no need to force a breach" because "in 1921, Europe and the world are not what they were in 1917 and 1918".² Pursuing the logic of Lenin's thinking and taking account of the fact that the contemporary world is not what it used to be some 40 or 50 years ago, that the newly independent countries taking the non-capitalist way, far from having to

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 152.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, pp. 317-18.

"force" a breach", can rely on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the following conclusion is well justified: the powerful international support and the class influence exerted by world socialism on the former colonies and semi-colonies are, alongside some internal conditions, an historical factor enabling these countries to take the path of social progress on the basis of broader class alliance and a new configuration of class forces. The possibilities are created for the emergence of diverse transitional forms of progressive development, under the leadership of revolutionary democrats in some countries.

It goes without saying that world socialism creates only *favourable* conditions, only *premises* for progressive development in the former colonies and semi-colonies. The prospects before the newly independent countries are decided in the course of struggle by the democratic forces against the reactionaries and imperialist scheming. While the socialist system has the decisive role in the overall revolutionary process, on the level of each country it is the national liberation forces that have the decisive role to play in transforming society.

b) The policy of imperialism, some of whose aspects promote the development of anti-capitalist tendencies. The neo-colonialist line, the resistance to national liberation and especially to its deepening, and the line of stimulating "dependent capitalism" are an important factor impelling some patriotic and nationalist circles in the former colonies and semi-colonies to take the socialist orientation. I have dealt with this at greater length in Part II of this work, but let me say at this point that the policy of imperialism in a number of countries has, in effect, given a substantial impetus to the switch by revolutionary democratic forces to a position of denial of capitalism. Here is what Che Guevara said in this context: "Our entry upon the path ultimately leading to communism is not some logical result of ideological development leading to a definite goal; socialist reality, and cruel imperialist reality, to an even greater extent, have forged and indicated for our people the way which we later consciously adopted."¹

¹ Ernesto Che Guevara, *Obras 1957—1967*, Tomo II, La Habana, 1970, pp. 574-75.

Add to this the fact that the imperialist attitude to capitalist development in the former colonies and semi-colonies is not always the same, because of the internal regularities of the capitalist mode of production and of the anti-neo-colonialist aspects of the development of national capitalism. As a result, in some respects imperialism appears itself to propel the national movement along the path of social progress.

Inter-imperialist rivalry in the national liberation zone, especially acute in the past few years, opens up before the progressive forces definite opportunities of using it in the interests of their countries' *anti-capitalist* development. Indeed, that is the sense in which use was made of Franco-American contradictions by Algeria, Guinea and Mali; of Franco-American and Anglo-French contradictions by Syria; of Anglo-American contradictions by Ghana, and so on.

Some opportunities of the same kind are also created by the contest between the two world systems in view of the imperialists' urge to prevent any approximation between the socialist countries and the leading national states, and any further shift by the latter to the left.

c) The present-day features of the national liberation movement and some of the specific features of the domestic situation in the formerly oppressed countries, the overall configuration of class forces and the conditions of capitalist development.

There is, above all, the internationalisation of the foundations of present-day national liberation revolutions, their orientation, as democratic revolutions of a new type, upon political liberation and economic emancipation from imperialism, their advance as a component part of the worldwide revolutionary process in alliance and interaction with world socialism, their inherently powerful national-democratic tendency, etc.

There is also the fact that, in contrast to its historical predecessors in the West, capitalism in these countries is confronted with a twofold task—the transformation of society on capitalist lines and completion of the process of national liberation—while developing, as I have said, in complicated conditions. The period of its rise falls within the period of the general crisis of the world capitalist formation. In addition, it

has to develop in countries which are still fettered with the bonds of many-sided dependence and wasting exploitation by imperialist capital, which has reached the state-monopoly stage and which has outstripped local capital in the former colonies and semi-colonies by a whole epoch, which has largely usurped the advantages of the scientific and technical revolution and which has, in consequence, a vast preponderance in strength. It has to develop in a society and an economy with a deep imprint of the survivals of the colonial past which rising capitalism is, as a rule, unable rapidly and radically to overcome, and with growing millions of small producers whose life and work is closely connected with these survivals.

It is the weakness of the national bourgeoisie which tends to complicate and frequently to undermine the capitalist prospects for the developing countries. This applies not only to its numerical strength but also to its economic and political positions. This applies equally to its socio-political weaknesses, its fear of revolutionary methods of achieving economic independence and eliminating pre-capitalist relations, its frequent urge to avoid active involvement in developing the productive forces, pusillanimity with respect to imperialist capital and a tendency to collaborate with it on unequal terms. In other words, this is a bourgeoisie which is, as a rule, hardly ready or able to act as the driving force of "American type" capitalist development.

The opportunities open to the bourgeoisie are also limited by contradictions in its own midst and also, and in particular, by its conflicts with the government authorities which tend to occur not only under progressive governments but also under bureaucratic, Bonapartist and petty-bourgeois regimes, all of which goes to create additional opportunities for the anti-capitalist forces.

Finally, in some countries alien-nation groups of the local bourgeoisie, constituting its major part, were subjected after the winning of independence to various restrictions and even confiscations that amounted, regardless of the intentions of the initiators of these measures, to blows of varying intensity dealt at the social foundations of capitalist development itself.

Of course, there is need once again to emphasise that when it

comes to *orientation* in the development of the former colonies and semi-colonies, bourgeois social potentialities cannot be reduced to those of the bourgeoisie "proper".

As a force leading to capitalist development, it can be variously substituted for at a definite phase by groups which are, strictly speaking, not yet bourgeois, but only pro-bourgeois in their main tendency. With respect to choice of way, these strata are capable of performing the class function which is proper to the bourgeoisie, because the uncontrolled and elemental development of the petty-commodity economy itself leads to capitalism, because capitalist development is a logical continuation of the social process which went forward under colonialist domination, so that there is need for *active* and *conscious* resistance to these elemental forces in order to turn the process in an anti-capitalist direction.

What also militates against capitalist development is the fact that local capitalism in the former colonies and semi-colonies has limited historical potentialities and a tendency to develop in a state of dependence on the international imperialist monopolies.

The key objective basis of anti-capitalist tendencies that is closely connected with this character of local capitalism is that the general democratic programme of the present phase of the national liberation revolution has, given resolute and consistent efforts to implement it, a tendency to carry the social process beyond the framework of capitalism. The very fact that the pressing democratic tasks of the phase *have yet to be fulfilled*, the vast difficulties and contradictions of capitalist development which have appeared in practice, the exceptionally heavy burden which it imposes on the working people, and the growing conviction among a sizable section of opinion in the former colonies and semi-colonies that these tasks *cannot* be fulfilled along capitalist lines, together with the search for effective ways of rapidly boosting the productive forces and bringing about national revival provide the fundamental premise for the emergence and consolidation of the anti-capitalist orientation. *Consequently, for influential patriotic and revolutionary democratic circles of opinion in the former colonies and semi-colonies and for its leading section as a whole, the question of socialist orientation becomes a matter of carrying through to the end*

the process of national liberation, a matter of their countries' independent national development.

Taking the Vietnamese and Cuban revolutions and the noncapitalist-oriented countries as examples, it is safe to say that social changes — both those which have a socialist orientation and which, besides, lead to the victory of socialism — start within the framework of national revolutions, and develop, frequently over a long period, chiefly as national liberation processes. That is due to the fact that in the former colonial and semi-colonial countries the question of national liberation is closely interwoven with the question of social progress and emancipation of the oppressed classes. For a long time, the class struggle and social progress in these countries are substantially, and at a definite phase, even predominantly, anti-imperialist and oriented upon national liberation. In this context, and from the standpoint of historical progress, not only within the world revolutionary but also within the national framework, the national liberation struggle in the developing countries operates as a form in which the people are carried forward towards socialist revolution. At the same time, broad sections of opinion in these countries regard anti-capitalist development and socialism as the way of national liberation.

This has an important effect on the configuration of class forces, making it possible to carry along the channels of the national liberation struggle towards anti-capitalist processes the masses of peasants, semi-proletarians and petty bourgeoisie, and also the sections of the proletariat which have not risen to a class awareness, and winning over to the socialist orientation the consistently patriotic circles of the intelligentsia.

Although class contradictions tend to sharpen within the newly liberated countries, the fact that imperialism with its ally, domestic reaction assuming an anti-national stand, is the chief enemy of the revolution is of vast importance in determining its social basis. The spread of anti-imperialist feelings and attitudes as a result of the struggle for the national liberation platform is, alongside the influence of the international working class, the most important catalyst in radicalising influential socio-political forces in the developing countries, inducing them to support the socialist orientation.

In general, the distinctive feature of the revolutionary process in the former colonies and semi-colonies even after the elimination of political dependence is that the switch of social development to anti-capitalist lines is based above all on democratic premises and motive forces, and that the social basis for giving this line of national liberation struggle greater depth is especially extensive. Therein lies the advantage of the progressive anti-capitalist tendency in the former colonies and dependent countries, but this also makes for the substantial complexity in realising it, for in a sense it tends to weaken the social basis of the anti-capitalist struggle, in consequence of the national factor being especially pronounced, and to make it more difficult for the politically active sections, to say nothing of broad masses of people, to understand its true class character.

The experience of the former colonies and semi-colonies provides fresh confirmation for the Marxist-Leninist proposition that the petty bourgeoisie is inclined to serious vacillations in the political struggle. At the same time, the petty-bourgeois masses are now more able than before to support deep-going social transformations. Alongside internal factors, this is determined by the fact that they have closer bonds with the international proletariat.

The peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the intermediate sections of the developing countries, by means of their political representatives, are now faced *in practice* with a choice of socio-political orientation, and have to make this choice not only within the national, but also within the world framework, and not only under the influence of domestic but also of international class factors.

The embryonic state of capitalist relations and the tenuousness of private-property traditions in many former colonies and semi-colonies, together with the experience acquired in the anti-imperialist struggle all go to make some peasant, petty-bourgeois and intermediate strata more receptive to the idea of non-capitalist development. In some respects, the lack of strong class stratification tends to multiply the political potentialities even of a very small vanguard in giving a lead to broad masses of people along the revolutionary path it has mapped out, although, of course, this also makes for the vast

difficulties in implementing the social choice that has been made.

It goes without saying that the presence of the proletariat is the most reliable and important social premise for anti-capitalist tendencies. Its numerical growth and enhancement of its social role at the new phase of the revolution multiplies the premises for the development and consolidation of these tendencies. The proletariat's ideological and political positions are also fortified owing to the influence of the world socialist system and the international working class. However, the present weakness of the proletariat in most newly free countries makes the anti-capitalist tendencies insufficiently stable.

Much importance attaches to the broad popularity of socialist slogans in the former colonies and semi-colonies. Although these attitudes are frequently not backed up by any class-conscious ideas of socialism, they tend substantially to undermine the moral and political basis for the development of capitalism in these countries.

Finally, a key subjective anti-capitalist factor in the newly liberated countries are the influential and organised socio-political forces which have deliberately come out against their countries' capitalist orientation, that is, above all, the Communist parties and Marxist groups which act as the vanguard in the struggle for socialism in these countries as they do everywhere else. There are also the revolutionary democratic parties and organisations. Sizable sections of the revolutionary democrats have already risen from an anti-capitalist protest and denial of capitalism and *feelings* in favour of socialism to political and economic *orientation* upon socialism.

Consequently, the following streams can be brought out in anti-capitalism, which is actively expressed in the national liberation movement at the present phase, with the proviso, however, that here and there these streams are combined in different proportions:

— an urge, which is fed by patriotic and nationalist feelings, to move along this way in tackling the tasks of national liberation and revival. In a sense, considering the spread of nationalism in the former colonies and semi-colonies, this is mainly a nationalistic trend;

— the petty-bourgeois fear of domination by big capital and its denial, a phenomenon which is also characteristic of past experience in early capitalist or pre-capitalist societies;

— more mature social aspirations, which are not confined to national liberation tasks and which are not entirely petty-bourgeois, for a just social system;

— the scientifically grounded and class-conscious stand of struggle for socialism, as represented by the Communist parties.

It goes without saying that some of these anti-capitalist factors are not all of a piece (for instance, the response to the policy of imperialism, the embryonic social differentiations, the predominantly democratic and national liberation basis for the development of the anti-capitalist tendencies, etc.). They also have, what might be called, pro-capitalist aspects, which I have considered here only in part.